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EQUITABLE DEFENSES
VILLIAM HAYWOOD MORELAND*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The term which is the subject of this paper is used with a number
of meanings which have varied with times and places and with different systems of procedure. It is therefore necessary to go into some detail
in order to separate and discuss the various meanings of the term.
We may assume that from a group of circumstances, or facts, which
have come into existence concerning Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff
selects such as suit his purpose, puts them forward in a law action, let
us say in a declaration in special assumpsit, and claims damages from
Defendant. Defendant in his turn may question the legal sufficiency of
Plaintiff's facts to warrant a court in giving him damages; or Defendant may deny the existence of these facts; or he may from the same
group of circumstances select other facts setting them up in a defensive
pleading, claiming that the existence of these additional facts repels
Plaintiff's claim to damages. In the first case, Defendant is said to demur. In the second case, he is said to traverse. In the third, he pleads
in confession and avoidance.
But there may be other facts which Defendant may not assert in this
law action but which he may set up in an equity suit in the same or in
another court, and these facts, if established, will prevent Plaintiff
from taking judgment in the law action, or will prevent the enforcement of a judgment if Plaintiff has taken one. These additional facts
set up in an independent equity proceeding make up what is called an
equitable defense. They cannot be used in the law action but may be
used in a suit in equity. This then is the first sense in which the term
equitable defense is used. It signifies a defense or set of facts which, if
asserted and proved in a proceeding in equity, will prevent judgment
from being rendered in an action at law, or will cause the enforcement
of a judgment, if rendered, to be prevented.'
*Dean and Bradford Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School
of Law.

2Pomeroy, Code Remedies (5 th ed. 1929) § 26.
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Of course from our set of circumstances the Plaintiff may in the
first instance select facts which will entitle him to go to equity for relief, but as we are concerned only with defenses we give no consideration to this. For purposes of explanation and analysis a tabulation is
inserted in the note.2 In each of these instances in the tabulation time
was when the defense could not be made in a law court. If we should
ask which of them may be made in a law court today, we should have
to put the question with reference to some particular time and place.
For these phases of the law of procedure are in a course of constant
change. These defenses, though equitable, have a way of "passing over"
to the law side and becoming true legal defenses, a process which has
been going on for a long time and on an irregular front. When defenses have so passed over the practice, as to many of them, is to continue to speak of them as equitable defenses; as to others, the transiAction on simple contract. Defense, fraud in procurement.
Action on simple contract. Defendant claims recoupment for fraud in procurement.
3. Action on bond. Defense, bond procured by fraudulent inducement.
4. Action on bond. Defendant wishes to counterclaim damages for fraud in procuring the bond.
5. Action on bond. Defense, payment without release under seal.
6. Action on penal bond. Defense, loss sustained by claimant is less than penalty
of bond.
7. Action to evict tenant for non-payment of rent. Defense, rent and interest
tendered after due day.
8. Action of ejectment. Defense, plaintiff has deed and legal title, but procured
it by fraudulent inducement.
9. Action of ejectment. Defense, defendant in possession has paid for land and
is entitled to deed.
io. Action on note for $i,5oo. Defense, that note was intended by the parties to
be made for $iooo, but by mistake was written for $i,5oo.
ii. Action of ejectment. Defendant had conveyed lots t and 2 to plaintiff by mistake, intending to convey only lot No. i. Defendant is in possession of lot No. 2 and
plaintiff brings ejectment to recover it.
12. Action of ejectment. Defense, unilateral mistake, which would undoubtedly
be a good defense in equity to a suit for a specific performance, but defendant wishes
to use it as a defense in this action.
13. Plaintiff sues defendant in general assumpsit to recover deposit on lot of
land. Defendant, resisting rescission of the contract, wishes specific performance of
the contract and a decree for the residue of the purchase price.
14. Plaintiff sues on contract. Defendant wishes specific performance of entirely
different contract.
15. Plaintiff sues defendant who pleads sealed release. Plaintiff replies release
21.

2.

gotten by fraud.
16. Same as No. 15, but replication sets up mistake, not fraud.
3

Hinton, Equitable Defenses under Modem Codes (1920) 18 Mich. L. Rev. 717,
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tion was made so long ago that we have forgotten that time ever was
when they could not be set up on the law side.
There are three methods, or courses, by which this passing over
may be effected:
First, by judicial legislation, which Professor Hinton calls the
natural course of "evolution." 4
Second, by special legislation directed to a particular defense.
Third, by general statutes permitting equitable defenses to be
set up in law actions.
Illustrating the first process, consider the defense of fraud in an
action on a simple contract; 5 much of the law of counterdaim; 6 the
law of conditions in contract; and personal defenses in suretyship. If
we were dealing with causes of action, rather than defenses, attention
should be called to the action of assumpsit. The law courts borrowed
this from equity and the tremendous consequences of this borrowing
may be appreciated by recalling Langdell's statement that when the
action of assumpsit was developed the modern law of contract came
into existence.' Returning to the first method, there is no reason to
think that this process of passing over has ceased. In recent years a
state court has decided that the defense of fraud to a sealed release
might be set up on the law side, although there was no statutory authority for it.s As time passed many states have permitted equitable defenses to sealed instruments, without the aid of legislation. Efforts have
been made in recent years to cause federal courts to extend this process
to the defense of fraud to sealed instruments, but without success.9
Illustrating the second process, that is special legislation directed to
particular defenses, instances are to be found in statutes permitting
equitable defense to an action on a penal bond which limits recoveryto injury actually sustained;10 permitting payment as a defense in ark
action upon a sealed instrument;" permitting defendant to defeat ark
'Hinton, Equitable Defenses under Modem Codes

(1920)

18 Mich. L. Rev. 717,

721.
'See Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347, 352, 7 S. Ct. 249, 252 (1886); Slim v.
Croucher, 1 De F. G. 9- J. 518, 527, 45 Eng. Rep. 462, 466 (186o).
&Loyd,The Development of Set-off (1916) 64 U. of Pa. L.Rev. 541.
Langdell, Summary of Contract (2d ed. 188o) 1o2; Barbour, History of Contract
in Early English Equity, 4 Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History (1914).
8
Nelson v. Chesapeake Const. Co., 159 Md. 20, 149 Ad. 442 (1930).
"Radio Corporation v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 296 U. S. 459, 56 S. Ct. 297 (1935).
204 & 5 Anne Ch. 16 § 13; Code of Virginia (Michie, 1936) § 6261.
u4 & 5 Anne Ch. 16 § 12; Robinson's Practice (1832) 208; Code of Virginia
(Michie, 1936) § 6141.
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action of ejectment by proving payment of rent after due day;12 permitting equitable defenses to be set up in actions of ejectment.13
With respect to the third process, that is to say general statutes permitting equitable defenses to be set up in law actions, we must go into
a somewhat detailed discussion, beginning with the history of English
procedure on the subject.
II. EqurrABLE DEFENSES

IN ENGLISH COURTS

A. Before the ProceduralReform Statutes
With the opening of the Nineteenth Century, the great century of
legal reform, the most powerful attacks on the procedure of that day
-were concentrated on two points-the separate procedures in law and
.equity, and the division of proceedings at law into forms of action. The
-well known Hilary Rules of 183414 gave us the first general attempt to
reform English procedure, but those rules did not include the abolition
of forms of action or provide for equitable defenses in actions at law.
In fact, their main consequence was to narrow the general issue and
multiply the number of special pleas, and thereby to usher in the most
technical era in the whole history of common law pleading. The reforms effected by the Hilary Rules are, therefore, not highly regarded.' 5
B. Under the Common Law Procedure Acts
The movement for procedural reform continued and increased in
intensity. Learned commissions continued their work of exposing the
deficiencies of the prevailing systems and of proposing reforms. This
resulted in the great Common Law Procedure Acts of 1852,16 185417
and 186618 and the statutes of the same period which reformed chancery procedure. 19 These statutes to reform chancery procedure are now
32Code of Virginia (Michie, 1936) § 5532.
"Code of Virginia (Michie, 1936) §§ 5471, 5472; 18 Am. Jur., Ejectment § 6o.
-' Rules adopted pursuant to 3, 4 William IV Ch. 42, § 1; 9 Holdsworth, History
of English Law (1926) 324 et seq.
159 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1926) 327 et seq.; Holdsworth, The New
Rules of Pleading of the Hilary Term (1923) 1 Camb. L. J. 261, 273.

1615 & 16 Victoria Ch. 76.
X17 & 18 Victoria Ch. 125.
1823 & 24 Victoria Ch. 126.
2115 & 16 Victoria Ch. 8o, 86, 87; 21 & 22 Victoria Ch. 27; 25 & 26 Victoria Ch. 42.
A Century of Law Reform (19o) 191: "The year 1852 may fairly be taken as an

epoch in the history of the Old Courts of Chancery. After 1852 it was a reformed
Court."
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forgotten, but a reading of them will show that they were far from
futile. The form of the bill in equity was shortened and simplified. No
longer was it subject to the criticism that it consisted of a thrice told
tale, told the last time in an aggrieved tone.20A bill drawn in accordance
with these statutes will bear very favorable comparison with a complaint drawn under our most modem procedure. No longer was discovery asked for in the bill. This not only simplified the bill, but
greatly simplified the answer, a reform not attained in the federal
courts of this country until 1912, and not attained in some of the states
to this day.
Under the statutes, allegations in the bill not denied in the answer
were taken as true. Here again we have an improvement in equity procedure which was not attained in our federal system until 1912, nor
yet in some of the states, where we still have the cumbersome exception
to the answer for not responding to the allegations of the bill. Trials
in open court rather than on deposition were provided for, another reform which came much later in equity courts in this country and is not
found in all such courts today. But as our interest is in equitable defenses made on the law side rather than in equity procedure, we pursue
that subject no further.
On the common law side, while the great Common Law Procedure
Acts of 1852 and 1854 made many very beneficial changes, no effort was
made to effect a general merger of law and equity. Powers not theretofore exercised by the equity court were in a few instances given to that
tribunal. 2' On the law side certain powers not before exercised by law
courts, but only in the equity court were given to law courts. But of
these reforms we are principally concerned with one; that is the power
of setting up equitable defenses and equitable replications on the law
side. This is found in the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 in Sections 83 and 85 which read in order:
"It shall be lawful for the Defendant or Plaintiff in replevin
in any Cause in any of the Superior Courts in which, if Judgment
were obtained, he would be entitled to Relief against such Judgment on equitable Grounds, to plead the Facts which entitle him
to such Relief by way of Defence, and the said Courts are hereby
empowered to receive such Defence by way of plea; provided
that such Plea shall begin with the Words 'For Defence on equitable Grounds,' or Words to the like Effect."
-'See A Century of Law Reform (1901) 181 et seq. Bowen, The Victorian Period,
reprinted in i Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (1907) 516, 524.
"Cairns' Act, 21 & 22 Victoria Ch. 27, enabling equity courts to award damages

and to assess them by a jury.
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"The Plaintiff may reply, in answer to any Plea of the Defendant, Facts which avoid such Plea upon equitable Grounds;
provided that such Replication shall begin with the Words 'for
Replication on equitable Grounds,' or Words to the like Effect."
While these provisions were soon swept aside by the surge of reform which produced the present day English procedure, they were
construed and applied during their brief lifetime in a series of cases
decided by the ablest judges in England. And while these cases are of
no importance in England today they are not without value in this
country, for the English statute furnished the model for the statutes in
many of the American states, and the decisions interpreting it have
been influential in determining the construction to be put upon the
American acts.
It is generally said that the usefulness of the English statute was
greatly impaired by the conservative construction put on it by the
English judges, but this criticism is not entirely justified. The statute
was based upon a report of the Commission on Procedural Reform
which urged far more drastic and radical reforms than Parliament was
willing to put into effect. The commission recommended that courts
of law should have power to give in a summary way the same relief
against actions pending therein as might be obtained by resorting to
chancery; but the act indicates that no such broad powers were given 22
To determine the justice of the accusations of conservatism, we may
refer briefly to some of the English decisions construing the statute. The
courts held that a defense set up as an equitable defense became at once
a legal defense, but the only relief which could be given was such as
fell within the limits of the orthodox common law judgment. The
courts were not empowered to give relief in equitable forms, such as
specific performance, cancellation or reformation. The defense was required to be one which, if set up in an equity court, would be a complete answer to the plaintiff's claim and could be made effective by a
perpetual injunction without condition. Thus, in an action to recover
rent reserved by lease, the defendant in Mines Royal Societies v.
Magnay23 set up as an equitable defense that plaintiff had agreed to
accept a surrender of the lease and to accept the assignment of leases
which defendant had made to sub-tenants, whereupon the plaintiff's
lease to the defefidant was to be cancelled; that the defendant had then
tendered a surrender of the lease, and the assignment of subleases,
'Day, The Common Law Procedure Acts (4th ed. 1872) 8.
231o Exch. 489, 156 Eng. Rep. 531 (1854).
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which the plaintiff had refused to accept. This was held not a good
equitable defense, for the court had no power to cancel or supervise
the execution of the document of surrender.
Again, in Wodehouse v. Farebrother24 in an action against surety,
a defense set up by special plea, that the principal debtor had put documents in the plaintiff's hands and that the defendant would pay the
plaintiff's claim provided the documents were delivered to him, was
held bad because it would not sustain a judgment for the defendant
that the plaintiff recover nothing by his writ. Lord Campbell, C. J. in
an excellent opinion pointed out that jurisdiction to claim relief on
terms might probably be very conveniently administered by a law
court, but no such jurisdiction had been given, and the law court had
no power to enter judgment that plaintiff take nothing by his writ if
defendant shall pay what is due the plaintiff. An equitable plea is good
only when final justice may be done by the court of law in the pending
action. Many other cases might be cited to the same effect.2 5
There are, however, three cases which should be noted, in which
the method of applying the statute should be of interest particularly in
code states in this country, when the question is raised as to what issue
shall be tried by jury.
In Steele v. Haddock 26 in trover for goods, the defendant pleaded
that plaintiff was owner of certain chemical works and stock in trade;
that defendant by written contract had purchased both works and
stock; that by mistake the contract failed to include the stock; that defendant had this in his possession and had paid for it; and that the
plaintiff was unjustly availing himself of a mere mistake in wording
the contract. This was held to be a good equitable defense, Baron Parke
saying that if plaintiff had taken judgment without such plea equity
would have enjoined the judgment without any condition. The case
comes squarely within the terms of the Common Law Procedure Act,
as the defendant was entitled in equity to relief absolute and unconditional; there was no need to reform the agreement which was wholly
executed with nothing remaining to be done by either party.
In Borrowman v. Rossell 27 an action was brought for not accepting
2'5 El. & BI. 277, 119 Eng. Rep. 485 (1855).
2Perez v. Oleaga, ii Exch. 5o6, 156 Eng. Rep. 930 (1856); Teede & Bishop v.
Johnson, 11 Exch. 84o, 156 Eng. Rep. 1073 (1856); Scott v. Littledale, 8 El. & B1. 815,
12o Eng. Rep. 304 (1858); Wakeley v. Froggatt, 2 H. & C. 669, 159 Eng. Rep. 277
(1863).
Oio Exch. 643, 156 Eng. Rep. 597 (1855).
2716 C. B. (N. S.) 58, 143 Eng. Rep. 1045 (1864).
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petroleum tendered according to contract. The defense interposed by
way of equitable plea was that by mistake the contract did not set out
the real agreement, which was to deliver petroleum according to sample, and that the petroleum tendered by the plaintiff was not up to
sample. This was held to be a good equitable plea because a judgment
for the defendant would settle the whole controversy. The plaintiff, by
failing to deliver the petroleum in accordance with the real terms of
the contract, had put it out of his power to recover damages.
In the third case, Vorley v. Barrett,28 B was bound with another as
an accommodation party to raise money by bill of exchange for D. B
was forced to pay the bill and thereupon sued A, his co-surety, for contribution. To A's plea of a contract between B and the principal debtor
by which B released his claim and thereby released the plaintiff, it was
replied on equitable grounds that only by mistake did the contract set
out in the plea cover the transaction on which B and A were sureties.
On a demurrer to the replication on the ground that it did not set up
an equitable defense to the plea, Creswell, J., remarking that "the only
question is whether the mistake can be rectified at law," held that the
plaintiff should be permitted to show that the agreement was not intended to include this bill. And Crowder, J., said that "the necessity
for reforming an agreement in equity exists only in case of agreements
that are executory and not where they are fully performed and executed."
These cases seem to refute the claim that the construction put upon
the statute by the English courts was always too conservative. In fact,
the method used in these cases will bear more than favorable comparison with that followed in the New York case of Susquehanna S. S. Co.
v. Anderson & Co. 29 There the question was whether the defense of
mistake in expression set upin the answer was a defense which should
be tried by the court or by jury. The court's judgment, holding that
the defense should be tried by the jury, was and continues to be subjected to severe criticism.30
C. Under the JudicatureActs
The reforms put into effect by the Common Law Procedure Acts,
which prevailed for twenty years, worked very well;31 but the tide of
ssi C. B. (N. S.) 225, 14o Eng. Rep. 94 (1856).
29239 N. Y. 285, 146 N. E. 381 (1925).
Clark, Code Pleading (1928) Ch. 2; Clark, Trial of Actions under the Code
(1926)

11 Corn. L. Q. 482.

8$Sutton, Personal Actions at Common Law (1929) 200.
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reform was running so strong that Parliament adopted the Judicature
Acts of 187332 and 1875. 33 These two acts34 and the rules of court formulated pursuant to the acts 35 provided for England a most advanced
form of procedure which remains to this day-a model for all such reforms, and was admittedly drawn on generously by the draftsmen of
the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Briefly, the new system adopted in England swept away all forms
of action; permitted the defendant to set up all the defenses which he
might have, regardless of their nature; and blotted out completely all
distinction between legal and equitable forms of relief, in the sense
that any court could give any form of relief that the case might merit.
There are still English books on equity, and English judges and
writers constantly refer to equitable rights and remedies; but we hear
no more about distinguishing between legal defenses and equitable defenses. These terms are no longer important in English practice. But
no one can deny, certainly not our practical-minded English brethren,
that there are wide differences in the methods of handling law and
equity controversies. Therefore, for convenience only, certain controversies are brought in the Chancery Division and not in the King's
Bench.3 6 This, however, is a mere matter of procedure and in an action
brought in the King's Bench, what we should call an equitable defense,
may be developed and handled and need not be transferred to the
37
Chancery Division.
We naturally inquire what becomes of the jury trial; and the answer is that with no written constitution to obstruct, it was possible to
make an analytical and practical division of causes of action and to
provide, without regard to historical antecedents, that certain of them
might be tried by jury but that the others were to be tried by the court.
Thus, the problem that has caused so much trouble in this country,
that of ascertaining the proper issues for trial by jury, gives no trouble
whatever in England. 38
"36 & 37 Victoria Ch. 66.
'38 & 39 Victoria Ch. 77"These acts were consolidated in the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925.
'Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883-1935 (1935). The reference work generally
used is The Annual Practice (White Book) published each year and fully annotated.
-15 & 16 Geo. 5 Ch. 49 § 56.
2Odgers, Pleading and Practice (12 ed. 1939) 182, 215.
"The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933, 23 & 24
Geo. 5 Ch. 36 § 6; The Annual Practice (1939) order 36, Rules 1-7; Jackson, The Incidence of Jury Trial During the Past Century (1937) 1 Mod. L. Rev. 132, 138.
See the Administration of Justice (Emergency Provisions) Act 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6
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Recapitulating rapidly what has been said about the English procedure, we found that the Common Law Procedure Acts provided for
certain equitable defenses, but did not in any way empower common
law courts to grant relief on equitable terms. They effected no conjunction between law and equity, because the proceeding remained an
action at law wherein only the orthodox common law judgment could
be rendered. Nor did the interjection of these defenses into a law action
raise any problem of jury trial. W"Te found also that the present day
English procedure, which dates from 1873, blots out all distinction between legal and equitable relief; permits the common law courts to
issue injunctions, grant specific performance, order reformation, cancel
documents and enter declaratory judgments.3 9 And finally, we found
that the problem of jury trial is handled practically and realistically by
assigning to that method of trial the controversies to which it seems
best adapted.
III. EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN THE STATE COURTS

A.

General Survey

Returning to our own country, we find that until nearly the end of
the first third of the Nineteenth Century the subject of equitable defenses in the second sense, that is defenses formerly available only in
equity but which by general legislation had become available in law
actions, had received no attention. In some cases, equitable defenses
had passed over to the law side either by the process of gradual evolution or by statute directed to the particular defense. Most of the cases
in which it was attempted to assert equitable defenses in law actions
arose on sealed instruments when efforts were made to set up total or
partial failure of consideration, fraud in inducement, recoupment, and
mistake; but in no case was the attempt successful.4 0 And of course no
41
equitable defenses to ejectment were permitted.
The first general enactment permitting such defenses to be set up
in law actions was adopted in Virginia in 183 iA.4 Thus it antedated the
English legislation already referred to by more than twenty years, and
Ch. 78 § 8 (1), which provides that no jury trial shall be had in the High Court or
any inferior court unless the judge permits it. The same rule applies to Scotland.
2 & 3 Geo. 6 Oh. 79 § 4 (1), (3)"The Future of the Common Law (1937) 66, 69.
' 0See Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defences (1895) 9 Harv. L. Rev. 494l 9 C. J. 1084.
"Va. Acts of Assembly (1931) Ch. XI § 62.
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the reforms of code pleading in our own country by seventeen years. In
brief, it permitted the defendant to set up in any contract action any
matter which would entitle him to relief in equity against the obligation of the contract. But as this statute was not the model to which later
American legislation was adapted, and as the Virginia cases will be the
subject of a separate discussion, they will not be further referred to in
this paper.
• At the time the Common Law Procedure Acts were adopted, code
pleading had already begun its career in the States, whereas the English reform did not proceed so far until the Judicature Acts of 1873 and
4
x875, 3 New York adopted code pleading in 1848. Other states rapidly
fell in line until, when Judge (formerly Dean) Charles E. Clark's book
on Code Pleading44 was published in 1928, the same or similar forms
of procedure had been adopted by thirty jurisdictions. 45 The last state
to adopt the code was New Mexico which did so in 1897. From that
date until 1934 no other state abandoned its procedure and adopted
the code, although during the interval a number of states reformed
their procedure. Then in January, 1934, Illinois, long a stronghold of
common law pleading, went over bag and baggage to the code side. 46
Today, the fifteen states which do not have code pleading include all
of the New England states except Connecticut, and Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Virginia
and West Virginia. The basis of their procedure is the common law,
although of course, subject to many divergent modifications.
B. In Common Law States
Many of the common law states listed above, following the passage
of the English Act of 1854, adopted statutes seemingly on the English
model which permitted equitable defenses in law actions. Of course we
cannot deal with each statute separately, nor can we develop the subject exhaustively in any one state. However, these enactments, which
generally are brief,47 have several aspects in common which should be
noted.
Supra, notes 32, 33.
"Clark, Code Pleading (1928).
"Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 19. See also, Throckmorton, Cases on Code Pleading (2d ed. 1938) 2.
16llinois Civil Practice Act, in force Jan. 1, 1934, Ill.
Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd,
13

1935)7 Ch. 'io.
4 Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws Ann. (Skillman, 1927) § 4301: "The defendant in any
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We observe, first, that these statutes do not authorize common law
courts to give relief in equitable forms. No power is given specifically
to cancel, to grant specific performance, to direct an accounting, or to
enjoin. Second, the applicability of the statute depends upon the question whether the relief requested can be fitted into the orthodox form
of the common law judgment. Third, trial by jury is not a determinative factor. The defense, if turned in, becomes a legal defense and is
cause in any of the courts of this State in which, if judgment were obtained, he would
be entitled to relief against such judgment on equitable grounds, may plead by plea
or subsequent pleading the facts which entitle him to such relief by way of defense.
"Such plea shall begin with the words, 'For defense on equitable grounds,' or
words to the like effect .. "
§ 4302: "The plaintiff may reply, rejoin, etc., in answer to any plea, etc., of the
defendant, facts which would avoid such plea, etc., upon equitable grounds .. "
Maine Rev. Stat. (193o) Ch. 96 § 18: "Any defendant may plead in defense to any
action at law in the superior court, any matter which would be ground for relief in
equity, and shall receive such relief as he would be entitled to receive in equity,
against the claims of the plaintiff; such matter of defense shall be pleaded in the
form of a brief statement under the general issue. And, by counter brief statement,
any plaintiff may plead any matter which would be ground for relief in equity
against any defense set up by any defendant in an action at law in said court, and
shall receive such relief as he would be entitled to receive in equity against such
claim of the defendant."
Md. Code of Pub. Gen. laws Ann. (Bagby, 1924) Art. 75, § 91: "It shall be lawful for the defendant in any action at law (including plaintiff in replevin where
avowry or cognizance is made) in which, if judgment were obtained, he would be
entitled to relief against such judgment on equitable grounds, to plead the facts
which entitle him to such relief by way of defense, and the court in which said action
is pending is hereby empowered to receive such defense by way of plea; provided,
that such plea shall begin with the words: 'For defense on equitable grounds,' or
words to that effect."
§ 92: "The plaintiff or the defendant in replevin may demur to such plea for
want of equity, or reply thereto facts which avoid such plea upon equitable grounds;
provided, that such replication shall begin with the words: 'For replication on
equitable grounds,' or words to the like effect."
Mass. Gen. Laws (Tercentenary ed., 1932) Ch. 231,§ 31: "The defendant may allege in defence any facts which would entitle him in equity to be absolutely and unconditionally relieved against the plaintiff's claim or cause of action, or against a
judgment recovered by the plaintiff in such action.
§ 35: "The plaintiff may, in reply to a defence alleged by the defendant, allege
any facts which would in equity avoid such a defence or which would entitle the
plaintiff to be absolutely and unconditionally relieved in equity against such defence."
R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) Title XXXIII, Ch. 333, § 22: "In any action at laws pending the superior court the plaintiff or the defendant may plead any equitable defence, upon which an unconditional judgment can be rendered for the party pleading the same: Provided, that if such case he brought from a district court, such
equitable plea shall be filed as other pleas are required to be filed in cases brought.
from district courts."

19401

EQUITABLE DEFENSES

tried to the jury with the other issues in the case. The procedure outlined remains in effect in many of the states.
Of the cases arising under the statutes, Hawkins v. Baker s from
Rhode Island is one of the most interesting and may be stated. The defendant was indebted to the plaintiff on two notes, one in the amount
of $3,5oo, and one for $6,ooo. He was in weak financial condition and
full payment could not have been enforced against him. He entered
into this compromise agreement with the plaintiff: to pay the $3,500
note in full; then to incorporate his business, when he would permit
the plaintiff to subscribe to stock in the corporation to the amount of
$3,500, whereupon the plaintiff would cancel the $6,ooo note. The corporation was chartered and apparently the plaintiff became a subscriber to the amount of $3,5oo. Afterwards, when both notes came due
they were renewed in one note. Then the plaintiff in violation of agreement brought an action of assumpsit on the note. For his defense the
defendant pleaded the foregoing facts as an equitable defense which he
drew in the form of a bill in equity. The prayers were that the plaintiff
be required to answer the plea, but without oath; that he be enjoined
from taking judgment upon the note sued on; that upon the payment
to the plaintiff of the sum of $3,500, plaintiff be required to release
and discharge the defendant from liability upon the note and be required to cancel the same; and for such other relief as to equity and
justice may appertain. A demurrer to this plea was sustained.
The opinion is a valuable one because it indicates that the Rhode
Island statute is based upon the English statute of 1854, and because it
contains a review of the leading English cases construing that act.
Moreover, the opinion points out that though the Rhode Island statute
is more liberal in its terms than the English act, it provides for defensive
relief only, not for affirmative relief; that if defendant wished more
than that he must resort to a suit in equity. The court very emphatically laid down the principle that forms of affirmative equitable relief,
which we assume to include cancellation, injunction and specific performance, cannot be had in a law action, saying:
'We do not see that any advantage would accrue to the defendant if obliged to resort to a suit in equity, by having it tried
within the bowels of an action at law .... ,,49
To this day no one else has attempted to set up an equitable defense at
law in the form of a bill in equity.
'914 R. I. 139 (1883). See also, Baker v. Hawkins, 14 R. I. 359 (1884).
"14 R. I. at 142.
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The Rhode Island case may be compared with Herrington v.
Jones,50 a recent West Virginia case. Plaintiff had bought land from
the defendant, giving a note for the purchase price, had taken a conveyance of the land and had given a deed of trust to secure the purchase price. Claiming to have been defrauded in the sale, plaintiff filed
his bill on the equity side asking for cancellation of the note and restoration to his original position. The court denied relief on the ground
that plaintiff could defend an action at law on the note and could get
full relief on the law side by reconveying the property to the defendant.
The value of the case is seriously impaired by the fact that the court
went on to examine the bill and found that the plaintiff had not made
out a case of fraud; also, by reason of its failure to cite any authority
for its holding. It is remarkable that the case received no attention from
reviewers. It would seem that it presented a clear case for equitable relief both on the ground of a bill of peace and also on the ground that
relief was necessary to reinvest the defendant with the tide to the land
and to cancel the deed of trust. No other case has been found in which
it was intimated that a law court could do either of these things. If the
court means that a judgment for the defendant, in an action brought
on the note, would completely dispose of the controversy, it is clearly
wrong. If it means that under common law forms complete relief could
be given, it is a remarkably liberal decision. It is hardly likely that the
court meant so much.
We may consider a few other cases involving equitable defenses in
law actions. A defense which would require an accounting cannot be
set up at law.51 Equitable defenses in ejectment furnish separate studies
in themselves and in fact are frequently the subject of special legislation. But if the plaintiff intending to convey lots number 1 and number 2 to the defendant, by fraud, or by mistake, conveys only lot number i but puts the defendant in possession of both lots, and afterwards brings ejectment for lot number 2, defendant has no defense except in equity, as relief would require a conveyance to him by the
plaintiff.52
Of course if a defense may be made as a legal defense it is never permissible to set it up as an equitable defense. Therefore, fraud as a de5117 W. Va. 188, 184 S. E. 853 (1936).
6'American Bldg. Loan & Inv. Co. v. Booth, 17 R. I. 736, 24 At. 779 (1892).
"Wright v. Lott, 155 Miss. 185, 124 So. 270 (1929); Sea Food Co. v. Meyer, 144,
Miss. 96, iog So. 674 (1926), 36 Yale L. J. 281.
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fense to a simple contract 3 and forgery 54 are both legal defenses. Generally, as a result of judicial legislation or pursuant to one of these
statutes fraudulent inducement as a defense, either to a sealed or unsealed instrument, may be made as a legal defense; but mistake gives
more trouble. With respect to the types of mistake which prevent the
formation of a contract, that is where the parties said the same thing
but mean different things, or where unknown to the parties the subject
of their negotiation was nonexistent, both of these being true legal defenses have always been available at law.
Other types of mistake, if they can be set up in a law action, are
available only as equitable defenses, and are not available then unless
complete relief can be given by an unconditional common law judgment. Even when to prove mistake would defeat completely the plaintiff's action, relief has been denied on the law side. This is due to the
narrow attitude taken by some courts that the judgment itself is not
full protection to the plaintiff or the defendant as the case may be, but
must be followed by physical conduct such as reformation or cancellation. 5 Again, in a real action to recover land conveyed by a mortgage
to the plaintiff, defendant-mortgagor cannot set up as an equitable defense that the land was included in the mortgage by mistake. 56 The
question whether a defense, that a deed was intended as a mortgage,
may be set up as an equitable defense has been held both ways. 57 On
the other hand, one sued on a contract may set up as an equitable defense that he signed as principal by mistake; that it was really understood by the parties that he was liable as a surety only.58 In an action
on a covenant against incumbrances in a deed, the declaration alleging
non-payment of taxes as a violation of the covenant, the defendant was
not permitted to set up as an equitable defense that the covenant did
not express the real agreement of the parties. The court thought that
it would be necessary to reform the deed and, therefore, resort must
be had to a court of equity.59
OMcGrath v. Peterson, 127 Md. 412, 96 At. 551 (1916).
r'Harper v. Farmers' 9- Merchants' Bank, 155 Md. 693, 142 Ad. 59o (1928).
OConner v. Groh, go Md. 674, 45 Ad. 1024 (igoo); Nydegger v. Gitt, 125 Md. 572,
94 At. 157 (1915).
"Martin v. Smith, 102 Maine 27, 65 At. 257 (igo6).
uThat it may be: Walls v. Endel, 2o Fla. 86 (1883). That it may not be: Sherman
v. Galbraith, 141 Mass. 44o, 5 N. E. 858 (1886).
r6Eustis Mfg. Co. v. Saco Brick Co., 198 Mass. 212, 84 N. E. 449 (19o8). The relief
in this case was in equity but the courts said the defense might have been set up in
a law action as an equitable defense.
OBond v. Hewitt, 111 Fla. 18o, 149 So. 6o6 (1933). But see Bostwick v. Antuono,
116 F a. 208, 156 So. 435 (1934).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

It is not easy to state all the circumstances to which these statutes
apply but the statutes themselves are generally similar. Whether relief
desired can be given depends upon whether it may be included within
the orthodox form of a common law judgment. Forms of relief which
are commonly called equitable are not available. Much depends upon
whether the court applying the statute thinks it necessary to give relief
in equitable form. Will a judgment for one party or the other settle
the matter? Or must there be supervised equitable affirmative relief?
There is great room here for an extension of the usefulness of these
statutes by a modification of the more conservative view on this subject. Of course, if it is necessary actually to reform or cancel, the common law judgment is not enough and the defense cannot be set up in a
law action.
The fact that the process of passing over from equity to law by judicial legislation is still going on is pointedly brought out in Nelson v.
Chesapeake Construction Co.,60 a Maryland case. The statute of that
state provides for equitable pleas but not for equitable replications. In
a contract action there was a plea of release under seal. The defense to
this release was fraud in procurement. Can this defense be made at law
when the statute does not specifically provide for an equitable replication? The court said Yes, that there was no practical advantage in separate proceedings when the issue can be settled at law without complicating the law action. Clearly the defense of fraud to a sealed release
had passed over to the law side because the court said that it had; and
we must agree that the court adopted a very sensible attittgde.
To sum up, an equitable defense can be made if the court thinks
that the controversy may be disposed of by procedure which falls
within the scope of the common law judgment. If it may be, the defendant is generally held to have his option to set it up in the law action as an equitable defense, or to go into equity. This latter privilege
is probably being somewhat restricted in recent years. The right to jury
trial plays no part in deciding the question and is never mentioned in
the cases. This procedure pertains probably in most of the so-called
common law states, and defenses, equitable in nature, that is to say
which are of equitable derivation but which can be set-up in law actions, are spoken of in those states as equitable defenses.
60159 Md. 20, 149 Ad. 442 (930).
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C. In Code States

The outstanding characteristics of code pleading are these: the common law forms of actions are abolished; one form of action is adopted
for all controversies, whether legal or equitable; and the defendant is
required to set up all the defenses he has to what is contained in the
complaint, whether those defenses have formerly been denominated
legal or equitable. Thus, it is apparent that the term equitable defense
has an entirely different meaning from that which has heretofore been
discussed. In a code state the question is not whether the defense may
be set up-in fact, it is required to be set up if it is ever to be availed of.
The question is, how shall it be tried, by the court or by the jury.
In all of the states, code and common law, the state constitution
preserves the jury trial, beyond the power of infringement by the legislature. Therefore, someone must determine, as to which of the issues
developed, the parties, or either of them, may demand a jury. This is a
matter to be decided by the courts in each state; and as the constitutional right to trial by jury depends upon the local interpretation of
that term, we must not expect to find uniformity of decision. In a few
states all issues, legal and equitable, are triable by jury. 61 In many of
the states, in order to assist the courts, statutes have been adopted which
attempt to specify the issues or defenses which are to be so tried.62 Althought uniformity is lacking, this is not to intimate that there is any
doubt as to the law in any particular state. It is probably true that the
practice in each state has by this time been worked out so that the
practitioner has no trouble on this point. But if we ask for a theoretical rule by which we can determine whether or not the issue is one for
the jury, it is believed that no one rule has been generally accepted.
Judge Clark, who is perhaps our best-known commentator on this
subject, puts forward the rule that we should look merely at the particular issue under consideration. If that issue was one triable by the
jury before the adoption of the code, it remains triable by jury under
the code; whereas, if it was tried by the court before the code, it remains triable only to the court. 63 But Professor McCaskill, also an able
commentator on the subject, is unwilling to accept this rule. He contends that a complaint is not simply a set of facts with a demand for
(1928) 21, n. 66.
2Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 55. See Crawford, Equitable Defenses to Actions at
Law under the Missouri Code (1939) 25 Wash. U. L. Q. 6o.
0
See Clark, Code Pleading (x928) 52-67, 427-431; Clark, Trial of Actions under
the Code (1926) 11 Corn. L. Q. 482.

OClark, Code Pleading
0
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relief, but that from the very beginning of the controversy it is subject
to a directional control either toward what was formerly a suit in equity
or an action at law. And, therefore, in his opinion we cannot solve our
64
problem by simply looking at the issues which may be evolved.
The writer is inclined to think that neither rule holds for all cases,
and that there is no one rule which can be relied upon. The reason for
this view is that any classification we may attempt to make, of issues
formerly tried by jury and formerly tried by the court, is of necessity
overlapping, a result due principally to the fact that equity courts administer legal relief. And the writer also believes that no statute can
be drafted which will furnish a rule which may be followed in every
case, at least not within the pattern of the constitutional right to jury
trial. The matter is one for each jurisdiction to work out for itself.
What we may easily lose sight of is the fact that defenses formerly
equitable drift over and become legal defenses, and there is no reason
to presume that this process came to an end when the codes of procedure were adopted.
The fairly recent case in New York, the Susquehanna case, 65 which
was the subject of a great deal of comment, may be noted here. In an
action on a contract to recover money, the defense set up in the answer
was mistake in expression. That is to say, if the contract had been
written as the parties intended to write it, there would have been no
liability to the plaintiff on the facts set out in the complaint. The question presented was, how was this issue to be tried? Judge Cardozo, in a
very careful opinion, held for a unanimous court, that under the statute
this was an action brought to recover money and the issue should be
tried by jury.
Clearly the court did not apply Judge Clark's rule, for the issue of
mistake is generally held to be an equitable issue tried only to the
court. 6 6 Professor McCaskill finds the decision objectionable, but for
a different reason. He thinks the issue of mistake is so complicated that
it is unwise to permit a jury to try it.67
The writer believes that the decision was right for the reason given
by the English courts three quarters of. a century ago in applying the
equitable defense statute of 1854, that is, that a judgment for the de"McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 614.
O'Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. Anderson & Co., 239 N. Y. 285, 146 N. E. 381 (1925).
6OSee Judge Clark's vigorous criticism of the case in, Trial of Actions under the
Code (1926) 11 Corn. L. Q. 482.
"McCaskill, Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure (194o) 88 Univ. of Pa.
L. Rev. 315, 328.
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fendant on this issue would decide the entire case. The English cases
reaching this conclusion have already been referred to. To state it another way, this type of defense, though based on mistake, formerly an
equitable question, has drifted over and become a legal defense and
this happened many years after the code of procedure was adopted. 6s
It might be added that the Virginia court under the statute permitting
equitable defenses in law actions reached this same conclusion many
years ago. 69
There is no occasion to go into any detailed discussion of the right
to trial by jury in code states. Our point is that in code states the question is not whether a defense may be set up in the controversy, but how
it is to be tried. Thus perhaps, when we speak of a defense as equitable
in such a state, we mean that it is tried to the court. On the other hand,
in a common law jurisdiction when we speak of a defense as equitable,
we may mean that it must be made the subject of a bill in equity, or we
may mean that although equitable, it has by operation of a statute been
turned into a legal defense which may be set up in a law action.
IV.

EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

A. General Survey
When we come to discuss equitable defenses in the federal judicial
system, we shall probably find ourselves in the most interesting field
that we have to cover, for at different periods during the life of the
system the term has been used with different meanings, and with the
adoption of the new Federal Rules, an entirely new problem is posed
for the courts. As is well known, from their inception in 1789 to the
taking effect of the Rules of Civil Procedure in September, 1938, proceedings at law and in equity were kept rigidly separate. In fact there
was much authority for the position that this separation was required
by the Constitution. But of course, the adoption of the new Rules by
70
the Supreme Court put this idea to rest.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, separate equity courts were set
up, to be held, however, by the same judge who conducted proceedings
at law-the familiar American arrangement. Congress endeavored to re"See Note (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 630.
nBrown v. Rice, 76 Va. 629 (1882).
'OPound, Law and Equity in the Federal Courts-Abolishing the Distinction and
Other Reforms (1911) 73 Cent. L. J. 204.
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strain equity from infringing upon the jurisdiction of the law courts,71
and adopted for equity courts the orthodox procedure in effect in England in 1789, as practiced generally in this country and as set out in
2
Daniell's Chancery Practice.7
In 1822, in 1840, and again in 1912, elaborate systems of rules were adopted for the regulation of equity practice. 73 These were ultimately superseded by the new Federal Rules.
The reforms in equity procedure in the states had no effect whatever upon the federal practice, whether in states which still retained
common law procedure, or in states which had adopted code pleading.
The state reforms were simply ignored. Of course, if new equitable
rights were created by state law, such rights were enforced in federal
equity courts. 74 This rigid ignoring of the state practice becomes more
emphatic upon a consideration of the federal procedure in law actions.
From the first, on the law side some sort of conformity with state
practice was followed, 75 but as it was the state practice in existence at
the time the state was admitted to the Union, the practice in the federal court as time went on diverged more and more from the practice
in the state court. This, together with the rules which the federal courts
were permitted to adopt for the regulation of law practice, brought
about what was considered an unbearable divergence between the two
practices. The Conformity Act of 187276 was adopted in order to bring
about the desired uniformity. But as that statute prescribed uniformity
only "as near as may be," and as acts of Congress were from time to
time adopted pertaining, of course, only to the federal practice, the resulting divergence between law practice in state and that in federal
courts became again the target for constant criticism and -complaint.77
Beginning with the middle of the Nineteenth Century, when the
common law states began to adopt statutes permitting equitable defenses, and when other states-more than two-thirds of the total number-began to enact codes of procedure, the federal courts on the law
"Judicial Code § 267, 36 Stat. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 384 (1928): "Suits in
equity shall not be sustained in any court of the United States in any case where a
plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law."
2See Hopkins, New Federal Equity Rules (6th ed. 1929) § 5.
:3Hopkins, New Federal Equity Rules (6th ed. 1929) § 9 et seq.
7'Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, N. C., 281 U. S. 121, 50 S. Ct. 270 (1930).
Rose, Code of Federal Procedure (1907) § 1o aa.
"TRose, Code of Federal Procedure (igo7) § 9oo a.
"'Judicial Code § 914, Rev. Stat. § 914, 28 U. S. C. A. § 724 (1928).
-See Dobie, Frictional Points of Conflict between State and Federal Courts (1933)
19 Va. L. Rev. 485, 487; Note, Conformity by Federal Courts to State Procedure
(1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 602; Note, Ineffectiveness of the Conformity Act (1927) 36
Yale L. J. 853.
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side consistently refused to apply the statutes allowing equitable defenses to be set up in law actions. And, of course, they were not permitted to follow the state codes combining law and equity in one form
of proceeding wherein all defenses might be set up.
To remedy this situation, in 1915 Congress adopted the statute
which permitted equitable defenses in law actions in federal courts.
This statute will be treated later at some length. Thus matters remained
until law and equity were merged in one form of proceeding in the
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States
which were adopted in 1938. Thus, in these new Rules, equity procedure, which had pursued one line of development, came to an end
at the same time as did procedure at law, which had followed another
line of development.
As this discussion is limited to defenses in law actions, there is no
more to be said about true equity procedure. Turning our attention to
the law side, we have three periods to consider in connection with the
use of equitable defenses in federal courts:
First, the period from the establishment of the federal courts
under the Constitution in 1789 to the adoption of the equitable defenses statute in 1915.
Second, the period from 1915 to the adoption of the new Rules
in 1938.
Third, the period from 1938 to the present.
B. Before the Equitable Defenses Act of x915
Taking up the first period, equitable defenses in the first sense, that
is defenses which could not be made in the law court, but which required the assistance of a bill in equity, were very well established. The
great transitions from equity to law had long since been made. The
process of passing over from the equity to the law side by gradual evolution, while still possible, is very little in evidence during this period.
The existence of the equity court and the rigid insistence upon the
separation of law and equity are perhaps the explanation for this.
While Congress might have shifted specific equitable defenses to legal
defenses, there is almost no evidence of its having done thisj8 Perhaps
this era in the history of the federal courts represents their most conservative period since it involved the exclusion of equitable defenses
and the necessity for the use of the bill in equity.
78See Judicial Code § 785, Rev. Stat. § 961.
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A brief examination of the general trend of the federal cases is in
order. That the defense of fraud may be made in an action at law on
an unsealed contract was well established 79 and it follows that in such
case equity will not interfere with a law action.8 0 The doubt on this
point which appears in a few cases 8' and which was certainly unjusti82
fied was removed by the decision in Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co.
in the Supreme Court of the United States. As the Supreme Court has
noted that anciently equity took jurisdiction in any case of fraud, 83 we
have acknowledgment of the fact that this defense to an unsealed contract has been taken over by the law courts and is no longer an equitable defense. But whether the contract is sealed or unsealed, the plaintiff must sue on it as it is written. He cannot recover on the contract as
it should have been written,8 4 but must first go into equity for reformation. Nor is mistake in expression available as a defense,8 5 nor mistake
induced by fraud;8 6 but mistake as to existence of the subject matter
and mistake which prevents a meeting of minds are clearly legal defenses.
In an action in a federal court on a sealed contract in a state in
which the common law incidents of the seal still pertain, nothing is better settled than that the defense of fraudulent inducement cannot be
made on the law side.87 But the courts have always insisted upon the
distinction between fraud in the inducement and fraud in the execu88
tion, holding that the latter is a legal defense.
The action of ejectment furnishes many illustrations of the principle we are discussing. Equitable defenses cannot be made in such action, though they are provided for by the state practice; 9 -and a claim
7
Hogg v. Maxwell, 218 Fed. 356 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); American Sign Co. v. ElectroLens Sign Co., 211 Fed. 196 (N. D. Cal. 1913).
OWDuPont v. Gardiner, 238 Fed. 755 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
Standard Portland Cement Co. v. Evans, 205 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913). Heck v.
Mo. Pac. Ry., 147 Fed. 775 (C. C. D. Colo. 19o6); Levi v. Mathews, 145 Fed. 152
(C. C. A. 4th, 19o6).
8'293 U. S. 379, 55 S. Ct. 310 (1935) 83Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347, 7 S. Ct. 249 (1886).
8SLumber Underwriters of New York v. Rife, 237 U. S. 6o5 , 35 S. Ct. 717 (1915).
8Allegheny Valley Brick Co. v. C. W. Raymond Co., 219 Fed. 477 (C. C. A. 2d,

1914).
'6Hogg v. Maxwell, 218 Fed. 356 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
87Hartshorn v. Day, 19 Howard 211 (U. S. 1856); George v. Tate, 1o2 U. S. 564
(188o). And see Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defences (1895) 9 Harv. L.
Rev. 49.
"George v. Tate, 1o2 U. S. 564 (188o); De Lamar v. Herderley, 167 Fed. 530
(C. C. A. 2d, 19o9). There are innumerable cases which make this distinction.
wRobinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheaton 212 (U. S. 1818); Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138"
U.S. 146, 11 S. Ct. 276 (1891).
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for betterments cannot be set up, though permitted by the practice in
the state.9 0 Estoppel, which in some states cannot be set up as a legal
defense, may be so set up in the federal courts.9 1 It follows, of course,
that a defense which cannot be set up in ejectment, will support a bill
in equity.9 2 But if the plaintiff in an action of ejectment permits an
equitable defense to be set up and tried, he cannot later object.9 3 A
defense which requires some form of equitable relief, such as partnership accounting, of course is barred from a law action.94 And a federal
court would not entertain a bill to subject property to the payment of
a simple contract debt before judgment is taken. 95
In an action in a federal court to enforce a judgment rendered in
another state, equitable defenses to the judgment cannot be set up on
the law side, though this would be permitted in the state law court. In
this case, the court said that such apractice would overthrow the whole
scheme for the administration of equity in the courts of the United
States.9 6 Nor will the federal practice permit a legal cause of action to
be presented on the equity side, when the remedy at law is adequate.
The courts are alert to detect attempts to violate this rule. In Buzard v.
Houston97 in which the plaintiff, who had been induced by fraud to
enter into a contract, filed a bill to cancel, the Supreme Court held that
he was excluded from equity, saying that damages in an action of deceit would give him full relief. Two justices dissented, however, on the
ground that his bill called for cancellation which he could not get
at law.
The cases show that trespass to land may not be turned into a proceeding in equity by calling for an accounting.9 Nor can an action on
a note in which the defense of fraud is available be taken into equity
by calling for cancellation.99 Illegality is a legal defense. 100 In an action
against a surety on a penal bond conditioned on performance of the
O'Doe ex dem. Myrick v. Roe, 31 Fed. 97 (C. C. S. D. Ga., 1887).
"Kirk v. Hamilton, 1o2 U. S. 68 (188o); Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578
(x879); Cheatham v. Edgefield Mfg. Co., 131 Fed. ii8 (C. C. D. S. C. 1904).
W-Davis v. Davis, 72 Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1896).
13Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. v. Strickley, i6 Fed. 852 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902).
Burnes v. Scott, 117 U. S. 582, 6 S. Ct. 865 (1886).
O:Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 1o6, 11 S. Ct. 712 (i8gi). But see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.,
Rule 18 (b).
DMontejo v. Owen, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9722 at 61o (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1877).
", 19 U. S. 347, 7 S. Ct. 249 (1886).
OUnited States v. Bitter Root Co., 200 U. S. 451, 26 S. Ct. 318 (19o6).
,'Boggs v. Wann, 58 Fed. 681 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1893).
2Maine Northwestern Dev. Co. v. Northern Commercial Co., 313 Fed. io3 (W. D.

Wash. 1914).
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terms of a lease, a defense that the lease secured was a different one
from that described in the plaintiff's pleading is a legal defense, which
is sustained by evidence which merely identifies the instrument secured
by the bond.' 01
The same principles are applied to replications to the defense of
fraud pleaded. If the release is not under seal, 102 or if under the state
law, the seal has been stripped of its common law characteristics, it is
treated as an unsealed release. 103 But where the seal retains its common law effect, a replication of fraudulent inducement to a sealed release cannot be set up on the law side.104 And, of course, such fraud
gives the plaintiff his opportunity to go into equity to enjoin the law
action and have the whole case decided on the equity side. Or, if a
judgment is taken at law, he may go into equity for an injunction
against its enforcement. 05 In one case a plaintiff so situated was permitted to sue at law for deceit in securing the release by fraud, but this
seems very questionable 06 We note here, as well as in the case of pleas,
that fraud in execution is available at law' 07 and if the point in controversy is merely the construction of the release, there is no need of
°
the assistance of equity. s
Thus, we see that in the federal system there was during this long
period no blending or merging of causes of action in law and equity
and no blending or merging of legal and equitable defenses. The latter must be availed of in a suit in equity; and no distinction was drawn
between defenses which were equitable only as a matter of legal history, and those which required some form of equitable relief, such as
cancellation, specific performance, or accounting. And very little evidence is seen of any passing over of defenses from the equity to the
law side.10 9
"Henderson v. Mound Coal Co., 181 Fed. 487 (C. C. A. 3d, 1g1o ) .
102Wagner v. National Life Ins. Co., go Fed. 395 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898). The very
excellent opinion of Taft, Circuit Judge, in this case is very often cited.
1
°3Southem Ry. v. Clark, 233 Fed. goo (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).
lMKosztelnik v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 91 Fed. 606 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1898); Vandervelden v. Chicago N. W. Ry., 61 Fed. 54 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1894); Shampeau v. Conn.
River Lumber Co., 42 Fed. 760 (C. C. D. Vt. 189o).
a1nWhitcomb v. Shultz, 223 Fed. 268 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915); Lumley v. Wabash R. R.,
76 Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896).
1
06Blalock v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 75 Fed. 43 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1896).
"°Union Pacific Ry. v. Harris, 158 U. S. 326, 15 S. Ct. 843 (1895); Union Pacific
Ry. v. Whitney, 198 Fed. 784 (C. C. A. 8th, igi2).
108Texas Pacific Ry. v. Dashiell, 198 U. S. 521, 25 S. Ct. 737 (1905).
""See Abbott, Fraud as a Defence at Law in the Federal Courts (1915) 15 Col.
L. Rev. 489.
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C. Under the Equitable Defenses Act of 1915
The first period closed with the adoption by Congress in 1915 of
the statute permitting equitable defenses in law actions in federal
courts, being Section 274b of the Judicial Code, which reads as follows:
"In all actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed
by answer, plea, or replication without the necessity of filing a
bill on the equity side of the court. The defendant shall have
the same rights in such case as if he had filed a bill embodying
the defense of [or?] seeking the relief prayed for in such answer or
plea. Equitable relief respecting the subject matter of the suit
may thus be obtained by answer or plea. In case affirmative relief is prayed in such answer or plea, the plaintiff shall file a
replication. Review of the judgment or decree entered in such
case shall be regulated by rule of court. Whether such review
be sought by writ of error or by appeal the appellate court shall
have full power to render such judgment upon the records as law
and justice shall require." 110
While the new Rules render the act inapplicable, many interesting
cases were decided under it during its twenty-three years of life; interesting not only in their day, but perhaps of controlling influence on the
practice under the new Rules. The procedure authorized by Section
27 4 b is entirely different from anything we have already considered.
The scope of the respective defenses as legal or equitable is not altered
in any way. Defenses which formerly could be set up at law are still required to be so set up"' and no warrant is found for carrying equitable
defenses over on the law side for trial by jury. Provision is made for
equitable replications as well as equitable pleas. A procedure heretofore unknown is presented-a forked or hybrid proceeding, part law
and part equity. Thus it differs from a common law proceeding in
which equitable defenses are permitted, but at once become legal defenses. And it differs as well from the familiar code pleading in which
there is only one form of action and all defenses whether legal or equitable are set up in the answer, the only problem remaining being the
method of trial.
Now, we find presented for the first time the importance and necessity of distinguishing between law and equity with respect to the
jury trial secured by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of
nOJudicial Code § 274 b, 38 Stat. 956 (1915), 28 U. S. C. A. § 398 (1928). See Adams,

Federal Practice as to Equitable Defenses in Actions at Law
467; Note

(1923)

36 Harv. L. Rev. 474.

2uEnelow v. N. Y.Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379, 55 S. Ct. 31o

(1924)

(1935).

1o

A. B. A. J.
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the United States. While there are many cases arising under Section
27 4 b in the lower federal courts, it is remarkable that so few cases
reached the Supreme Court. The first case to reach that Court was
Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank," 2 decided in 1922, in which
Taft, C. J. in an admirable opinion sketched the new procedural framework. This case arose in a code state. The plaintiff sued a bank to recover money which had been deposited there to be held in accordance
with the terms of a contract with third persons, plaintiff claiming that
by reason of the third persons' defaults it was entitled to reclaim its deposit. Thus the proceeding was what we should call in a common law
jurisdiction an action of assumpsit for money had and received. The
bank set up in its answer that it was a disinterested stakeholder; that
third persons were interested in the deposit and were claiming it of the
bank. It prayed that the claimants be made parties, and this was done.
The court heard and decided the case without a jury. The principal
question was whether the Supreme Court was reviewing a decision at
law or in equity.
Summarizing from the opinion, the proceeding began as a law action
to recover money, but the answer which was authorized by Section
27 4 b changed it at once to one in equity. Section 274 b permits affirmative equitable defenses. It is an important step toward a consolidation
of law and equity. While the practice is not the code procedure of the
states, it is a long step in that direction. When an equitable defense is
pleaded, an equitable issue is raised which is tried by the court as a
chancellor. The answer in this case caused the proceeding to become
in effect a bill in equity. The court properly tried the issue and the review was that of an equity case. However, the new procedure does not
change the nature of any defense. What was legal before the act remains legal and what was equitable before the act remains equitable.
When an equitable defense is interposed to a suit at law, the equitable
issue should be first disposed of as in a court of equity and then if an
issue at law remains, it is triable to a jury. The equitable defense makes
the issue equitable, but the trial by jury is preserved exactly as it was
at common law.
The second authoritative case, Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co.,

3

was decided twelve years later. This was an action upon a life insurance
policy which contained the usual two year incontestable clause. The
defense was that the policy had been obtained by false statements as to
"226o U. S. 235, 43 S. Ct. 118 (1922).
2' 293 U. S. 379, 55 S. Ct. 31o (1935).
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the health of the insured. This was set up as a defense under Section
-7 4 b in a plea in which the defendant prayed that this "equitable issue" be tried by the court as a chancellor. The Court, speaking through
Hughes, C. J., asked: "Was the defense set up by the defendant of
such a nature that defendant was entitled to have it heard and determined in equity and to enjoin the proceedings at law pending that
determination?" The Court replying in the negative, said that "The
test under Section 274b is whether the defendant could have maintained a bill in equity on the same averments." 114 Its position was that
there was no intent to change or enlarge the substantive jurisdiction of
equity. Hence it followed that this procedure cannot aid the defendant,
when a bill for the same relief would not lie because the defense is one
which is completely available in the action at law. The Court pointed
out the distinction between this case and a case in which a bill to cancel would lie. But here an action had already been brought. The defense was available in the law action. No bill in equity would have
lain to cancel. The issue would be tried by jury. Respondent was in no
better position under Section 274 b and, therefore, the case was reversed and remanded to be proceeded with as an action at law.
Another case to the same effect was decided by the Supreme Court
on the same day.'1 5 And in the later case of American Life Ins. Co. v.
Stewart" 6 the Court pointed out the conditions under which a bill to
cancel could be maintained. These cases then give us our outline of the
proper application and effect of Section 274 b, but it may be profitable
to refer to some of the cases in the lower federal courts.
These cases show that orthodox legal defenses remain such. This,
of course, is the principle of the Enelow case 117 just discussed. Fraud in
execution l s and fraud as a defense to an unsealed contract cannot be
turned into equitable defenses simply by setting them up under Section 274 b and praying for "cancellation and surrender," as such relief

is not necessary."19 Many cases of this type are actions on insurance
policies to which the defense of fraud is made. It is clear that unless
there are grounds which would sustain a bill to cancel, only a legal
"4293

U. S. at 383, 55 S. Ct. at 312.

-1Adamos v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 386, 55 S. Ct.

1630 U. S. 203, 57 S. Ct. 377 (1937).
" 7Enelow v. N. Y.Life Ins. Co., 293
5

315

(1935).

U. S. 379, 55 S. Ct. 310 (1935).
'" Pringle v. Storrow, 9 F, (2d) 465 (D. C. Mass. 1925); Skinkle v. Lehigh Valley
R. R., 3 F. Supp. 326 (E. D. N. Y. 1933).
"'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Banion, 86 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. ioth, 1936);
Franco-Wyoming Oil Co. v. Ehrlich, 83 F. (2d) 271 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1936); Neff v. Ashmead, 36 F. (2d) 771 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
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issue is raised. Such grounds are set out in many cases. 12 0 If a bill to
cancel is first filed and later a law action is brought to recover on the
policy, the future of the proceeding in equity depends on a number of
factors, including the court's discretion. In the Stewart case,' 21 decided
by the Supreme Court in 1937, this subject was gone into thoroughly.
In any insurance case, if the policy must be treated as a sealed instrument, fraud in the inducement cannot be made as a law defense,
and, therefore, the equity suit will continue. 122 But if the defense can
be made under Section 274 b, or can be made as a law defense, the suit
may be dismissed or at least suspended during the proceedings in the
law action.123 In a law action in a state court on an insurance policy in
which the defense was material misrepresentation, the defendant afterwards filed a bill in a federal district coirt to cancel the policy and such
relief was given; 12 4 but it is clear that if the defendant had been sued
in the federal court he must have made his defense either as a law issue
or as an equitable issue under Section 274 b.
The cases show that if the plaintiff wishes to sue on the contract not
as it is written, but as it was intended to be written, he must proceed in
equity for reformation.' 25 Section 27 4 b does not affect such a case.
Estoppel is a legal defense. 126 Fraud in the procurement is an equitable
defense to an action on an instrument under seal, where the seal retains its historical incidents. And despite the growing dissatisfaction
with this position, it seems clearly the law in federal courts.127 But if
mAmerican Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U. S. 203, 57 S. Ct. 377 (1937); Mass.
Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Anderegg, 83 F. (2d) 622 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1936), cert. denied, 299
U. S. 567, 57 S. Ct. 30 (1936); Hesselberg v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 75 F. (2d) 490 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1935).
'nAmerican Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U. S. 203, 57 S. Ct. 377 (1937). See also
Brown v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1933).
'2Mass. Protective Ass'n v. Kittles, 2 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1924).
mNichols v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 84 F. (2d) 896 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936), cert.
denied, 299 U. S. 598, 57 S. Ct. 19o (1936).
'2 4Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 70 F. (2d) 863 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1934).
cert. denied, 293 U. S. 582, 55 S. Ct. 95 (1934). Compare Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I.
Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 59 S. Ct. 657 (1939).
225Fiorito v. Clyde Equipment Co., 2 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925); Prudential
Casualty Co. v. Miller, 257 Fed. 418 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919).
'2'American Cyanamid Co. v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co., 62 F. (2d) loia
(p. C. A. 5 th, 1933); Thorpe v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 40 F. (2d) 269 (D. C. Mass.
1930).
'--Pringle v. Storrow, 9 F. (2d) 464 (D. C. Mass. 1925); Penn. R. R. v. Hammond.
7 F. (2d) 1o (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
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the issue of fraud is tried to the jury without objection, the point is
8
waived.12
To a replication to a release under seal the same rules pertain.
Fraud in execution is a legal defense, while fraud in procurement is
equitable. Since this view leads to close and sometimes questionable
distinctions between fraud in execution and in inducement, 29 it is
easy to understand the dissatisfaction with the requirement. For more
than a century in Virginia, and in England since 1854, and in most of
the states, whether under the code or at common law, such a defense
of fraud in inducement may be made at law. But the federal courts are
painfully conservative on. this subject. Of course if the release is not
under seal fraud raises only a law issue.' 30 An able district judge has
held in a very careful opinion that fraud in inducement as a defense
to a sealed instrument presents a law issue. 131 But the most instructive
opinion rejecting the generally accepted federal view is found in a case
decided in the First Circuit in which all the cases are reviewed and the
conclusion reached that fraud may be availed of as a legal defense to
a sealed instrument.132 But unfortunately, when the case went to the
Supreme Court it held that the real defense to the release was illegality,
which undoubtedly was a legal defense. The Court said it was enough
for present purposes that no equitable issues were presented, and,
therefore, it would be premature to review "not a little" of what had
been said in the court below. 133 This seems to be where the matter
stands at this time.
It is clear that affirmative equitable relief may be asked for under
Section 274 b. The statute itself provides for it. The relief in the Liberty Oil case' 34 was essentially affirmative. Reformation for mistake may
be given to which, of course, laches may be replied. 35 Also, cancellaInthitney Co. v. Johnson, 14 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Manchester St. Ry.
v. Barrett, 265 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. ist, 1920).
mPenn. R. Co. v. Hammond, 7 F. (2d) 1oo (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
'Patterson v. C. N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 5 F. Supp. 595 (D. C. Ky. 1932). As to replication that release was executed while plaintiff was insane see Farmers Bank & Trust
Co. v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, 13 F. Supp. 548 (D. C. Ky. 1936).
'nWenzel & Henoch Const. Co. v. Metropolitan Water District, 18 F. Supp. 616

(S.D.Ca. 1937).

2'Raytheon Mfg. Co. v. Radio Corporation of America, 76 F. (2d) 943 (C. C. A.

1st, 1935).
''Radio Corp. v. Raytheon Co., 296 U. S. 459, 56 S. Ct. 297 (1935).
,Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 260 U. S. 235, 43 S. Ct. 118 (1922).
1MTokio Marine &Fire Insurance Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 91
F. (2d) 964 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Donnelly v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 59 F. (2d) 46
(C. C. A.

5 th, 1932).
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tion and release of cloud on title to land may be decreed. 3 6 Here also,
we find that while the defense of mutual mistake to a release presents
an equitable issue, if the parties permit it to be tried to the jury they
cannot afterwards object. 3 7 And if a party fails to set up his equitable
defenses under 2 7 4 b, he cannot afterwards file a bill for equitable relief. 3 8
Enough has been given to show how the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts applied the equitable defenses statute of 1915. The
review of the cases brings us to 1938 and the new Rules.
D. Under the New Rules
When the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States went into effect on September 16, 1938, procedure in
federal courts passed into its third stage. Recapitulating very rapidly,
before that event there was a sharp division between proceedings in
law and in equity. In proceedings at law under the uncertain guidance
of the Conformity Act, and with equitable issues capable of being
raised at law under Section 27 4 b, there was no doubt as to what controversies belonged on the law side. There was likewise no doubt as to
which controversies belonged in equity where the procedure was regulated in the main by the rules of 1912. With respect to transferring
cases, Section 274a of the Judicial Code provided for shifting to the
law side cases which were improperly brought in equity. The converse
proceeding, shifting to the equity side cases originally brought in law
but which had become equitable by reason of pleas under Section 27 4 b,
was explained by Taft, C. J., in the Liberty Oil case. Equity Rule 23
provided for trying in equity, law questions which arose in equity
suits. It is noteworthy that the English rule,139 from which this rule
was taken, does not contemplate a jury trial, whereas Rule 23 seems to
do so;140 but no doubt the rule is superseded today.
With the adoption of the new Rules an entirely different picture is
presented. No addition to the tremendous bibliography on the subject
mKneberg v. H. L. Green Co., Inc., 89 F. (2d) oo (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
'-"Atlantic Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Metz, 7o F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), cert,
denied, 293 U. S. 562, 55 S. Ct. 73 (1934).

3Lyons v. Empire Fuel Co., 262 Fed. 465 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920). Compare Cardozo,
J., in Schuykill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 25o N. Y. 304, 165 N. E.
456 (1929). See (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 964.
'*Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883-1935 (1935) 1o8, Order XXXVI, rule 3.
14
1Hopkins, New Federal Equity Rules (6th ed. 1929) 169.
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will be made here. 141 Attention will be confined to equitable defenses,
a subject which under the new Rules, as in code pleading, generally
becomes for all practical purposes a study of what controversies or issues are entitled to trial by jury. The Rules cover all suits of a civil
nature in the District Courts of the United States, whether cognizable
in law or in equity. 1 42 There is to be one form of action known as the
143

"civil action."'

The complaint shall contain a demand for judgment
for the relief to which the plaintiff deems himself entitled. 44 Forms of
denials145 in the answer are provided for, as are affirmative defenses, 40
and the answer may contain as many defenses as the defendant has,
whether on legal or equitable grounds, or both.1 47 A party waives all
defenses which he does not present.' 48 And this is true also of counterclaims which arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. 149
In the Enabling Act, which authorized the Supreme Court of the
United States to prescribe the Rules, Congress was careful to provide:
"That in such union of rules the right of trial by jury as at
common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the
Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."1 50
Obedient to this direction, Rule 38(a) prescribes that the right of
trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to
the parties inviolate; and the advisory committee which prepared the
Rules assures us that it had neither the power nor the desire to deprive
any party of his jury trial. It should be noted, however, that Rule 3 8(b)
makes it easy for a party to lose his jury trial by inadvertence.
Now the problem is, what controversies or issues are triable by jury
under the new procedure? The very few reported cases which have interpreted Rule 38 will be referred to later. Other decisions will be
awaited with keenest interest by all who are interested in civil procedure. To the able discussions of the problem which have already ap""Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States (Government Printing Office, t939) So9 et seq.
"Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule .
"Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 2.
"'Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 8 (a).
" Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 8 (b).
"Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 8 (c).
"'Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 8 (e) (2).
""Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 12 (h). "'Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 13 (a).
2048 Stat. 1064 (1934). 28 U. S. C. A. § 723C (1939).
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peared, 151 the writer can hope to add but little. The problem now presented to the federal courts is the same which courts in code pleading
states have already faced. It is interesting and important to practitioners
and, therefore, has been the subject of lively discussion in the institutes
held under the auspices of the American Bar Association for the purpose of explaining the Rules. Until certainty is brought by decisions of
the Supreme Court, or by legislation, it is only to be expected that the
interpretations of the Rules will vary with the training and experience
of the judges who interpret them. Judges from code states are certain
to view the Rules in a somewhat different light from that in which
judges from common law jurisdictions will view them. The leading
voice in the exposition of the Rules has been that of Judge Clark. His
attitude seems to be the same as that which he expressed in his well
known book on code pleading.152 It is, that we need not concern our-

selves about how the case is to be tried until we first have discovered
what the issues are, and then each issue will be tried under the Rules
53
just as it would have been tried before they were adopted.
The writer ventures the opinion, however, that this view is not
realistic and offers an over-simple generalization. Lawyers think not
only of issues but of controversies, and it is impossible not to think of
controversies as being legal or equitable. If lawyers and judges continue to do this in England, and we have seen that they do, then surely
they will continue to do so in our own country. It is submitted that in
a complaint drawn under these Rules the draftsman will know from
the start whether he intends to ask for legal or equitable relief, and
will draw his complaint accordingly. In England courts freely speak of
relief in equity, meaning, of course, on the principles of equity, and the
Chancery Division of the Supreme Court has assigned to it a variety of
controversies because they are equitable in nature. The same controversies arise here and the complaint likewise will be equitable in nature. If an insurance company sues to cancel a policy because of fraud,
the insured still being alive, it will ask for the equitable relief of cancellation. There is no need to wait until the issues are made up to de- James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure (1936) 45 Yale
L. J. 1022; McCaskill, One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure, for the Federal
Courts (1935) 3o Ill. L. Rev. 415; McCaskill, Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure (194o) 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 315; Pike and Fischer, Pleadings and Jury Rights
in the New Federal Procedure (194o) 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 645.
'-'Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 52, 431.
2"The
subject was discussed at the Institutes held by the American Bar Association. Reports of Institute at Cleveland, 200, 274, 275; Washington, 115; New York,
310.
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termine whether the trial shall be by jury or by the court.154 Again, if
an insured person has released his claim and wishes to set aside the release, because procured by fraud, and to recover on the original claim,
he sues for cancellation of the release and for recovery on the policy.
The proceeding is in equity and he knows it.1 5 So when -a vendee sues
to recover from the vendor money paid on a contract by which the
vendor is to convey land to the plaintiff, the vendee basing his action
on his rescission of the contract because of the vendee's default, he
knows he is suing at law. If the vendor wishes to retain the money and
have the vendee ordered to pay the balance when the vendor will convey the property to the vendee, the situation requires more attention.
At common law there was no relief except in a separate equitable proceeding. In those common law jurisdictions having the usual statute
permitting equitable defenses, the vendor will probably likewise be required to go into equity, as a common law court could not afford the
requisite equitable relief; while in a federal court, under Section 274 b,
the situation is perfectly dear. The federal court would realize that
there are, or may be, two issues presented: the first, to recover the
money, is at-law and triable by jury; the second, to require the payment of the balance and direct and supervise the conveyance of the
land, is in equity and triable by the court.
The objection to Judge Clark's position is that he concentrates all
of his attention on the issues, when, as a matter of fact, the issues are
governed by the controversy and the nature of the controversy is reflected to some extent by the issues.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the cases decided under the
new Rules, it may be possible to list certain situations which are relatively clear. First, claims for equitable relief which is not needed for
proper disposition of the controversy, whether in the complaint or in
the answer, will not be permitted by the courts to carry true legal controversies or issues over into equity; that is to say, will not under the
new Rules deprive the party of his jury trial. Second, defenses which
were equitable under Section 274 b will remain equitable and therefore not triable by jury. Third, the great group of cases, such as those
of which the Chancery Division in England is given jurisdiction, are
essentially equitable and there will be no jury.
There is another type of case, however, which is certain to cause
trouble and that is the familiar controversy in equity in which, in order
UAAmerican Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 3oo U. S. 203, 57 S. Ct. 377 (1937).
Crigger v. Mutual H. & I. Ass'n, 69 S. W. (2d) 907 (Tenn. App. 1933).
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to give full relief, the equity court must decide questions of law and
award damages. For example, the plaintiff sues to establish a nuisance,
to recover the damages already inflicted by it, and to secure an injunction against its continuance. Clearly two of these issues are legal, but
under the equity practice all three might be decided by the chancellor,
and if a jury were impaneled it would act in an advisory capacity only.
This is not to lose sight of the long struggle that has been gone through
in order to get rid of the idea that the establishment of a nuisance,
easement, or a trespass is essentially a law issue which must be tried by
a law court, or at least by a common law jury. The attitude toward the
problem today is one of convenience and policy rather than of inherent
right, and federal courts have not hesitated to try such issues in the case
imagined without a jury, and as a part of relief in a suit in equity.
Now, when the supposed case is brought under the new Rules, to
apply Judge Clark's rule, we- should be compelled to say that either
party would have a right to a jury on the issues of the existence of
nuisance and the amount of damage suffered. But if it was the intention of Congress when it authorized the new Rules to require the jury
trial to be continued as it then existed in federal courts, we should certainly not reach that conclusion.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the decisions in the lower
federal courts will be controlled largely by the professional training and
experience of the judges. If in an action on a contract, the defendant
wishes to set up mistake in expression which, if established, will show
that the plaintiff has no cause of action, a federal judge in New York
might be expected to hold that this is a legal issue following the Susquehanna case; 15 6 whereas, if we looked only at the issue of mistake, we
should say with Judge Clark that the case is wrong.'3 7 Then again, a
federal judge may hold that the defense of fraud to a sealed instrument
has passed over and become a legal defense triable by jury, and he may
be sustained in that position. In fact it is altogether likely that he
would be. If he were federal judge in Virginia, this would not seem at
all unusual to him as this has been a legal defense in Virginia for more
than a hundred years. Furthermore, in some code states both fraud and
mistake are legal defenses tried by jury. However, a federal court in
such a state making a similar ruling is certainly in danger of reversal
as to the latter defense, because under the former equity practice mistake in expression was an equitable defense. It seems apparent, there'25Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. Anderson & Co., 239 N. Y. 285, 146 N. E. 381
5Clark, Trial of Actions Under the Code (1926) it Corn, L. Q. 482.

(1925)..
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fore, that though the same Rule is being interpreted, different conclusions may be reached because of the attitudes of the federal judges toward different issues when the new Federal Rules went into effect.
Thus it would seem that any expression of opinion as to what portions
of a case set up in a federal court in a civil complaint are to be tried by
a jury, is at this time little more than prediction, and that the answer depends not only upon the issue raised but upon the controversy
itself.
The cases thus far decided under the new Federal Rules though
few in number are not without interest. The jury trial preserved by
Rule 38(a) includes controversies on special statutes which provide for
such method of trial. 58 The distinction between law and equity abolished by the new Rules is a distinction in procedure and not a distinction between remedies, and a distinction still remains between jury
actions and non-jury actions. What was before the adoption of the
Rules an action at law is a jury action, and what was a suit in equity
is a non-jury action. And in an action brought to enjoin infringement
of a patent and to recover damages, no jury is used, whereas, if the
action is for damages only, a jury may be demanded. 5 Likewise, if the
complaint is for the rescission of a contract for fraud, the issue is equitable with no jury, but if the complaint is amended, abandoning rescission and asking only for damages, either party has a right to a
jury.60 Clearly there is no warrant in this case for the position that it
is the issues which determine the right to trial by jury. Again, it has
been held that an action for breach of a royalty agreement was triable
as a matter of right by a jury, although the complaint also prayed that
the defendant be enjoined from refusing access to its plant. The court
reached this conclusion since the information sought by the injunction
might be obtained as successfully by discovery. 161
An interesting case, Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger,162 was
decided recently in the Southern District of New York. An insurance
company brought an action to cancel a life insurance policy for fraud.
The policy, which was incontestable after two years from the date of
issue, was issued on September 3o, 1936. The insured died March 1o,
2'U. S. v. Green, io7 F. (2d) 19 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); Columbia River Packers
Ass'n v. Hinton (D. C. Ore.), Decisions on Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Dept. of Justice, 40
Bull. 39, Aug. 9, 1939.
2"Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co., 3o F. Supp. 37 (D. C. Mass. 1939).
mwGlauber v. Agee Dep't. Stores, i Fed. Rules Dec. 137 (W. D. Ky. 1939).
1
11U. S. Process Corp. v. Fort Pitt Brewing Co., 29 F. Supp. 37 (W. D. Pa. 1939).
'227

F. Supp. 554 (S.D. N. Y. 1939).
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1938, and no action had been brought to recover on the policy when
the suit to cancel was commenced on August 25, 1938. The defendant
beneficiary denied fraud and set up in a counterclaim a demand for
benefits under the policy. The court, speaking through Coxe, D. J.,
held that Rule 13(a) made it compulsory on the defendant to set up
the counterclaim, whether it be legal or equitable, and that on this
counterclaim the defendant was entitled to trial by jury. It should be
noted that this case follows the rule of procedure advocated by Judge
Clark. Thereby it differs from the orthodox equity practice, for there
if the insurance company's complaint is sustained as a bill of peace,
while the defendant may assert his rights under the policy, they would
be tried as in an equity suit with no right to a jury.
How should the following controversy be decided? Plaintiff sets out
the policy, the loss under the policy, a release under seal executed by
him, that the release was secured by fraud, and asks that the release be
cancelled and that he be permitted to recover on the policy. Here again,
under the orthodox equity practice, this is a proper proceeding in
equity in which full relief may be given.163 Now, under the new Rules,
do we have an equitable issue on the claim to cancellation, and if that
be decided in favor of the plaintiff, a law issue on his right to recover
under the policy?'6 Many such problems will come before the courts
under the new Rules.
It has been decided by two district courts that the defense of fraud
to a release under seal presents a non-jury issue. 65 But another district
court has held that the issue in such a case is a jury issue., 66 The case
of Ford v. Wilson & Co.,' 67 decided in the District Court of Connecticut presents very interesting features. In a complaint containing two
counts, plaintiff set out in the first count sale and delivery of a large
number of rose bushes to the first defendant for which plaintiff had not
been paid, and in the same count charged the second defendant with
having interfered with the performance of the contract. The second
count charged that the second defendant took over the control of first
anCrigger v. Mutual H. & I. Ass'n, 69 S. W. (2d) 907 (Tenn. App. 1933).
'"This is the converse of an equitable defense of fraud, set up in an action at
law brought on the policy, in which release under seal is pleaded.
21 5Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum Corp., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D. C. Ore. 1939);
Ross v. Service Lines, Inc., s1 F. Supp. 871 (E. D. Ill. 1940).
"Thomas Beagle v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (W. D. Wash.), Decisions on Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc., Dept. of Justice, 66 Bull, i9, Feb. 16, 1940.
113o F. Supp. L63 (D. C. Conn. 1939).
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defendant's business, rendering it impossible for it to perform its contract with plaintiff. The relief asked for on the second count was,
$20,0oo damages, a decree setting aside the fraudulent transfer, and the
appointment of a receiver. The question before the court was, which of
these issues was triable by jury. The court said, "Clearly the first count
states a cause of action for breach of contract against the defendant,
Wilson Company [the first defendant]," and also "states a cause of action against the Bank [the second defendant] in tort by reason of its'
interference with the contract between Wilson & Company and the
plaintiff." Therefore, "the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial upon all
the issues raised upon the first count." If the bank, as charged in the
complaint, concealed its interest in the first defendant's property and
thereby caused injury to the plaintiff, such a cause is a legal cause of
action for fraud involving purely legal issues to be tried to the jury.
While the second count, in its aspect as an equitable proceeding for
setting aside the fraudulent assignment, is to be tried to the court. Now
if the plaintiff in preparing his complaint followed the newer learning
and merely hewed out the operative facts, letting the issues fall where
they might, he seems to follow Judge Clark. But is that what the plaintiff did? It seems rather that he knew he had, or at least thought he had,
four causes of action, three clearly at law and one in equity; and that
he knew from the beginning how the issues should be tried. And it
seems that the court's attitude was the same. Another interesting problem is joinder of parties and causes, but so far as mode of trial is concerned, the complaint contains three legal causes of action triable by
jury and one equitable cause of action triable by the court.
The last case to be noted is Williams v. Collier,168 decided in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on March 28,
194o. This was an action by a trustee in bankru.ptcy to set aside a
fraudulent transfer, to recover the value of assets alleged to have been
fraudulently transferred to defendant, and to impress a trust on proceeds of resale. The plaintiff demanded a jury trial. The court
(Kalodner, D. J.) said:
"Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial as 'of
right' is the question to be determined. The decision must rest
upon a prior determination as to the nature of the complaint'1'(E. D. Pa.), Decisions on Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Dept. of Justice, 72 Bull. 26,
Apr. 17, 1940.
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is the action in its essence one at law or in equity? If it is in law,
the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial; otherwise not."
And further,
"Thus, to determine the validity of plaintiff's demand, inquiry must be made into the status of the case had it arisen
when the formal distinctions between an action at law and a
suit in equity still existed."
In an opinion which will well repay careful study the court abandoned
entirely the theory that the right to trial by jury depended on the issues and held that the entire case should be tried by the court.
It will be recalled that in England, with no constitution to interfere with Parliament, the cases in which there is a right to a trial by
jury may be established by legislation without the hindrance of historical concepts and cases. Would such a statute be permissible in this
country? In view of the tremendous liberties which have been taken in
the last two or three years with the constructions previously put upon
various sections of the Constitution, it is not unthinkable that a statute
of this type would be upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court might
well reason that the right to trial by jury, which in its main outlines
means the jury trial as already established in England at the time this
Government was formed, is subject to readjustment and classification
provided what is preserved is the essence of the jury trial. Every student of procedure is familiar with similar changes. The new Rules
themselves contain some of them. Furthermore, if the old construction
placed upon the Constitution may be modified in the light of our later
experience, why would not the same principle apply to legislation
which modernized on an analytical, practical and fair basis the right
to jury trial as it should exist today? Such a statute might hasten that
certainty and uniformity in procedural matters in all federal courts
which we hope may be soon attained in this matter of trial by jury.
V.

CONCLUSION

To conclude this lengthy discussion, the term equitable defense in
a common law state which has not adopted a statute permitting such a
defense to be pleaded at laiv, signifies a fact or set of facts which may
be set up in a bill in equity to enjoin the entry of a judgment at law
or to enjoin its enforcement, if such a judgment has been entered. In
many common law jurisdictions the term signifies a defense which under a statute may be set up as a legal defense in the law action. The

1940 ]

EQUITABLE DEFENSES

statutes which permit this to be done are largely modelled on the English Common Law Procedure Act of 1854. The defense cannot be affirmative; that is, it will not sustain affirmative relief in equitable forms
such as specific performance or cancellation. In the states which have
adopted code procedure, the term equitable defense has an entirely different meaning. Any defense, whether legal or equitable, may be
availed of in the answer. The question is, how shall the issues be triedby court or jury?
In federal courts during the long first period between 1789 and
1915, the term equitable defense had the meaning first spoken of above.
From the adoption of the act of 1915 to the adoption of the Federal
Rules for the District Courts in 1938, an anomalous procedure was in
effect. A law action in which an equitable plea or replication was
pleaded became a split or hybrid proceeding, part law and part equity,
the first portion tried by jury, the second by the court. This period
came to an end when the Federal Rules went into effect on September
16, 1938. Now there is but one form of action and in it the defendant
may set up all defenses, legal or equitable. This results in laying before
the federal courts the same problem which the courts in code states have
long struggled with-how shall the various issues be tried? It is believed
that the long series of cases in the federal courts are still controlling,
and if before the adoption of the new Rules the controversy was triable
to a jury, it remains triable to a jury still, while if it was formerly tried
by the court sitting as a chancellor, it remains so triable.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

(Vol. I

POST-WAR PROTECTION OF
FREEDOM OF OPINION
A Study of Supreme CourtAttitudes
RAYMON T. JOHNSON*

Introduction
The English struggle to vindicate the rights of the individual from
Magna Carta in 1215 through and beyond the Bill of Rights of 1689
was not without influence in shaping the American conception of personal liberty. It would be error to assume, however, that such influence
was of a controlling character. The inhabitants of the New World
were more influenced by environment than they were impressed by
history. Pioneer conditions, reacting upon a middle-class people, produced a point of view unhampered by conventions and unfettered by
traditions. The American people were ideally conditioned to respond
to the eighteenth century philosophy of natural rights.
This response found expression in the Declaration of Independence
wherein "self-evident" truths, "created equal," "unalienable rights,"
"Life, Liberty and the pursuit of happiness" and other magic phrases
were marshalled to impress the "opinions of mankind." That the opinions of mankind were profoundly affected by this revolutionary challenge to the existing political order is the uncontroverted conclusion

of history. This vital document ushered in a new era of expanding personal liberty.
The outbreak of the World War, however, marked the end of this
era in which more peoples had achieved some decent measure of in-

dividual freedom than in any other period that has been recorded.
Since that time the world has been subject to political and economic
distractions of an unprecedented nature. Much that had been gained
seems definitely lost. The prospect that the pendulum of liberty will
continue on the back-swing appears increasingly likely. In an interrelated world it is difficult for a particular country to run counter to
the orbital course of events. The purpose of this study is to examine
the attitude of the Supreme Court in handling the delicate problem of
freedom of individual opinion during this post-war period of social,
economic and political upheaval. It is hoped that the examination will
accurately reflect the extent to which the First and Fourteenth Amend*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
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ments create a zone of constitutional immunity for the protection of
this fundamental right from governmental invasion.
War-Time Espionage Act
Freedom of discussion and privilege of debate are indispensable
requisites to the orderly functioning of democratic institutions. Without them there could be no crystalization of opinion to chart the course
of responsible government. The first provision of the Federal Bill of
Rights was designed to safeguard freedom of speech, press and assembly from restrictions by the National Government.' In 1917 Congress
passed the Espionage Act, making it criminal to obstruct or conspire
to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States,
During the war numerous convictions were procured under this Act
and several of them were reviewed by the Supreme Court in cases disposed of by that tribunal soon after the cessation of hostilities.
In March, igig, the Court decided the Schenck,2 Frohwerk,3 and
Debs4 cases, upholding convictions under the Espionage Act. All three
decisions were by a unanimous Court and the opinion in each case was
written by Mr. Justice Holmes. In the Schenck case the Secretary of the
Socialist party and other defendants had been convicted for circulating
leaflets attacking the Conscription Act. The leaflets stated that conscription was the worst form of despotism and that a conscript was little better than a convict. While advising people not to submit to intimidation, the documents merely advocated peaceful agitation for the
repeal of the Conscription Act. In the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes
it was said:
"We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have
been within their constitutional rights. But the character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
... The question in every case is whether the. words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger5 that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question
of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
'"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Amend., Art. I, Const. U. S.
2Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919).
Trohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 39 S. Ct. 249 (1919).
'Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 39 S. Ct. 252 (1919).
5

Italics supplied.
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fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right." 6
In the Frohwerk case Mr. Justice Holmes disposed of the freespeech defense by observing that
".... so far as the language of the articles goes there is not much
in them and those beto choose between expressions to be found
'7
fore us in Schenck v. United States."
He followed this by the "little breath enough to kindle a flame" argument that appears quite judicial under circumstances of excitement
but which seems less convincing when considered in the light of more
settled conditions.
The conviction of Eugene Debs was upheld on the basis of the evidence contained in a speech delivered by him in Canton, Ohio on
June 16, 1918. Debs admitted the obstruction of war effort but contended that the Espionage Act was unconstitutional as being in conflict with the First Amendment. In his trial Debs had addressed the
jury in his own behalf in these words:
"I have been accused of obstructing the war. I admit it. Gentlemen, I abhor war. I would oppose the war if I stood alone."8
To the argument that the Act was unconstitutional as being an invasion of the right of free speech, Mr. Justice Holmes bluntly responded:
"Without going into further particulars we are of opinion
that the verdict on the fourth count, for obstructing and attempting to obstruct the recruiting service of the United States, must
be sustained." 9
These, and other cases, 10 upholding the application of the Espionage Act make it clear that the Supreme Court offers little protection to
0249

U. S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249 (1919).

7249
U. S. 204, 207, 89 S. Ct. 249, 251 (1919).
8
As quoted in 249 U. S. 211, 214, 39 S. Ct. 252, 253 (1919).

89 S. Ct. 252, 254 (1919).
'0See Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 39 S. Ct. 191 (1919) where Mr.
Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court, was of the opinion that the assertion of the free-speech defense in the case did not present any substantial constitutional question. See, also, Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 S. Ct. 17 (1919)
in which Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented on the ground that
the case departed from the clear and present danger test of the Schenck case. For an
interesting discussion of the Abrams case, see Chafee, A Contemporary State Trial
(1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 747 and see (1921) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 9 for a further treatment
of the case by the same author. Two other cases upholding the Espionage Act,
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, 40 S. Ct. 259 (192o) and Pierce v. United.
9249 U. S. 211, 216,
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the free expression of critical opinion in time of war. Even as qualified
by the clear and present danger test laid down by Mr. Justice Holmes
in the Schenck case, it is quite obvious that the decisions sanction the
virtual extinguishment of free discussion. To remonstrate against war
and decry bloodshed must be regarded as peace-time privileges rather
than war-time rights. When the whole energy of a people is directed to
the accomplishment of a vital purpose, the customary protection of individual opinion is promptly and decisively interned. There is no zone
of immunity for the protection of minority opinion under the abnormal conditions of war.
Peace-Time Subversive Activities
W\rhatever may be the justification for war-time suppression of opinion, it would seem that the peace-time approach should evidence greater
toleration. It is to be recalled, however, that the "Red scare" which followed the war was of unparalleled dimensions. Under older Anarchy
statutes or more recent Syndicalism statutes, many States made a concerted effort to stamp out subversive movements regarded as dangerous
to the existing political order. One of the most significant cases decided by the Supreme Court was that of Gitlow v. New York," in which
the defendant had been convicted in New York for the crime of criminal anarchy under a statute which penalized language advocating or
advising the overthrow of organized government. The defendant had
circulated "The Left Wing Manifesto" which proclaimed that
"Revolutionary Socialism does not propose to 'capture' the
bourgeois parliamentary state, but to conquer and destroy it."
States, 252 U. S. 239, 40 S. Ct. 205 (192o) elicited dissents by Mr. Justice Holmes and
Mr. Justice Brandeis because it was felt that the majority had, again, departed from
the clear and present danger test of the Schenck case. In the case of Gilbert v. State
of Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 41 S. Ct. 125 (1920), upholding a conviction under a
State statute which made it unlawful to interfere with the enlistment in the military
forces of the United States, Mr. Justice Holmes concurred in the result, Mr. Chief
Justice White dissented on the ground that Congress had occupied the whole field by
statute, and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented on the basis of the clear and present
danger test. In Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 S. Ct. 352
(1921) the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion from the second class mailing privileges of a newspaper published in violation of the Espionage Act. The decision in
the latter case has been generally criticized. See (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 715: ". . . the
relator, if entitled to the use of the mails at all, was entitled to the second class
privilege ....
Note, also, the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr.
Justice Holmes in the case.
n268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925).
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In upholding the conviction the Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Sanford, admitted that
"There was no evidence of any effect resulting
from the pub2
lication and circulation of the Manifesto."'
The Court distinguished the Schenck case on the basis that the Espionage cases dealt with acts, the punishment for which necessitated a judicial appraisal of the danger to be apprehended from the commission
of the acts. The Gitlow case, it was said, involved words with respect
to the use of which the legislature had already found the existence of
danger. In this connection Mr. Justice Holmes registered a dissent, in
which Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred, which relied upon the clear and
present danger test of the Schenck case.
The Supreme Court in the Gitlow case reached one conclusion, however, that served to clarify a point that had been, theretofore, obscurethe relationship between the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
majority opinion declared:
"For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom
of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
by the States."' 3
The Court dismissed a statement to the contrary in PrudentialIns. Co.
v. Cheek,14 as not determinative of the question. While one may fail to
be impressed by the narrow distinction 15 drawn between the prohibited
acts of the Schenck case and the proscribed words of the Gitlow case as
a means of avoiding judicial determination of clear and present danger,
the dictum in the latter case that unwarranted restriction of opinion
by a State violates the Fourteenth Amendment represents an unqualified advance.' 6 The long-range protection inherent in the latter position embodies the prospect of ultimate good.
The Gitlow case was followed by that of Whitney v. California17 in
12268 U. S. 652, 656, 45 S. Ct. 625, 626 (1925).

11268 U. S. 652, 666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 63o (1925).
1"259 U. S. 530, 543, 42 S. Ct. 516, 522 (1922).
1

5See (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 527 expressing the view that the Gitlow case
seriously modified the clear and present danger test of the Schenck case.
"eBut see Warren, The New Liberty Under the 14th Amendment (1926) 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 431, 464: "Is it, or is it not, a good thing that the legislation enacted by
each State to meet local conditions and to regulate local relations should be standardized, by being forced to comply to a new definition of 'liberty' applied to every
State by the judicial branch of the National Government?"
1 274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641 (1927).
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1927 in which the Court upheld a conviction under the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act for participation in the organization of the
Communist Labor Party in that state. The organization was found to
be one which advocated force and violence in the attainment of its objectives. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the majority, through Mr. Justice Sanford, declared:
"The essence of the offense denounced by the Act is the combining with others in an association for the accomplishment of
the desired ends through the advocacy and use of criminal and
unlawful methods. It partakes of the nature of a criminal conspiracy. That such united and joint action involves even greater
danger to the public peace and security8 than the isolated utterances and acts of individuals is clear."'
Mr. Justice Brandeis, with whom Mr. Justice Holmes joined, concurred in the result only because the defendant had not properly raised
the issue of "present danger." On the merits, Mr. Justice Brandeis broke
through the crust of judicial calm to proclaim:
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost of liberty ....
Only an emergency can justify
repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom.9 Such, in my opinion, is the command of
the Constitution."'
On the same day that the Whitney case was decided the Court, in
the case of Fiske v. Kansas,20 unanimously reversed a conviction under
the Kansas Syndicalism statute. The only evidence of the violation of
the Act was that the defendant had circulated the preamble to the Constitution of the I. W. W. which advocated the abolition of the "wage
system" but in which no reference to force or violence was discovered.
The Syndicalism Act was not held unconstitutional but the application
of the statute to a defendant, against whom the evidence was unconvincing, was held to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
dictum in the Gitlow case that freedom of speech was a right protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment against infringement by a State had
now become the basis of actual decision.
Again, in Stromberg v. California,21 the Court reversed a conviction based upon the violation of a statute, one section of which made
it a crime to display the red flag as an emblem of opposition to or-

18274
"274
"274
2283

U. S.
U. S.
U. S.
U. S.

357, 371, 47 S. Ct. 641, 647 (1927).
357, 377, 47 S. Ct. 641 , 648 (1927).
380, 47 S. Ct. 655 (1927).
359, 51 S. Ct. 432 (1931).
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ganized government. In the trial of the defendant, a nineteen year old
girl, the California court had instructed the jury that any one section
of the statute was enough to sustain the conviction. While not condemning the statute as a whole, the Supreme Court held the "red flag"
section to be unconstitutional in that it was vague and indefinite. Mr.
Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler dissented on the ground
that the conviction should be upheld under the other sections of the
statute. It would appear that the Court, in the early thirties, was beginning to adopt a more tolerant outlook in the handing of such cases.
The Stromberg decision prompted the remark in one of the law reviews of California that
"The case is of interest in showing the more liberal attitude
22
recently developed in the United States Supreme Court."
In 1937 the Supreme Court decided the case of De longe v.
Oregon.23 In that case the accused had been convicted under the Oregon Syndicalism statute and sentenced to seven years imprisonment for
assisting in the conduct of a public meeting, otherwise lawful, which
was held under the auspices of the Communist Party. The Court. (Mr.
Justice Stone not participating) unanimously concluded that the conviction should be set aside. In the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
it was pointed out that
"Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights
which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the 14 th
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The right of peaceable
assembly is a right cognate to'24those of free speech and free press
and is equally fundamental.
The Court was of opinion that a meeting was not unlawful merely because it was held under the auspices of the Communist Party. It is to
be noted that freedom of assembly, for the first time, was brought
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this connection it has been observed that
"Extension of the due process clause to include the right of
peaceable assembly practically completes the Supreme Court's
transcription of the personal
liberties of the First Amendment
25
into the Fourteenth."
In Herndon v. Lowry 26 the defendant, Angelo Herndon, a negro,
2(1931) 5 So. Calif. L. Rev. 172, 173.
2299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255 (1937)299 U. S. 353, 364, 57 S. Ct. 255, 260 (1937).
*(1937) 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 489.
28301 U. S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732 (1937).
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had been sent from Kentucky to Atlanta, Georgia to persuade negroes
to join the Communist Party. He held three meetings and was arrested.
In his room was found a great bulk of radical Communist literature,
but there was no proof he had circulated any of the material. He was
convicted of an attempt to incite to insurrection under a statute, 27 the
pertinent section of which, defined the offense in these words:
"Any attempt, by persuasion or otherwise, to induce others to
join in any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the
State shall constitute an attempt to incite insurrection."
The conviction of the defendant was affirmed by the State court 2s
which held that the statute applied whether or not immediate violence
was threatened.
In a habeas corpus proceeding which reached the Supreme Court
it was decided that the Georgia statute, as construed and applied, was
so vague and uncertain as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Roberts declared:
"The statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely to
a dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change
of government if a jury can be persuaded that he ought to have
foreseen his words would have some effect in the future conduct
of others. No reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt is prescribed. So vague and indeterminate are the boundaries thus set
to the freedom of speech and assembly that the law necessarily
of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth
violates the guarantees
29
Amendment."
On the issue of the statute's vagueness, Mr. Justice Van Devanter voiced
a dissent which was joined in by Justices McReynolds, Sutherland and
Butler. In view of the Court's five-to-four division on the issue of
vagueness, the decision all the more demonstrates the willingness of
the Court's majority to bring conduct involving freedom of speech
within the protection of the constitutional guarantees. The case would
seem to be but another manifestation of that growing liberality of attitude to which previous reference has been made.
In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization30 the longstanding dispute between Mayor Hague of Jersey City and the C. I. 0.
was finally passed on by the Supreme Court in reviewing an injunction
"Section 56 of the Penal Code (Ga. Code 1933, § 26-902).
2'Hemdon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S. E. 597 (1934). Rehearing denied, Herndon
v. State, 179 Ga. 597, 176 S. E. 62o (1934).
301 U. S. 242, 263, 57 S. Ct. 732, 742 (1937).
3'3o7 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939).
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restraining the continuance of interference by the city officials with
the constitutional rights of the protesting parties. The bill alleged that
under ordinances of Jersey City these parties had been denied the right
to use public buildings, streets and parks for lawful assemblies and
had been prevented from circulating leaflets and pamphlets in public
places. It was claimed that the conduct of the city officials had been
discriminatory and amounted to unconstitutional interference with
freedom of speech and assembly.
In upholding the rights of speech and assembly the majority could
find no common ground of reason to sustain the decision. The opinion
of Mr. Justice Roberts, in which Mr. Justice Black concurred, stated:
"...
it is clear that the right peaceably to assemble and to discuss
these topics [National legislation], and to communicate respecting them, whether orally or in writing, is a privilege inherent in
the citizenship of the United States which the [Fourteenth]
Amendment protects." 31
In resorting to the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as a source of constitutional right, Mr. Justice Roberts
put the protection on an exceedingly narrow basis. This clause is a
protection to citizens only and with respect to those rights which grow
out of Federal citizenship. Does the opinion imply that an assembly to
discuss State legislation would not be protected? Does the opinion lead
to the inference that non-citizens have no right to assemble to discuss
anything? If such conceivable doctrine be not unsound, it is at least
unfortunate.
In a separate opinion, concurred in by Mr. Justice Reed, it was
stated by Mr. Justice Stone:
"It has been explicitly and repeatedly affirmed by this Court,
without a dissenting voice, that freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose are rights of personal liberty secured to all persons, without regard to citizenship, by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.... It has never
been held that either is a privilege or immunity peculiar to citizenship of the United States, to which alone the privileges and
immunities clause refers .... -32
The logic of this position commends itself more than does that employed by Mr. Justice Roberts. The due process clause is a living, growing and vital source of protection. The privileges and immunities
clause is restrictive in application and all but judicially decadent. Its
3'307 U. S. 496, 512, 59 S. Ct. 954, 962 (1939).
23o7 U. S. 496, 519, 59 S. Ct. 954, 965 (1939).

1940]

FREEDOM OF OPINION

202

resurrection for this purpose is of dubious value. One is constrained to
agree with the comment that
".. . it is regrettable that in a case of such public notoriety the
Court did not invoke squarely
the established doctrines for the
33
defense of civil liberties."
The Court's handling of this highly controversial case is, to say the
least, both disappointing and confusing. The positions taken by the
individual members of the Court may be summarized as follows:
Mr. Justice Roberts (Mr. Justice Black concurring) held that
the rights were protected by the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Stone (Mr. Justice Reed concurring) held that the
rights were protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes concurred with Mr. Justice Robberts "on the merits."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate in the hearing or the determination of the case.
Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler wrote dissenting opinions.
It is to be noted that the maximum strength mustered for any one of
the positions assumed does not represent more than one-third of the
Court's membership. One naturally regrets that in a case of this importance the reasoning was so indecisive. It is difficult to deduce any
settled principle from this discordant medley of concurrence and dissent. In result, only, can the case be regarded as satisfactory.
Freedom of the Press
Within two weeks of the 1931 decision of the Stromberg case,34 in
which the Supreme Court had given evidence of a new liberality of
opinion in reversing a conviction under the California "red flag" statute, the case of Near v. Minnesota35 was disposed of by the Court. This
decision, involving the freedom of the press, provided still more striking evidence of a judicial intent to safeguard the free expression of
opinion. A Minnesota statute36 of 1925 provided for the abatement of
malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspapers and periodicals as
public nuisances. The defendant, whose past conduct had been decidedly unsavory, made an unprincipled and defamatory attack upon
m(i939) 59 Col. L. Rev. 1237, 1244.

'Supra. n.

21.

2283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931).
=Chap. 285, Session Laws of Minn., 1925.
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public officials in the Saturday Press. He was enjoined under the statute from continuing the publication of the newspaper because of its
scurrilous and defamatory content. The Supreme Court pronounced
the statute unconstitutional because its application and enforcement
embodied "the essence of censorship." 37
In the majority opinion, written by "Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, it
was stated:
"The question is whether a statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of publication is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed. In determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it
is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints
upon publication."3 8
The belief that the proper remedy was to be found in the application
of the libel laws was thus expressed:
"The fact that for approximately one hundred and fifty years
there has been almost an entire absence of attempts to impose
previous restraints upon publications relating to the malfeasance
of public officers is significant of the deep-seated conviction that
such restraints would violate constitutional right. Public officers,
whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free
discussion in the press, find their remedies for false accusations
in actions under libel laws providing for redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and periodicals."'39
That the decision was, in no sense, predicated upon the justifiable
quality of the defendant's conduct appeared obvious from the following excerpt from the opinion:
"We should add that this decision rests upon the operation
and effect of the statute, without regard to the question of the
truth of the charges contained in the particular periodical. The
fact that the public officers named in this case, and those associated with the charges of official dereliction, may be deemed to
be impeccable, cannot affect the conclusion that the statute
im40
poses an unconstitutional restraint upon publication."
Mr. Justice Butler (speaking also for Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland) gave expression to this pointed dissent:
"It is well known, as found by the state Supreme Court, that
-283 U. S. 697, 713,
38283 U. S. 697, 713,
3'283 U. S. 697, 718,
40283 U. S. 697, 723,

51 S. Ct. 625, 6go (1931).

51 S. Ct. 625, 63o (1931).
51 S. Cf. 625, 632 (1931).
51 S. Ct. 625, 633 (1931).
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existing libel laws are inadequate effectively to suppress evils resulting from the kind of business and publications that are
shown in this case. The doctrine that measures such as the one
before us are invalid because they operate as previous restraints
to infringe freedom of the press exposes the peace and good order
of every community and the business and private affairs of every
individual to the constant and protracted false and malicious
assaults of any insolvent publisher who may have purpose and
sufficient capacity to contrive and put into effect a scheme or
program for oppression, blackmail or extortion." 41
Without detracting from the force of the dissenting argument it
would appear nevertheless true that "previous restraint" embraces the
prospect of great abuse. The balance of social interest would seem to
favor the majority position. That the laws of libel are not wholly efficacious in dealing with a "program for oppression, blackmail or extortion" may be admitted. The appraisal of doctrine, however, must
proceed with a view to ultimate advantage. This advantage seems furthered by absence of "previous restraint." That a less-favored position
is an unconstitutional one requires explanation. In view of our constitutional history, the specific restrictions of the First Amendment and
the expanding protection accorded to freedom of speech and of the
press under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
might it not be suggested that legislation impinging upon these basic
immunities should be stripped of its presumptive validity? Such suggestion would afford a justification for the Near decision that would
otherwise require more extended reasoning.
The decision in Grosjean v. American Press Co. 42 in 1936 was by a
unanimous Court. Suit had been brought by nine publishers of Louisiana newspapers to enjoin the enforcement of a Louisiana statute of
1934 levying a two per cent license tax on the gross receipts from advertising in papers with a circulation of more than twenty thousand copies
per week. In holding the statute unconstitutional as in conflict with the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Sutherland, said:
"The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money
from the pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question would be presented. It is bad because, in the
light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a
deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information to which the public is entitled in vir"283 U. S. 697, 737, 52 St. Ct. 625, 638 (1931).
-297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444 (1936).
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tue of the constitutional guarantees. A free press stands as one
of the great interpreters between the government and
the peo43
ple. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves."
The Court pointed out that by placing the decision on the due process
clause it was unnecessary to determine whether the statute denied the
equal protection of the laws.
In this case the Court quite obviously looked behind the scenes to
discover in the Louisiana political situation a ruthless attempt to
throttle freedom of expression in opposition to the controlling political regime of the State. The unanimous quality of the declaration
served notice to political machines that devious attacks upon the freedom of the press would meet with judicial resistance. The decision fortified the "no censorship" position which had been taken in the Near
case.
In Associated Press v. Labor Board,44 the Court in 1937 rendered
another five-to-four decision on the issue of freedom of the press. The
four dissenting Justices were the same who dissented in the Near case.
This time, however, the dissenters came to the defense of the press
whereas in the Near case they were found on the other side. The issue
in the case was whether the National Labor Relations Board could
compel the Associated Press to reinstate a discharged editorial writer
with back pay. After holding that Congress had the power to regulate
the business of the Associated Press under its control of interstate commerce, the majority held that the application of the National Labor
Relations Act was not in violation of the constitutional rights protected by the First Amendment and that the reinstatement order of
the Labor Board was valid.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Roberts, called attention to the fact that
"The business of the Associated Press is not immune from
regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of
a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others. 4 3
The Court indicated that the right to discharge such employee was unlimited except for his labor union activities.
'"297 U. S. 233, 250, 56 S. Ct. 44, 449
"301 U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650 (1937).
"301

(1936).

U. S. 103, 132, 57 S. Ct. 650, 656 (1937).
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Mr. Justice Sutherland, with whom Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler agreed, entered a stirring dissent. He said:
"No one can read the long history which records the stern
and often bloody struggles by which these cardinal rights were
secured, without realizing how necessary it is to preserve them
against any infringement, however slight." 46
One wonders why this solicitude for the press might not have found
expression in the Near case. The dissent remarked on the difference of
status between an editorial writer and one employed in the mechanical
and purely clerical work of the press. The "halt at the threshold" argument was effectively employed against incipient invasion of constitutional right.
The dissenting opinion ended on a note of high emotional quality:
"Do the people of this land-in the providence of God, favored, as they sometimes boast, above all others in the plentitude
of their liberties-desire to preserve those so carefully protected
by the First Amendment: liberty of religious worship, freedom
of speech and of the press, and the right as freemen peaceably to
assemble and petition their government for a redress of grievances? If so, let them withstand all beginnings of encroachment.
For the saddest epitaph which can be carved in memory of a
vanished liberty is that it was lost because its possessors failed to
47
stretch forth a saving hand while yet there was time."

Would there be those uncharitable enough to harbor the suspicion
that this lyrical passage from the pen of the gifted Justice was inspired
not only by love of the press but also by a lack of regard for the practices of the Labor Board? Valid arguments may, of course, be advanced
in behalf of both majority and minority positions. The protection of
the Labor Board might better have been directed to the safeguarding
of the rights of the more ordinary group of employees without being
extended to members of the staff who might occupy positions more intimately connected with possible matters of policy and management.
When one considers the extent to which the press, in many lands, has
been subject to governmental interference, no suggestion of debatable
encroachment by administrative boards should merit judicial indulgence. For an administrative ruling to invade the editorial room and
directly affect its personnel may offer prospect of mischief that will outweigh the meager gain to labor which the case represents.
In 1938 the Supreme Court announced its decision in the case of
"30,

'7o

U. S. 103, 135, 57 S. Ct. 65o, 657 (1937).
U. S. 103, 141, 57 S. Ct. 650, 659 (1937).
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Lovell v. City of Griffin.48 A city ordinance forbade as a nuisance the
distribution, by hand or otherwise, of literature of any kind without
first obtaining written permisson from the City Manager. The defendant was c6nvicted of violation of the ordinance in distributing religious tracts. The Court was of the unanimous opinion, Mr. Justice Cardozo not participating, that the ordinance violated due process by invading freedom of the press.
In the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes it was again pointed
out that
"Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress,
are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by
state action." 49
This position, dating from the Gitlow pronouncement 0 in 1925, has
become a judicial commonplace. Not so commonplace, however, is the
idea that such handbill regulations impinge upon freedom of the press.
The opinion explained that
"The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These
indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as
the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history
abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinon." 51
It is doubtful whether the legal profession anticipated this ruling.
The case provides evidence of an intent on the part of the Court to
keep open the channels of information. In the light of such purpose
the decision is highly significant. One practical aspect of the holding
is indicated in this comment:
"The instant case holding that handbills merit the same protection as newspapers is of practical importance to minority
groups which might otherwise be materially hampered in advocating their doctrines. The language of many municipal ordi'5 2
nances will no doubt need revision in the light of this opinion."
That there is need for revising the language of existing handbill
485o 3 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938).
4"50 3 U. S. 444, 450, 58 S. Ct. 666, 668 (1938).
Supra, n. 13.
51303 U. S. 444, 452, 58 S. Ct. 666, 669 (1938).
5'(1938) 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 675, 676.
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ordinances is evidenced by the opinion53 handed down by the Supreme Court in November of the past year. Convictions under four
different handbill ordinances were reversed in this one opinion. The
ordinances held to be invalid were those of Irvington, New Jersey; Los
Angeles, California; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Worcester, Massachusetts. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated
in his opinion:
"Four cases are here, each of which presents the question
whether regulations embodied in a municipal ordinance abridge
the freedom of speech and of the press secured against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." 54
He concluded that
"Although a municipality may enact regulations in the interest of the public safety, health, welfare or convenience, these
may not abridge the individual liberties secured by the Constitution to those who wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or opinion."m
The Court, in protecting the rights of pamphleteers, in viewing the
problem in a realistic way. It is concerned with the circulation of "information and opinion." It is not to be supposed that the Court is
throwing the cloak of immunity around advertising dodgers or commercial solicitation. 56 Ordinances designed to prevent the littering of
streets and the annoyance of householders, however, must not be employed to curtail the constitutional right of religious, political and economic groups to disseminate information and opinion favorable to
their cause. Democratic institutions thrive on liberty and languish from
its restraint. Events may prove that the typewriter is mightier than the
tank and that the mimeograph will become the symbol of a changing
order. The Supreme Court gives them judicial blessing and safeguards
them from the doctrine of "previous restraint."
Pursuit of Learning
No examination of freedom of opinion should fail to take into account the freedom of teaching and learning identified with educational
practice. For the State to maintain a system of public education is a
commendable effort of government and one of its recognized responsi5(1) Schneider v. State of New Jersey, (2) Young v. People of State of California,
(3) Snyder v. City of Milwaukee, (4) Nichols et al. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts-6o S. Ct. 146 (1939)r46o S. Ct. 146, 147 (1939).
56o S. Ct. 146, 150 (1939).
5See 60 S. Ct. 146, 152 (1939).
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bilities. For designing agencies to undermine freedom of instruction,
however, is little better than contributing to the delinquency of the
young. The whole character of a people can be changed in a relatively
short time by any government that is accorded full and unrestricted
control over the developing mind of youth. No weapon for standardized mass-thinking and the elimination of individualized opinion is so
powerful as a unified, State-dominated system of instruction. When
the brain is saturated with the compulsory doctrines of State, a whole
population may be made the unsuspecting victims of seduced opinion.
In the interest of avoiding the prospect of standardization that is inherent in State-provided education, the integrity of private schools
should be scrupulously respected. This is a matter that should be accorded unrelaxed attention.
The Supreme Court has, on occasion, exercised restraint upon legislative efforts designed to curtail the independence of private instruction. In 1923 the Court decided the case of Meyer v. Nebraska,57 pronouncing unconstitutional a Nebraska statute, one section of which
prohibited the teaching of any language, other than English, to a child
who had not passed the eighth grade. The statute, by its terms, applied
to private, denominational, parochial or public schools. The defendant,
a teacher in a parochial school, was convicted for teaching German to
a child of ten who had not passed the required grade. In condemning
the application of the statute to private schools, Mr. Justice McReynolds stated in the majority opinion:
"That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to
improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights
which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as those
born with English on the tongue.... We are constrained to conclude that the statute is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State."8
Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom Mr. Justice Sutherland agreed, ex9
pressed the opinion in Bartels v. IowarP
disposing of a similar statute,
that
"Youth is the time when familiarity with
a language is established ....

I am not prepared to say that it is unreasonable

to provide that in his early years he shall hear and speak only
English at school."6 0
39o, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923).
U. S. 390, 401, 403, 43 S. Ct. 625, 627, 628
"262 U. S. 404, 43 S. Ct. 628 (1923).
'0262 U. S. 404, 412, 43 S. Ct. 628, 63o (1923).
'262 U. S.
M262

(1923).

19401

FREEDOM OF OPINION

This rivulet of argument, happily, found its way into the sea of dissent.
In view of the fact that nearly one-half of the States had adopted statutes of this type, it is evident that a concerted effort had been made to
bring private instruction within the ambit of public control. For the
Supreme Court to declare such statutes an arbitrary invasion of the
freedom of instruction came as a shock to the groups that had instigated the legislative crusade. Mr. Justice Holmes' penchant for upholding legislation placed him in the dubious company of professional
patriots. Mr. Justice Sutherland's position does not merit the charity
of this explanation.
In the case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters,61 in 1925, the Court passed
upon the validity of an Oregon statute that made compulsory the attendance in public schools of all children between ages eight to sixteen. Private schools had secured temporary restraining orders preventing the enforcement of the statute. Attorneys representing the State
of Oregon advanced this argument to sustain the validity of the legislation:
"At present, the vast majority of the private schools in the
country are conducted by members of some particular religious
belief. They may be followed, however, by those organized and
controlled by believers in certain economic doctrines entirely
destructive of the fundamentals of our government. Can it be
contended that there is no way in which a State can prevent the
entire education of a considerable portion of its future citizens
and conducted by bolshevists, syndicalists and
being controlled
62
communists?"
It is to be noted that what counsel feared was the economic "isms"
likely to be propagated by the sinister "ists." The Court, however,
unanimously rejected this attenuated method of forestalling objectionable doctrine. In an opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds it was pointedly remarked:
"The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high63 duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."
violation of the due process clause of
The statute was held to be ith
1268 U. S. 5i0, 45 S. Ct. 57i (1925).
e'268 U. S. 510, 526 (1925).
e'268 U. S. 510, 535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573 (1925).
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the Fourteenth Amendment. No one should ignore the significant character of this decision. The Pierce case, coupled with the Meyer holding,
effectively checked the drive to control the freedom of private instrucdon. That the State may establish certain standards of curriculum and
qualification for teachers in private schools admitting children of compulsory school age, is readily conceded. The theory, however, that private education may be changed into education that is virtually public,
or that school-age children may be withdrawn from private schools by
State decree, has been decisively repudiated. Had the Supreme Court
resolved this issue to the contrary, it is difficult to determine where the
zeal for uniformity would have stopped.
This judicial determination to safeguard the freedom of private in64
struction was reaffirmed in the later case of Farringtonv. Tokushige
in which the Court concluded that Hawaiian legislation, which attempted the minute regulation of the numerous foreign language
schools of that territory, was unconstitutional. Reliance was placed
upon the Meyer and Pierce cases as authority for the conclusion. Since
the issue arose in Federal territory, the decision was based upon the
restraint of the Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. It is obvious, therefore, that both State and Federal agencies of government
are subject to pronounced constitutional limitations in the attempted
interference with the operation of private schools.
It is not without significance that the Supreme Court has found occasion to say a word about the conduct of State-supported instruction.
In the case of Missouri v. Canada6 5 the Court gave warning against discriminations by the States in the management of public institutions of
learning. In that case it was declared that the denial of admission to a
negro citizen who wished to enroll in the law department of the State
university denied the equal protection of the laws. While segregation
of the white from other races is permitted, the State is under the constitutional obligation to provide separate facilities to the excluded race.
In the absence of separate facilities, the Court concluded that all qualified citizens had equal right of admission to the instruction provided
by the State. This indicates an intention to keep open the channels of
public instruction to the extent that a qualified citizen may have that
equal access to learning which will contribute to the cultivation of enlightened opinion.
In view of these cases it must be said that the Supreme Court has
'273 U. S. 284, 47 S. Ct. 406 (1927).

6'305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct.

232

(1938).
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exercised its judicial power to safeguard fundamental rights incident
to the pursuit of learning. It is reasonable to suppose that the Court
has not exhausted the scope of protection in this regard. What the
Court has already done constitutes a genuine contribution to the safeguarding of instructional freedom.
Summary and Conclusion
. It is hoped that this examination has served to indicate the postwar attitude of the Supreme Court toward freedom of opinon. It appears that this attitude has been, on the whole, one of surprising liberality. It is to be admitted that the handling of the Espionage cases,
growing out of the war, provided little evidence of impending liberalism in this particular. It is likewise true that the "Red scare" led to unfortunate decisions in the Gitlow and Whitney cases in 1925 and 1927
respectively. It is to be observed, however, that these two cases marked
the end of the Supreme Court's willingness to sustain legislation designed to restrict the free expression of opinion.
For almost fifteen years the Court has pursued an unbroken course
of extending judicial protection to freedom of speech, press and assembly. In the Fiske case a member of the I.W.W. was protected against
the application of the Kansas Syndicalism Act. The "red flag" statute
of California was held invalid in the Stromberg decision. In the case of
De Jonge v. Oregon the right of peaceable assembly was vindicated.
The court granted habeas corpus in the Herndon case to safeguard the
freedom of speech of a negro communist. Though the reasoning seems
unsatisfactory, the Hague controversy resulted in an injunction to prevent interference with the constitutional rights of members of the
C.I.O.
For the past decade the Supreme Court has been unquestionably
diligent in preserving the freedom of the press. In the Near case the
doctrine of "previous restraint" was condemned. A tax, designed to
limit newspaper circulation, was held unconstitutional in the Grosjean
appeal. The five-to-four decision, disallowing the free-press defense in
the Associated Press case, was complicated by protection-to-labor considerations and is generally defended by professed liberals. The handbill cases unqualifiedly extended freedom of the press to embrace
pamphlets and circulars disseminating matters of opinion.
Since 1923 the integrity of private instruction has received repeated
judicial support. The Meyer case struck down the Nebraska language
law as applied to private schools. Compulsory attendance upon public
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schools was denied validity in the Pierce case. Legislation interfering
with the management of private schools in Hawaii was declared unconstitutional in the Farringtoncase, while Missouri v. Canada prohibited discrimination in the treatment of citizens qualified to attend
State-supported institutions.
It is submitted that these cases reflect a settled determination on
the part of the Court to safeguard freedom of opinion. The Fourteenth
Amendment, in particular, has been given an ever-widening application. This steady advance holds the promise of still more extended protection. The social implications of the present judicial attitude are apparent. Minority groups are freed from many restrictive practices previously common. Those who subscribe to the paradox of restraint as a
means to freedom are naturally disappointed. Those who believe that
the last word is never said in the everlasting search for social betterment may take heart.
Unless the right of free speech and press protects unpopular opinion the constitutional safeguard is a delusion. One does not need the
protection of the Constitution to endorse the Ten Commandments or
to advocate the Golden Rule. When a group program goes beyond the
expression of opinion and takes the form of overt acts directed to the
immediate purpose of force and violence, the right of government to
protect itself from threatened danger cannot be denied. The enjoyment of all rights is subject to the rule of reason. The advantages inherent in social stability are obvious but the dangers inherent in social
stagnation are equally apparent. Only a warped philosophy could regard an imprisoned mind and a silenced tongue as societal assets.
The history of American political development reveals the fear of
oppressive government at every step. The specific safeguards embodied
in both Federal and State Bills of Rights reflect the purpose of the
American people to be free from arbitrary restraints upon freedom of
opinion. The safeguarding of this purpose is a high judicial task, in the
performance of which the Supreme Court is no longer faltering. The
course which is being pursued by the Court merits the support of those
who have faith in the ultimate value of truth.
Impressed with the necessity of keeping open the channels of free
opinion, the writer takes occasion to reiterate the thought he expressed
in connection with the Near case-that, in the vindication of these basic
rights specifically safeguarded from governmental interference, the customary presumption of validity be withheld from encroaching legislation. The burden of explanation should be placed upon government
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to justify the necessity for any direct invasion of this zone of constitutional immunity. In practice, the Court seems to be drifting in this
direction. Indeed, the very latest decisions by the Court in the Thornhill v. Alabama66 and Carlson v. California67 cases, handed down on
April 22, 194o, indicate that no real presumption of validity is accorded to legislative limitations upon freedom of discussion. In both
cases, anti-picketing legislation was declared to be an unconstitutional
interference with the free expression of opinion. Speaking through Mr.
Justice Murphy, with only Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting, the
Court declared in the former case:
"In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded
as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the
Constitution." 6s
The fact that picketing involves the prospect of personal violence and
public disturbance provoked no comment concerning presumptive
validity. In most of the cases dealing with the safeguarding of free
opinion one finds judicial silence in this respect. An outright declaration that such presumptions no longer obtain where legislation attempts to restrict the area of free discussion would serve to clarify the
judicial attitude.
The final place to be occupied by the Supreme Court in our constitutional system is not certain. Grave social and economic problems
press for solution. The limit to legitimate governmental activity and
regulation has perhaps not been reached. Suggested remedies for economic ills are subject to an understandable difference of opinion and
provide the occasion for justifiable debate. Experimentation should be
permitted a wide lattitude, unhampered by judicial restraint. Restrictive decisions by the Supreme Court in this field no longer merit the
support of the American people. After all, the Supreme Court is not
a negative Congress, to debate the wisdom of method.
In safeguarding the more basic rights of free speech, press and opinion, however, the Court is charged with a responsibility which it should
not shirk. This is not a field for reasonable debate. The democratic
way of life calls for the unrestricted interplay of individual thought.
To place legislative restrictions upon free discussion is to jeopardize
the orderly processes of social change. The attitude of the Court for
c-6o S. Ct. 736 (194o).
6 6o S. Ct. 746 (1940).
6o S. Ct. 736, 744 (1940).
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the past several years leads to the belief that judicial protection will
continue. To fortify that protection by putting the burden on government to justify an impinging course should be the next step in the
defense of the constitutional right to freedom of opinion.
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CLARIFYING THE AMENDING PROCESS
NOEL

T.

DOWLING*

In a decision' accompanied by a series of opinions last Term, the
Supreme Court put a new complexion on the legal features of the process of amending the Constitution. Hitherto the question whether an
amendment had been properly and seasonably adopted was, by assumption if not by actual decision, cognizable in and determinable by the
Court, though the principles governing the determination were by no
means clear or settled. Today the question is one for Congress. It has
ceased to be justiciable. It has become political.
This bit of transmutation was not accomplished with the greatest
of ease. Two cases were argued together 2 in October, 19,8, but, while
other cases submitted then and thereafter were readily disposed of in
the normal period of six weeks to two months, nothing was heard of
these. At that time the Court had only eight members, no successor to
Mr. Justice Cardozo having been appointed, and it was believed that
they were equally divided on the question of jurisdiction. After the appointment of Mr. Frankfurter it was expected that the cases would be
set down for re-argument, but the retirement of Mr. Justice Brandeis
again reduced the Court to eight. Finally, on April 17, the day on which
Mr. Justice Douglas took his seat to make a full bench of nine, the reargument was begun. Seven weeks later, June 5, the decision came
down. Four opinions were delivered, the prevailing one by Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes (joined by Justices Stone and Reed), a concurring one
by Mr. Justice Black (joined by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and
Douglas), a separate one by Mr. Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justices
Roberts, Black and Douglas), and a dissenting one by Mr. Justice Butler (joined by Mr. Justice McReynolds).
The case which called forth this bevy of opinions presented a single
issue, namely, whether or not the ratification of the Child Labor
Amendment by Kansas was valid. In the period which had elapsed since
the submission of the amendment in 1924 the State had first (1925) rejected the proposal and thereafter (197) accepted it. A suit was begun
to test the legality of such action and two separate questions were developed in the litigation; first, was a State bound by its first vote, so that
*Nash Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School.
'Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972 (1939).
2Chandler v. Wise, 307 U. S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992 (1939), was the other, but as will
appear later, it was dismissed without consideration of the merits.
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after having voted No it could not vote Yes, and, second, was the proposed amendment "dead" by reason of the passage of so many years
since its submission, notwithstanding the absence of any time limit in
the proposing resolution. The highest court of Kansas had answered
both questions in the negative, and sustained the ratification.3 This
4
judgment was affined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
On the first question, the effect of the previous rejection of the
amendment, the Court deemed the matter settled by "historic precedent." This precedent was created by the action of Congress and the
Secretary of State in proclaiming the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The legislatures of some of the States, including North
Carolina and South Carolina, had first rejected and then ratified the
Amendment, while in at least two other States, Ohio and New Jersey,
the legislatures first ratified and then passed resolutions withdrawing
their consent. Congress, informed of these facts by a report from the
Secretary of State, adopted a Concurrent Resolution which declared the
Fourteenth Amendment to be a part of the Constitution, all four of the
above named States being included in the list of those which had ratified. Thereupon the Secretary of State issued his proclamation which
also included those States.
Thus, as the Court points out, the "political departments of the
Government" had dealt not only with the first question here involved
but also with the related one whether prior ratification could be revoked, and had determined that both previous rejection and attempted
withdrawal "were ineffectual in the presence of an actual ratification." 5
Declaring that this decision by the political departments as to the
validity of the Fourteenth Amendment "has been accepted," the Court
added:
"We think that in accordance with this historic precedent
the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in
the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should
be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the
'In the Chandler case similar questions were involved concerning ratification by
Kentucky. The Court of Appeals of that State answered both questions in the affirmative, and overturned the ratification.
'Thus the judgments in both cases were left standing, that of Kansas (for ratification) because the Supreme Court thought it was right, and that of Kentucky
(against ratification) because the Court, there being no justiciable question, could
not say whether it was right or wrong.
5The Court noted that there were "special circumstances" because of the action
of Congress in relation to the governments of the rejecting States but said that thesecircumstances "were not recited in proclaiming ratification."
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exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of
the amendment."
The Court then stated the "precise question" in the case to be
"whether, when the legislature of the State, as we have found, has actually ratified the proposed amendment, the Court should restrain the
State officers from certifying the ratification to the Secretary of State,
because of an earlier rejection, and thus prevent the question from
coming before the political departments"; and answered it: "We find
no basis in either Constitution or statute for such judicial action."
The second question, as to whether the proposal by Congress had
lost its vitality through lapse of time, was found by the Court to be
"more serious" than the first. Dillon v. Gloss6 brought on the difficulty.
In that case, as the Court now re-affirms, it was held that Congress in
proposing an amendment may fix a reasonable time for ratification. 7
But much more was said in the opinion. Thus it was suggested that
amendments would not remain open to ratification for all time, that
ratification must be sufficiently contemporaneous in the required number of States to reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively
the same period, and that ratification must be within some reasonable
time after the proposal.
These considerations, and others not necessary to be recited here,
were "cogent reasons," said the Court, for sustaining the power of Congress to fix a reasonable time, but they must not be taken as indicating
that, when Congress does not exercise that power, the Court should
take upon itself the responsibility of deciding what constitutes a reasonable time. No such question was presented in Dillon v. Gloss and
the Court did not consider itself foreclosed from examining the matter
on the merits.
The question of a reasonable time, said the Court, would involve an
appraisal of "a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social, and
economic," which are appropriate for the consideration of the political
departments of Government. Indeed the Chief Justice suggests that
these conditions "can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range
of evidence receivable in a court of justice" and as to them "it would be
an extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice"
6256

U. S. 368,

41 S. Ct. 510 (1921).

7

Actually, as Professor Freund pointed out at the time, Legislative Problems and
Solutions (1921) 7 A. B. A. J. 656, that was not the holding. The seven year limit
in that case had been inserted by Congress in the text of the amendment itself (it

was the Eighteenth); it was not a part of the proposing Resolution. Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes calls attention to the fact that no limitation of time in respect of the Child
Labor Amendment appears "either in the proposed amendment or in the resolution
of submission."
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as the basis of deciding the controversy. The questions they involve are
"essentially political and not justiciable."
"Our decision that the Congress has the power under Article
V to fix a reasonable limit of time for ratification in proposing
an amendment proceeds upon the assumption that the question,
what is a reasonable time, lies within the congressional province.
If it be deemed that such a question is an open one when the
limit has not been fixed in advance, we think that it should also
be regarded as an open one for the consideration of the Congress
when, in the presence of certified ratifications by three-fourths
of the States, the time arrives for the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment. The decision by the Congress, in its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the question
whether the amendment had been adopted within a reasonable
time would not be subject to review by the courts."
On both points, then, the Chief Justice concluded that the determining power rested in Congress rather than in the courts. But either
he was not categorical enough or else he said too much to satisfy Mr.
Justice Black and the three associates who joined with him. In their
view control of the amending process has been given by the Constitution "exclusively and completely" to Congress. They considered the
process as "political" in its entirety, from the submission of an amendment to its adoption, and they denied that it is "subject to judicial
guidance, control or interference at any point." Consequently they
looked on any judicial expression which amounted to "more than mere
acknowledgment of exclusive Congressional power" as a "mere admonition to the Congress in the nature of an advisory opinion, given
wholly without constitutional authority."
The bare fact that the Court discussed the matter at all, as against
dismissing the cause forthwith and completely as a political question,
evidently gave them some concern. In fact they insisted that the Court
"treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as
subject to judicial construction." They wanted an express disapproval
of the "conclusion arrived at in Dillon v. Gloss thatthe Constitution
impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must die unless ratified within a 'reasonable time'," together with a disapproval of
the Court's "prior assumption of power to make such a pronouncement."
In the separate opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter the position was
taken that the parties had "no standing in this Court" and that the
cause should be dismissed.
Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting, stood squarely on the conclusiorr
which he quoted from Dillon v. Gloss, namely, that "the fair inference
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or implication from Article V is that ratification must be within some
reasonable time after the proposal." In his judgment, upon the reasoning of the opinion in that case, "more than a reasonable time had
elapsed." Also, declaring that the non-justiciable character of the question had not been raised or argued at the bar, he urged that no decision should be rendered on the point that the Court lacks power to
determine what is a reasonable time for ratification.
-In the companion case of Chandler v. Wise, already referred to,
which brought up on certiorari similar questions concerning the validity of Kentucky's ratification and which had held the ratification invalid, the writ was dismissed on the ground that after the Governor
"had forwarded the certification of the ratification of the amendment
to the Secretary of State of the United States there was no longer a
controversy susceptible of judicial determination." Mr. Justice Black
and Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, referred to the opinion by the
former in the Kansas case and added: "We do not believe that state or
federal courts have any jurisdiction to interfere with the amending
process." s Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler thought that
the Kentucky judgment should be affirmed on the authority of Dillon
v. Gloss.
The result of it all seems to be: first, that the Court considers the
law already settled by "historic precedent" to the effect that a state can
change its vote from No to Yes (the same precedent refused a change
from Yes to No), and, second, that the Court will have nothing to do
with determining what is a reasonable time for ratification.
The first of these results itself involves something akin to a decision
on the merits. That is to say, when the Court declared that the historic
precedent of the Fourteenth Amendment "has been accepted" it was
in that very declaration making a pronouncement on the law. And it
will be recalled that the Court retained jurisdiction of the Kansas case
and affirmed the judgment, "but upon," as it added, "the grounds stated
in this'opinion."
Whether the Child Labor Amendment is now to be listed among
the quick or the dead, we do not know.9 That puzzle still survives notwithstanding the elaborate discussion of the general problem in the
present case. But the opinions do point the way for those who would
8

1t will be noticed that while Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion in the Kansas case concerning the political
character of the question they did not join in the present declaration of no jurisdiction.
9
Four other amendments have been proposed, two in 1789, one in 18io, and one
in 1861, and are "outstanding" in the sense that they have not been ratified.
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like to know what rules shall govern the game of amending the Constitution. The rules must be made by Congress, unless peradventure
Congress, eschewing rules, prefers to leave all questions open for decision if and whenever they may arise in connection with the ratification of any given amendment. But surely the law on such a basic matter as amending the Constitution ought to be known in advance; and
the judicial branch has here passed full responsibility over to the legislative.
Congress has done singularly little on the subject. Today the total
statutory content consists of one provision to the effect that it is the
duty of the Secretary of State to proclaim the adoption of an amendment whenever he has received official notice that the requisite number of States have ratified it.10 Even that provision was not thought
heretofore to have any striking legal significance, for the Secretary's
proclamation was treated, not as necessary to ratification, but as a means
of giving publicity to a result already accomplished. Dillon v. Gloss
was decided on the theory that ratification is complete as soon as the
last State required to make up the three-fourths has accepted the
amendment; furthermore, the Court will take judicial notice of such
state action."' The episode of December, 1933, may be recalled when,
with ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment already completed in
35 States, the thirty-sixth staged a performance not far from theatrical
in putting an end to prohibition.
But perhaps that feature of Dillon v. Gloss must also be taken with
reservation in the light of the new views of the Court. And one wonders
whether the same must be said of Hawke v. Smith, 12 National Prohibition Cases,13 and United States v. Sprague,14 where the, Court dealt
"The text of the provision is as follows: "Whenever official notice is received at
the Department of State that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the
United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the
Secretary of State shall forthwith cause the amendment to be published, with his
certificate, specifying the States by which the same may have been adopted, and that
the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution
of the United States." 5 U. S. C. 16o, from an Act of April 20, 1818.
uThus, with regard to the Eighteenth Amendment whose effective date was involved in the case, the Court said: "Its ratification, of which we take judicial notice,
was consummated January 16, gig. That the Secretary of State did not proclaim its
ratification until January 29, igig, is not material, for the date of its consummation,
and not that on which it is proclaimed, controls." (256 U. S. at 376.) To the same
effect, United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217, 222 (1934), concerning the effective
date of the Twenty-first as repealing the Eighteenth.
2253
U. S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 495 (1920)2,253 U. S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486
"258 U. S. 130, 42 S. Ct. 217

(1920).
(1922).
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with the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment; and of Leser v. Garnett,15 involving the validity of the Nineteenth. In all these cases the
Court passed on questions of procedure or substance, though it must
be said that they were decided in the absence of any explicit congressional legislation on the points involved. 16
The way is open, and the responsibility clear, for clarifying the
amending process by a comprehensive statute. Could Congress, notwithstanding the historic precedent, now prescribe that a State's first
vote on a proposed amendment shall be final, whether No or Yes,
U. S. 716, 51 S. Ct. 220 (1930).
"These cases covered features of the Eighteenth Amendment other than the time
factor discussed in Dillon v. Gloss. Thus in Hawke v. Smith it was held that when
Congress submits an amendment for ratification by legislatures a State has no authority to require the submission of ratification to a referendum under the State
Constitution; consequently, as sought in the case, an injunction should issue against
the spending of public money for that purpose. Here the Court passed on the meaning of the term "Legislatures" in Article V. In the National Prohibition Cases, which
comprised seven suits each seeking an injunction against the execution of the National Prohibition Act to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment, the Court, in the face
of elaborate argument to the contrary, concluded, inter alia, that the substance of
the Amendment "is within the power to amend reserved by Article V" and that the
"Amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution." United States v. Sprague was an appeal by the Government from an order
of the federal court in New Jersey quashing an indictment for violation of the National Prohibition Act. That court, entertaining the view that the convention method
was requisite for such an amendment, held that the amendment (ratified by legislatures) had not been validly adopted. In reversing this judgment the Supreme
Court, reiterating what was said in the National Prohibition Cases, declared that it
rests solely in the discretion of Congress to make the choice of method of ratification. In Leser v. Garnett the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of a Maryland
court dismissing a petition to require election officers to strike the names of specified
women voters from the registration list. The contention was made that the extension
of suffrage to women was so great an addition to the electorate that, absent the
State's consent (Maryland had refused to ratify), it would destroy the State's autonomy as a political body, and hence did not lie within the amending power. Other
contentions were that limitations either in state constitutions or in legislative procedure had not been complied with and that noncompliance made the ratifications
ineffective. All these contentions were considered and rejected.
Prior to these cases, Professor Orfield writes, the only instance in which the Supreme Court had passed on the validity of an amendment was Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798), concerning the Eleventh. Even there, however, he says,
the question had to do with the procedure by which the Amendment was adopted,
not with its content; and no point was made or discussed that the question was a
political one. In a later case, Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849), Professor Orfield
adds, the Court declared in dictum that it was political. As far as state courts are
concerned he finds that the decisions have been "virtually unanimous to the effect
that the question is judicial." He concludes that "it is not peculiar" that the Supreme Court "when it came to passing on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments was prepared to view the issue as judicial." The Federal Amending Power:
'282

Genesis and Justiciability (1930) 14 Minn. L. Rev. 369, 374, 379-
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thus preventing a shift in either direction? Presumably such action lies
within the competency of Congress under the view expressed by the
Chief Justice that the "question of the efficacy of ratifications by state
legislatures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal,
should be regarded as a political question." Certainly full Congressional freedom would be acceptable to Mr. Justice Black. Doubless
Congress could authorize the Secretary of State to make the determination, on grounds fixed by the statute, whether an amendment has been
adopted or rejected, and to proclaim the result. That would give
potency and dignity to the Secretary's proclamation. And much can be
said for making proclamations operate on a two-way street: ratification
when three-fourths of the States signify their acceptance; rejection
when more than one-fourth signify the contrary.
Congress might strike out on other lines for the purpose of making
the adoption or rejection of amendments depend upon a nation-wide
and substantially direct vote of the people. Thus, it might declare a
national policy that all amendments hereafter proposed shall be submitted for ratification or rejection by state conventions instead of legislatures, and provide that delegates to such conventions be chosen at
elections, general or special, held throughout the country on a given
date; that the election of delegates be accompanied by a state-wide
referendum on the adoption of the amendment, the result thereof to
bind the delegates; and that the conventions assemble and vote within
a specified time after the election.
To a considerable extent that method was tried and found satisfactory in the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, the only amendment so far ratified by conventions. 17 There, however, the individual
States, not Congress, enacted legislation embodying one or more of the
above noted provisions concerning the election of delegates and the
procedure of the conventions. The question whether Congress had
power to legislate along those lines was debated in the House when
the resolution submitting the amendment was under consideration, and
the House was divided in opinion.' 8
Large questions of power and policy are involved in any assertion
17

See A New Experiment in Ratification (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 383.
"Such legislation has been urged by publicists from time to time, and at least
one Bill has been introduced in Congress to that end. The Bill was introduced by
Mr. Wadsworth of New York in the 74th Congress. H. R. 29oo, and again in the 75 th
Congress, H. R. 299. Remarks of Mr. Wadsworth on the subject of the Bill will be
found in 79 Cong. Rec. 1264-68, January 3o, 1935, and 81 Cong. Rec. 1873-1876,
March 4, 1937.
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of congressional authority touching elections in the States. Manifestly it
is a matter of great delicacy in federal relationships. But within the
limited area of the election of convention delegates the question of
power, whatever may be said for or against the propriety of its exercise, wears a different aspect since the Child Labor Amendment decision was rendered.' 9
Even if Congress should resolve the issues of power and policy favorably and enact a law calling for the convention method and making
general provision for the conventions, the legislative program would
still be incomplete. Further legislation would be necessary in the States
themselves, complementary to the Congressional, to provide the local
machinery for the election of the delegates and to set it in motion upon
the submission of an amendment.
Legislation of that character in the States is needed whether Congress
passes such a law as the above or not. It is needed, that is, if the States
are to be equipped to proceed without delay in the event that Congress
should submit an amendment and, as it did in the case of the Twentyfirst, specify merely that it be ratified by conventions instead of by legislatures. Up to that time no laws had been passed under which such
a constitutional convention could be assembled. And if it had not been
for the efforts of individuals and private organizations it is likely that
the formulation of the necessary statutes would have been considerably
retarded. Even so, only sixteen States made their statutes general in
character, that is, designed to become operative whenever Congress
submits an amendment for ratification by conventions. The remainder
shaped their laws solely with regard to the proposed Twenty-first
Amendment; and those laws, their function in the ratification of that
Amendment hiving been performed, are dead letters now. They of
course furnish guides for legislative action if further proposals should be
submitted, but the point is that new state legislation would be necessary. At the present time not more than one-thirdl of the States are
ready' to proceed by the convention method for the consideration of
proposed amendments.
I A surprisingly sympathetic attitude towards national power was taken by the
States when they enacted statutes to provide for conventions to deal with repeal of
prohibition. About half of those statutes contained a provision to the effect that if
Congress should prescribe the manner in which the conventions shall be constituted
and should not make an exception of States which had enacted their own plans,
then the state statute "shall be ineffective" and state officers shall be authorized and
directed to act in obedience to the federal statute "as if acting under a statute of
this State." See the article cited in footnote 17-
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EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO PRICE v. NEAL:
The Virginia Solution in a Case of Double Forgery
Ca-ARLs R. McDOWELL

The case of CentralNational Bank of Richmond v. First and Merchants National Bank of Richmond' presents such an unusual factual
situation as to be unique.2 Certain fraudulent parties, desiring to get
possession of money standing to the credit of one Justin Moore in the
Central Bank, forge Moore's name as drawer of a check on the original
depository bank (Central Bank) and deposit it in the second bank
(Merchants Bank) to the credit of the same man, Moore. They then
forge checks on Moore's account in the Merchants Bank in order to
withdraw the funds for their own use. It is not at all unusual for a
forger to put money fraudulently withdrawn from the first bank into a
second bank and allow it to remain there for a short time before withdrawing it from the second bank. The device is apparently thought to
lull the first bank into security, the theory being that the original bank
i.ill be less suspicious of a transaction which simply transfers funds to
another solvent bank than it is of a transaction involving direct payment of cash. In the ordinary case, however, the money fraudulently
checked out of the first bank is placed to the forger's own credit in the
second bank and later withdrawn from the second bank by checks
drawn in his own name. In the ordinary case of this type, therefore, the
first check is a forged check but the second is not. While strange factual
situations are likely to arouse a certain amount of himan interest
among members of the legal profession, such cases are not always important as far as the legal problems are concerned. The unusual device
employed by this forger, however, has obliged the Court of Appeals of
Virginia to review the whole problem of Price v. Neals and to take a
position as to the true meaning of Section 62 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
1171 Va. 289, z98 S. E. 883 (1938).
2The opinion states that exhaustive briefs by able counsel fail to disclose a case
closely in point.

'3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
"Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5624: "The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance, and admits-. The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument, and 2. The existence of the payee
and his then capacity to indorse."
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The problem is: Since Section 62 of the N. I. L. is simply a direct
copy of Section 54 of the English Bills of Exchange Act, which in turn
is a legislative declaration of Pricev. Neal, and since the English Courts
had declined to recognize certain equitable exceptions to the Price v.
Neal doctrine which had grown up in the various jurisdictions in the
United States, did the passage of Section 62 of the N. I. L. constitute a
statutory abolition of the equitable exceptions to the Price v. Neal
doctrine?5 The significant point in the case, therefore, is that Virginia
has added itself to that list of jurisdictions which take the view that
the passage of Section 62 of the N. I. L. has not abolished the so-called
6
equitable exceptions to the Price v. Neal doctrine.
So far as necessary to the main point involved, the facts .may be
given as follows: A fraudulent party, who called himself Clancy, learned
that one Justin Moore had a substantial checking account with the
Central Bank. He forged Moore's name as drawer of a check for $85oo
on the Central Bank and deposited it in the Merchants Bank to the
credit of Moore. Previous to the time of this transaction, Moore already
had a substantial checking account with the Merchants Bank. 7 Central
Bank paid the full amount of the original check through the clearing
house to Merchants Bank. Clancy later withdrew $8149, or all except
$351 of the $8500, from the Merchants Bank by checks to which Moore's
name was forged. Moore discovered the forgery of the $85oo check and
demanded that the Central Bank recredit his account for that amount.
Central did recredit Moore's account s and demanded of Merchants
that they return the $85oo. Merchants refused and Central brought suit
against Merchants for money had and received under mistake. Merchants' main defense is that under the rule of Price v. Neal and Section
62 of the N. I. L., Central is not entitled to recover because of its legal
responsibility for recognizing its own depositor's signature. The case
was tried under a stipulation that neither party was guilty of any factual negligence, the forgeries in both instances being clever forgeries
upon Moore's own blank checks stolen from Moore's office. The trial
court gave judgment for the plaintiff bank for so much of the $85oo as
"See full discussion by Crawford D. Henning, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1911) 59 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 471, 497.
6

For recent cases see Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel,
1o L. R. A. (N. S.) 49.
'Except for this fact it might be argued that the method employed in withdrawing 8the money from the second bank did not constitute a forgery.
At the time Central recredited the account, Central took an assignment of
Moore's claim against the defendant. A considerable portion of the opinion relates
to the assignment but is unnecessary to the point herein discussed.
1938). For earlier cases see Note (19o7)
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had not been checked out of the Merchants Bank, or $351. The Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court and gave the plaintiff Central Bank
judgment for the full amount of the original check, or $8500.
In his opinion, Justice Spratley takes the following position: Vhere
the original bank pays to the second bank money on checks drawn on
the first bank to which the drawer's name has been forged, and the
second bank has paid out all of the money on authentic checks, the socalled rule of Price v. Neal or the rule of Section 62 of the N. I. L. prevents the original bank from recovering; but where the money paid by
the original bank is still in the second bank, the original bank may recover. Next, since the $8149 paid out by Merchants were mispayments
on forged orders, the court must treat the case as if the $85oo was in
fact still in the Merchants Bank. Ergo, the court says that the plaintiff
Central Bank can recover the full amount of $8500.
The opinion, upon analysis, is syllogistic. It amounts to this: If the
money is still in the second bank, the original bank may recover it. The
$85oo is in legal effect still in the second bank, the second bank having
paid out its own money on forged orders. Therefore, the first bank can
recover.
A generation of lawyers taught to look at a syllogism out of the
corners of their eyes may react to the opinion with suspicion. They may
ask themselves: Was the money still in the Merchants Bank; had not
Clancy taken most of it and spent it? Was not the whole case decided
when the meaning was put into the minor premise? Was the court justified in treating the case as if the money were still in the Merchants
Bank when it was irrecoverably gone?
It is believed that the decision would have been more palatable if
the court had simply said that Virginia is hereby deciding, as a matter
of policy, to take its position among those states which hold that the
established American equitable exceptions to the Price v. Neal doctrine
have not been abolished by Section 62 9 of the N. I. L.; that before the
N. I. L. there was respectable authority to the effect that a negligent
defendant was ineligible to invoke Price v. Neal as a defense in a suit
for money had and received under mistake of fact, 10 and that the legal
9

Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5624.
the opinion in American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Industrial Savings Bank, 242
Mich. 581, 219 N. W. 689 (1928) the following cases are cited as applying to so-called
equitable exceptions: Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Bingham, So Wash. 484, 71
Pac. 43 (19o2), 6o L. R. A. 955 (19o3); Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 33
(1820); American Express Co. v. State National Bank, 27 Okla. 824, 113 Pac. 711, 33
L. R. A. (N. S.) 188 (911); Woods v. Colony Bank, 114 Ga. 683, 40 S. E. 72o, 56'
2In
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negligence of the Merchants Bank in allowing the money to be withdrawn on forged orders prevented it from invoking the rule of Section
62 as a defense to this suit for money had and received under mistake.
Section 62 is a rather vague section of the N. I. L. So far as the problem of this case is concerned, Section 62 simply says that an acceptor by
accepting "admits" the genuineness of the drawer's signature. Since
payment of a check is held to have the same effect as a certification for
future payment, 1 our problem is: Since Central Bank "admitted" to
Merchants Bank that the signature to the original $8500 check was the
authentic check of Justin Moore, what was the legal effect of such
"admission"? Did Central by admitting the signature make such an irrevocable guaranty of the authenticity of Moore's signature that Central would be absolutely barred from bringing the matter up, regardless of the negligence of the Merchants Bank; or, on the other hand,
did Central simply make a representation implied-in-law or a holding
out implied-in-law which would be the basis of an equitable estoppel
in the event that Merchants was injured by reasonably and nonnegligently relying upon such representation? If Central's admission
means nothing more than a legal representation, then it may be reasonably contended that Merchants did not reasonably and non-negligently rely upon such holding out, because it was itself guilty of legal
negligence in allowing the money to be checked out on forged signatures of the drawer.
In Louisa National Bank v. Kentucky National Bank,' 2 decided by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1931, where the drawee (CatlettsL. R. A. 929 (1902); Continental National Bank v. Metropolitan National Bank, 107
III. App. 455; Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank, 66 W. Va. 545, 66 S. E.
761 (19o9), 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 605 (1912).
"In First National Bank of Portland v. U. S. National Bank of Portland, ioo Ore.
264, 197 Pac. 547, 552, 14 A. L. R. 479, 488 (1921) the following words appear: "It
will be observed that in § 7854, Or. L., [Sec. 62 N. 1. L.] the word 'accepting' and
not the word 'paying' is employed in the statute; and yet in all the states where the
question has been presented, except the state of Pennsylvania, where a different
course of legislation has produced a different result, and except in South Dakota...,
the courts have ruled that Section 62 is merely a legislative affirmation of the rule
announced in Price v. Neal, and that this section includes the payment as well as

the acceptance of a negotiable instrument on the theory that the section was intended
as a legislative adoption of the entire doctrine of Price v. Near." Also see case in
Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel, 1938) 761.
1239 Ky. 302, 39 S. W. (2d) 497 (1931).

It is noteworthy that the courts in cases like the Louisa Bank case require a
higher standard for eligibility to plead Price v. Neal as a defense than is required of
a purchaser to qualify as a holder in due course. The purchaser of bearer paper may
qualify as an h.d.c. without having the transferor identified. Goodman v. Simonds,
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burg Bank) had paid a check to the Louisa Bank under a forged drawer
signature, and the Catlettsburg Bank sued for money had and received
under mistake, the court allowed a recovery because the defendant
Louisia Bank had negligently cashed the check without having the
fraudulent transferor identified. The Kentucky court said:
"Some... [courts] hold that the provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Law adopt the rule in Price v. Neal, free from the
exceptions which the courts have grafted onto it.... Others hold
that the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law is merely a legislative affirmation of the rule of Price v. Neal with the equitable
exception.... The exception is not expressly included.... Nor
is it abrogated."' 3
It will be noticed that while the Kentucky court used the terminology of equitable exception, the result is the same as if the Kentucky
court had talked the language of estoppel. The drawee-payor bank
would have recovered if the Kentucky court had simply said that Section 62 provided that the drawee's paying a check constitutes an implied-in-law representation that the signature was genuine and that
the defendant's negligence prevented it from establishing reasonable
reliance. The only real difference between the Kentucky case and the
principal case is that in the Kentucky case factual negligence on the
part of the defendant bank was found in its cashing the check without
identifying the fraudulent transferor, whereas, in the principal case, the
court found legal negligence in the defendant's allowing the money to
be withdrawn on forged signatures.
Several different theories concerning the reason for the original rule
of Price v. Neal are discussed and analyzed by Mr. Woodward in his
textbook on the law of quasi-contract. 14 Among them appears the socalled "Change of Position Theory" which is in effect the same as the
estoppel theory. Mr. Woodward rejects this theory in favor of the view
that the reason for the rule lies in a general rule of policy-a broad
policy of promoting security by regarding payment as final and irrevocable so far as possible. But whatever may have been the original
reason for the rule, an examination of the cases in Beutel's recent reHow. 343, 15 L. ed. 934 (U. S. 1857). The apparent inconsistency is perhaps explained by the fact that the law of negotiable instruments is seeking to promote free
transfer as far as possible, whereas the law of quasi-contracts is based upon broad
equitable doctrines. While the problem of the Louisa Bank case involves an N. I. L.
section it is ambiguous and is interpreted in the light of quasi-contract law.
"Louisa Nat. Bank v. Kentucky Nat. Bank, 239 Ky. 302, 39 S. W. (2d) 497, 500-501
(1931).
"4Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (1931) §§ 81-88 inclusive.
2o
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vision of Brannon on Negotiable Instruments indicates that there is a
definite tendency for the courts to hedge about the doctrine with equitable limitations 15 and to arrive at the same result as if they actually
said: "Payment by the drawee bank amounts to a representation implied-in-law to the effect that the drawer's signature is genuine, which,
if reasonably and non-ndgligently relied upon by the bank receiving
payment, may estop the plaintiff bank to show that the money was paid
under mistake to the extent of the reasonable reliance, but not in case
of negligent reliance, nor beyond the extent of detriment actually
suffered."
That there is a trend toward reliance as a necessary element of the
defendant's right to invoke Price v. Neal or Section 62 as a defense to
a suit for money had and received, is indicated by the following cases.
In American Surety Company of New York v. Industrial Savings
Bank,16 where the collecting bank had been paid by the drawee bank
on a drawer's forged signature and had given the fraudulent party
credit which had not been drawn out, the defendant collecting bank
was held ineligible to invoke Section 62 as a defense. There was no reliance upon the representation. Again, in First State Bank & Trust
Company v. FirstNational Bank of Canton,'7 the court protected the
collecting bank to the extent of its reliance before notice. The Illinois
court permitted a recovery for so much of the money as had not been
withdrawn, and no more.
It is well to remember that these cases are to be decided under the
broad equitable principles of quasi-contract law so far as they are not
dearly modified by the statutory enactment found in Section 62 of the
N. I. L., the general rule of quasi-contracts being that money paid under a mistake of fact may be recovered by the payor from the recipient.
It is well to remember also that the so-called rule of Pricev. Neal is not
really an affirmative rule but a statutory exception to the general rule.
Therefore, to say that there are exceptions to the rule of Price v. Neal
amounts to saying that there are exceptions to the exception. By creating exceptions to the exception, we bring ourselves by circuitous and
2'See Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel, 1938) 769 for collection of cases decided under N. I. L. Mr. Beutel says: "Only two cases, however,
have been found, namely, National Bank of Commerce v. Mechanics American Nat.
Bank, 87 Neb. 841, 128 N. W. 552, and State Bank v. Cumberland Savings, etc., Co.,
168 N. C. 6o5, 85 S. E. 5, L. R. A. 19i 5 D, 1138, not citing the N. I. L. which seem to
hold that the drawee can not recover, even though the holder was negligent."
"242 Mich. 581, 219 N. W. 689 (1928).
27314 Ill. 269, 145 N. E. 382 (1924).
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awkward thinking back into the original affirmative rule. It would seem
simpler to think of Price v. Neal as merely a statutory exception to the
broad rule that money paid under mistake may be recovered and to
regard the so-called equitable exceptions to the so-called Price v. Neal
doctrine as mere qualifications of the statutory exception. The question
then becomes understandable and free from confusion. Shall we say
that the statutory exception to the general rule found in Section 62 is
limited to cases in which the defendant collecting bank has reasonably
and non-negligently relied upon the implied-in-law representation
found in Section 62; or, should the exception be broadened to amount
to an absolute guaranty of the drawer's signature irrespective of freedom from negligence or reliance? Virginia in deciding the CentralBank
case has limited the Price v. Neal exception to cases which show a
meritoriousness on the part of -the receiving bank justifying what
amounts to an estoppel. Thus far, the writer approves the case.
Whether the court has made a proper application of the rule is more
questionable. The present writer leaves the case with the feeling that
a man on a log would have thought that the Merchants Bank never
would have been subjected to any responsibility for determining the
authenticity of Moore's signature if Central had not gotten them mixed
up with the "crooks." If that is a straddle, the only answer is that a
system of law which never divides losses between equally innocent parties is likely in such a case to make straddlers or "rationalizers" of us all.
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NOTES
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION STATUTES

One answer of the Federal Government to the acute unemployment

problem which had confronted the nation during the depression years
was the Social Security Ad of 1935.1 Two titles of the Ad relate directly
to unemployment benefits. Title III authorizes the essential federal ap-

propriations, while Title IX imposes a federal tax upon those employers
who do not fall within the enumerated exceptions. The proceeds of this
tax are paid like other internal revenue collections. However, should
the taxpayer make contributions to an unemployment fund under a
state law, he is allowed a credit of not more than ninety per cent of the
federal tax. General control of the Ad is administered by the Social Security Board which is given power to establish standards of operation,
and to approve the state laws under which the government will make
credit allowances to employers contributing to a state fund.2 Thus it
may be seen that the Ad contemplates a coordinated state and federal
plan, directed toward alleviating the effects of wide-spread unemployment.3
1

Act of August 14, 1935, Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 3o-1307 (Supp.

1939).

2Section 9o3 provides that the Social Security Board shall approve any state law
which it finds provides that:
(i) All compensation is paid through such agencies as the Board may approve;
(2) No compensation is payable within two years of the first period with respect
to which contributions are required.
(3) All money received is payable to the Secretary of the Treasury to the credit
of the Unemployment Trust Fund;
(4) All money withdrawn shall be used solely in the payment of compensation;
(5) Compensation shall not be denied an individual for refusing to accept new
work under an enumerated list of conditions;
(6) The rights, privileges, and immunities conferred by the Act exist subject to
the power of legislative repeal or amendment.
'Prior to the passage of the Act, few states had imposed taxes for unemployment
insurance (Wisconsin, 1931, California, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New
York, 1935) because of the economic disadvantage to their commerce in competition
with that of states which did not have this type of tax.
Douglas, J., in Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 6o S. Ct. 279, 282 (1939):
under the coordinated scheme which the act visualizes, when Congress brought
...
within its scope various classes of employers it in practical effect invited the states
to tax the same classes. Hence, if there were any doubt as to the jurisdiction of
the states to tax any of those classes it might well be removed by that invitation, for,
in the absence of a declaration to the contrary, it would seem to be a fair presump-
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Influenced 4 by the provision for a federal tax credit to employers
coming within the provision of the National Ad, the legislatures of the
several states quickly adopted 5 corrollary Ads complying with the re6
quirements of the Social Security Board.
Employers who were opposed to payments thereunder first attacked
the whole plan as unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld the constitutionality, both of the Federal A% and
of the complementary state laws. 7 The opponents of the plan then
sought to avoid payments by a showing that they did not fall within
the scope of the employment relationships adopted by the state laws.
It is to this latter phase of litigation that the present inquiry is directed.
At the outset it must be borne in mind that the common law relationships of master and servant, principal and agent, and hirer and
independent contractor have different connotations and that the terms
employer and employee may be given diverse interpretations.8 Confusion in distinguishing between them has arisen because of a tendency
on the part of some courts and writers to use the terms "servant" and
"agent" interchangeably, and because of the lack of a definite standard by which to define the scope of the term "independent contractor."
In a strict sense "agent" denotes a commercial relationship while
"servant" refers to the manual or "service proper" relations, the distinction being chiefly in the degree of control exercised by the "master."9
Many tests have been resorted to in an effort to define an independent
contractor relationship, 10 but the most realistic approach to the probtion that the purpose of Congress was to have the state law as closely coterminious
as possible with its own. To the extent that it was not, the hopes for a coordinated
and integrated dual system would not materialize."
'The term "coerce" has been in ill repute since the decision of Stewart Machine
Co. v. Davis, 3o U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81 L. ed. 1279, io9 A. L. R. 1293 (1937).
"By August 16, 1937, all states and territories and the District of Columbia had
passed unemployment compensation laws, covering more than. 21ooo,ooo workers.

OSupra, note 2.
7Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 3o U. S. 495, 57 S. Ct. 868, 8x L. ed.
1245, iog A. L. R. 1327 (1937) upheld the constitutionality of the Alabama Act;
Helvering v. Davis, 3oi U. S. 619, 57 S. Ct. 904, 81 L. ed. 1307,

1o9

A. L. R.

1319

(1937) upheld the Federal Social Security Act; Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 3o U. S.
548, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81 L. ed. 1279,

1o9

A. L. R. 1293 (1937) upheld the Federal Social

Security Act. And see Howes Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts Unemployment Compensation Commission, 5 N. E. (2d) 720 (Mass. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 657, 57 S. Ct.
434, 8i L. ed. 867 (1937) upheld the Massachusetts Act.
'Restatement, Agency (1933) § 220, comment c.
'American Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Riplinger, 249 Ky. 8, 6o S. W. (2d) 115 (1933); Restatement, Agency (1933) § 220, comment c.
"°The test most relied upon has been "who had the right of control?" The weakness of this test, it has been argued, lies in the fact that it first necessitates a declara-
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lem is taken by the Restatement of Agency which enumerates a list of
factors to be considered in determining whether one is a servant or an
independent contractor. 1"
The unemployment compensation statutes under which questions
of an employer's tax liability have arisen may be classified broadly into
two major types. Under the first type, which the courts have interpreted
as affording a maximum coverage, decisions increase the tax burden by
extending the benefits of unemployment compensation to a class of employees who under the tests applied at common law might be termed
"independent contractors." Statutes of the second type have been interpreted as having a more limited scope, thus restricting the benefits to
that group of employees qualifying as common law "servants." This
diversity of interpretations, as will be subsequently shown, is due to a
fundamental difference in the various statutes, and to a tendency on
the part of the courts to define the employer and employee relationships for tax purposes by recourse to inapt decisions in unrelated
fields.12
tion of the relationship, and then an assertion that the defendant did or did not
have control. Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors (193o) 28 Mich. L. Rev.
365. More helpful has been the entrepreneur theory, under which liability is imposed
upon him who has in fact assumed the risk of profit and loss in the enterprise. Indicative of the entrepreneur are: (a) control, the ability to formulate and execute
policies, (b) ownership, legal title to the property used in the performance of the
production or marketing functions of the enterprise, (c) chance of profit and risk of
loss. The party having the majority of these attributes is the entrepreneur. Douglas,
Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 584.
"Restatement, Agency (1933) § 220 (2): "In determining whether one acting for
another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact,
among others, are considered: (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the
master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation,
with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required
in the particular occupation; (e)whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the
length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether
by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; and (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating
the relationship of master and servant."
"As precedents for their decisions the courts have relied upon cases arising in
the field of tort liability and those arising under the workmen's compensation acts.
It should be noticed, however, that in these cases the employment relationships involved are defined in common law terminology. In Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132
U. S.518, 10 S.Ct. 175, 33 L. ed. 44o (1899), a salesman was held to be a servant and
not an independent contractor, hence the employer was held liable for torts committed in the course of the salesman's employment.
In Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 93 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), an oil com-*
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Illustrative of the broad type of statute is the unemployment compensation act which was passed by the legislature of the State of Washington 13 pursuant to the provisions of the National Social Security
Ac. 1 4 The employment upon which the excise is levied is defined as:
"... service ... performed for wages or under any contract
of hire, written or oral, express or implied. . . . Services performed by an individual for remuneration shall be deemed to
be employment subject to this act unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the director that:
"(i) Such individual has been and will continue to be free
from control or direction over the performance of such service,
both under his contract of services and in fact; and15
"(ii) Such service is either outside the usual course of the
business for which such service is performed, or that such service
pany was held liable for the negligence of its distributing agent. The distributor
owned all the equipment and paid all of the expenses of conducting his business,
but was held to be a servant because an examination of the contract with the oil
company showed that a substantial degree of control over his activities was exercised
by the company. Contra: (minority) Greaser v. Appaline Oil Co., iog W. Va. 396,
155 S. E. 170 (1930).

In Bohanon v. James McClatchy Pub. Co., 16 Cal. App. (2d) 188, 6o P. (2d) 51o
(1936), a publisher was held not liable for the tort of a distributor who bought
newspapers from the publisher and sold them to subscribers along a prescribed route
even though the publisher had the right to take over the management of the route
at any time the distributor might prove unsatisfactory. The court held that this restriction merely assured a satisfactory quality of work, and that complete, unqualified control determines the master-servant relationship. Contra: Schmitt v. American
Press, 42 S. W. (2d) 969 (Mo. App. 1931).
In Mountain Meadow Creameries v. Industrial Accident Comm., 25 Cal. App.
(2d) 123, 76 P. (2d) 724 (1938), the widow of a dairy distributor was held not entitled to workmen's compensation insurance. It was shown that deceased was assigned an exclusive territory, required to sell only the company's products therein
from trucks of an approved body and color design. The contract between the parties
was terminable immediately for an enumerated list of causes. The court held that
these restrictions merely assured a satisfactory performance of the contract and that
they were not so detailed as to indicate a master-servant relationship. Contra: Press
Pub. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. of California, igo Cal. 114, 21o Pac. 82o (1922),
wherein a newspaper distributor was held entitled to workmen's compensation insurance; McDermott's Case, 283 Mass. 4, 186 N. E. 231 (1933), in which a journeyman steam fitter was held entitled to workmen's compensation insurance. Glielmi v.
Netherland Dairy Co., 254 N. Y. 60, 171 N. E. 906 (ig3o), where a dairy salesman was
held entitled to workmen's compensation insurance upon a showing that he bought
milk products from the company and resold to customers along a prescribed route.
He was required to hire the company's wagons, and to permit the company's representative to ride with him at any time to supervise the handling of the route. The
contract was terminable at the pleasure of the company. The court held that he was
a servant even though the contract was framed to suggest a different relation.
2-IVashington, Laws of 1937, Ch. 162, p. 574.
1
'Supra, note i.
1
Italics supplied.
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is performed outside of all of the places of business of the enterprises for which such service is performed; and 16
"(iii) Such individual is customarily engaged in an indepenof
dently established trade, occupation, profession or business,
17
the same nature as that involved in the contract of service."'
By establishing this statutory test which requires the concurrence
of these three essential items in order to entitle the employer to an exemption from the social security tax, it is apparent that the legislature
intended the concept of employment to be more inclusive than a mere
master and servant relationship. The Supreme Court of the State of
Washington adopted such an interpretation in the case of McDermott
v. State' s when it held that barbers employed under oral lease agreements19 were "employees" within the meaning of the At. The court
argued that it was unnecessary to decide whether or not the barbers
were "servants"

".

. . because the parties are brought within the purview

of the unemployment compensation act by a definition more inclusive
than that of master and servant." 20
Construing similar statutes, the courts of other jurisdictions have
been equally astute in making this differentiation between the statutory
definition of employment and the common law concepts designated by
the same words. Thus it has been held in Colorado 2' and North Caro"'Italics supplied.

17Washington, Laws of 1937, Ch. 162, § 19(g), p. 6og.
8s196
Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568 (1938), hereafter referred to as the McDermott
case.
1OIt was shown that at the time the National Industrial Recovery Act became effective the plaintiff, who held himself out as owner of the shop, entered into oral
lease agreements with his barbers. Under these agreements each was "leased" a chair
and the necessary barbering equipment in consideration of a percentage of the
gross receipts from the services performed on the chair. When any chair was temporarily vacated by the original "lessee" the lease was suspended. A barber working
at- a less advantageously located chair might move to the vacant one thus making
effective a new lease between himself and the plaintiff. These arrangements were
terminable by either party upon a week's notice, and under certain conditions by
the plaintiff without notice.
21196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568, 570 (1938): "We are clear that the so-called oral
lease agreements are, in fact, contracts of service within the meaning of the act. To
hold otherwise would be to ignore the realities of the case as disclosed by the ...
[plaintiff's] ... own testimony." It is of interest to note that no cases were cited in
the opinion.
2Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 88 P. (2d)
56o (Coo. 1939). In this case it appeared that the company assigned its general agents
to exclusive territories. These agents in turn contracted with district or special agents
who subsequently contracted with the various soliciting agents. A general control
was exercised over these agents by requiring them to observe certain "Rules and In-
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lina22 that insurance agents were "employees" and entitled to unemployment compensation. And the Utah Supreme Court has held that
a commission agent was within the purview of the Utah A&.23 Although
the New York Ac 24 does not establish a list of requirements which must
be met in order to exempt an employer from tax payments, its operation was extended to common law "independent contractors" when the
structions" in the issuance of policies, and by prohibiting full time agents from entering other lines of business except with the consent of the company. Each contract
denied that a master and servant relationship had been established with the company. Disregarding this provision, the court held that the company was not exempt
from the act since it had not shown a concurrence of the three conditions which the
legislature considered essential for an exemption. Accord: Equitable Life Insurance
Co. of Iowa v. Industrial Commission, 95 P. (2d) 4 (Coo. 1939).
2-Unemployment Compensation Commission of N. C. v. Jefferson Standard Life
Insurance CO., 215 N. C. 479, 2 S. E. (2d) 584 (1939). Therein an insurance company,
which required its agents to devote their full time to their duties, and to issue policies in accordance with the company's instruction, was held not to be able to qualify
under the three requirements for an exemption. "The clear and unequivocal meanings of those [statutory] definitions are strongly indicative of legislative intent ...
to disregard a number of the neat categories of the common law....

Although the

extent of the area encompassed by some of the definitions may cause surprise, the
duty of this Court is to expound and to interpret the law as it is given to us, not to
redraft it along lines which may seem to us more conservative and more desirable."
2 S. E. (2d) 584, 590- (Italics supplied.)

2Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 9i P. (2d) 512 (Utah
1939). In this case the company for which the agent sold products furnished him
with stationery, order books, and samples. It also made advances when the agent sold
to customers with good credit, and at times collected overdue accounts. The agent
furnished his own display room and kept his own hours. The contract was terminable
at the will of either party. In holding that this company had not qualified for exemption under the statutory test, the court declared that it was not bound by a
strict common law definition of "independent contractors." "The most independent
of independent contractors ... are not included in the class of individuals entitled
to benefits, but a class of individuals, who under strict common law concept of independent contratorship were other than employees, are entitled. We need not draw
the line. It is drawn for us by the act." 91 P. (2d) 512, 514 (Utah 1939). Upon pe-

tition for rehearing, 97 P. (2d) 582 (Utah 1939) the court said of the quotation just
given: "The language was merely illustrative, but we delete it so as to avoid confusion .... Since the act applies to a new field of law which has its own glossary and
defines the relationships to which it applies, the introduction of old concepts which
fitted into the conceptual pattern of tort liability carried over into this field may
only be confusing." (Italics supplied.)
2
1Ch. 32, Labor Law (Ch. 31 of the Consolidated Laws), Art. 18, § 502, as amended
June 1939, Ch. 662 § i: "'Employment,' except where the context shows otherwise,

means any employment under any contract of hire, express or implied, written or
oral, including all contracts entered into by helpers and assistants of employees,
whether paid by the employer or employee, if employed with the knowledge actual
or constructive of the employer, in which all or the greater part of the work is to be
performed within this state."
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court held that industrial home workers25 and news carriers26 were employees within its terms. Surprisingly, the Washington State Supreme
Court has not considered that it was bound by its prior decision in the
McDermott case. That decision was not only in effect overruled in the
case of Washington Recorder PublishingCo. v. Ernest,27 but the court
went further and substituted a wholly different test to be used in establishing the existence of an employer and employee relationship. In deciding that news carriers were "independent contractors" and not "employees" 28 within the meaning of the act, the majority of the court
argued that the statute merely established a guide and that the legislature really intended to include only common law "servants" within its
scope.29 In support of its decision the court quoted verbatim that com2Andrews v. Commodore Knitting Mills, 257 App. Div. 515, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 577
(1939). In this case the company sent raw materials to various home workers together with a statement of the price which would be paid for the finished garments.
The other equipment was furnished by the workers. Finished garments which met
the company's inspection were bought from the workers at the predetermined prices.
The court held that these workers were employees within the meaning of the act
since a sufficient control was exercised by the company to establish an employeremployee relationship.
6Matter of Scatola v. Bronx Home News Pub. Co., 257 App. Div. 471, 14 N. Y. S.
(2d) 55 (1939)- Therein a route carrier who delivered papers to subscribers of the publishing company was held to be an employee and not an independent contractor. It
was shown that his deliveries were made over a prescribed route to subscribers whose
names were furnished by the company. The carrier made an initial deposit for his
papers and at the end of each week paid the company's inspector for the papers
which he had delivered. His compensation was the difference between the price of
the papers to him, and the sale price to the customers. The contract was terminable
at the will of the company. "The relation between this carrier and publisher differs
from that of a newsboy who purchases papers and sells them on the street corner
through crying his wares. While this carrier paid the ... [coirpany's] . .. inspector
for the papers which he had delivered, his ownership was qualified, as they could be
used only in fulfilling the publisher's contract with its subscribers and in furthering
the effort of the publisher to obtain new subscribers. In determining whether a person is an independent contractor or an employee, the authorities deem the right to
'hire' and 'fire' of great importance." 257 App. Div. 471, 472.
71 9 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 78 (1939). Of the four justices who comprised the
majority only two had been on the bench when the decision in the McDermott case
had been rendered. Simpson, J. concurred in the decisions of both cases. Geraghty,
J. who had written the opinion in the McDermott case, concurred in the result in
the second case. The only mention made of the McDermott case in the majority
opinion concerns the right to bring this action under the declaratory judgments act.
'-The contract involved was the familiar "carrier contract" whereby the publisher "sold" the papers to the newsboy who in turn "resold" them to the publisher's
subscribers. The publisher assigned exclusive routes and supervised the handling of
accounts. The contract was terminable at the will of the publisher.
2The opinion states that the items in the statutory test do ".. . not differ from
the test employed at the common law and by this court in determination of the
question whether the relationship is that of employee or independent contractor.

1940]

NOTES

ment of the Restatement of Agency which was favorable to its position. 30 Had the court read a paragraph further it would have found
that "... The context and purpose of the particularstatute controls the
meaning [of the term "servant"] which is frequently not that which the
same word bears in the Restatement of this subject."13 1 By this process

of judicial legislation the court, violating the well-established rule of
statutory interpretation that the legislative definition must prevail,32
held that a concurrence of the three items in the statutory definition of
"employment" was not essential for exemption under the Ad. Since the
purpose of this broad statutory definition was to prevent the evasions
which arise from the refined distinctions attendant upon common law
concepts, 33 it would appear that the decision merely raised additional
problems of tax avoidance.
In contrast to the broad statutes of the Washington type are those
which correspond to the unemployment compensation acts of Connecticut 34 and Kentucky. 35 The employment upon which the Connecticut
excise is based is defined as ".... any service.., performed under any

express or implied contract of hire creating the relationshipof master
and servant." 36 The Connecticut court in Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Tone37 held that insurance agents hired under a con...In the enactment of the Unemployment Compensation Statute the legislature selected or picked out three elements to be considered. The legislature did not say, nor
is the language capable of that interpretation, that each of those elements must exist
one hundred percent in order to establish the relationship of independent contractor. Surely, the legislature did not intend to establish a different rule than that which
has heretofore been employed by this court. To hold otherwise would be to, in effect,
eliminate the relationship of independent contractor." 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718,
724 (1939)wRestatement, Agency (1933) § 220, comment a, b, c.
='Restatement, Agency (1933) § 220, comment d. (Italics supplied.)
mFox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333, 79 L. ed. 780 (1934);
Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 98 F. (2d) 66, 170 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938),
"It is a general rule that where a statute defines the meaning of words used therein,
the statutory definition must prevail, regardless of what other meaning may be attributable to it by other authorities, or even by common understanding"; Taran v.
United States, 88 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); State v. City of Des Moines, 266
N. W. 41, 42 (Iowa 1936), "In defining terms as applied to any given act, the legislature is its own lexicographer"; Unemployment Compensation Commission v. City
Ice and Coal Co., 216 N. C. 6, 3 S. E. (2d) 290 (1939).
23This point was argued by Blake, C. J. in his vigorous dissenting opinion in
which he urged the court to adhere to its decision in the McDermott case.
3'Connecticut, General Statutes, Supp. 1937, Ch. 28oa.
!Kentucky Statutes, 1939 Supp., § 4748g- 1 et seq.; Acts of 1936, 4th Extraordinary session, Ch. 7, as continued and replaced by Acts of 1938, Ch. 5o.
2'Connecticut, General Statutes, Supp. 1937, Ch. 28oa, § 8o3d. (Italics supplied.)
3.125 Conn. 183, 4 A. (2d) 640, 121 A. L. R. 993 (1939).
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tract which subjected them to a substantial degree of control38 were not
"servants" within the statutory meaning. It has been thought, however,
that because of the company regulations which govern the issuance of
policies and the division of territories, and the company prohibition
forbidding agents to engage in other business activities except with express permission, the agents qualified as "servants" within the restrictive
language of the act. 39 A subsequent decision by the same Connecticut
court in Jack and Jill, Inc. v. Tone4° would indicate that where the contract of employment merely creates the appearance of an independent
contractor relationship, the "master" will not be exempt from tax liability. That case presented a situation in which an ice cream company
sought to avoid payment of the tax by "selling" its products to its truck
drivers who in turn "resold" to customers along a prescribed route. It
was shown that at the end of each day's deliveries the "unsold" ice
cream was returned to the company for full credit, that the drivers were
required to "borrow" the company's trucks, and that they were required
to permit the company's inspectors to supervise the management of
the routes. In reaching its decision the court rightly held that since the
drivers had no substantial discretion as to manner of performance of
their services, they were mere "servants." It seems unfortunate, however, that the court, in defining the relationships which arose in an
entirely unrelated field of law, sought recourse to the common law con41
cepts of "servant" and "independent contractor."
The Unemployment Compensation Law of Kentucky differs from
the restrictive Connecticut Ad in several important particulars. In the
first place, the law specifically provides that "This At shall be liberally
construed to accomplish the purposes thereof." 42 Secondly, "'Covered
employment' means service performed for wages or under contract of
hire in which the relationship of the individual performing such services and the employing unit for which such services are rendered is,
as to those services, the legal relationshipof employer and employee." 43
3"For a fuller discussion of the contract see Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 88 P. (2d) 56o (Colo. 1939), supra note 21.
"Commenting upon this decision, in the case of Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 88 P. (2d) 56o, 567 (Colo. 1939), supra, note 21,
the court said: ".... a reading of the opinion in the Connecticut case will disclose
that the Supreme Court there placed a rather strained construction on the relationship of master and servant as applied to its Unemployment Compensation Act."
409 A. (2d) 497 (Conn. 1939).
4
1See Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. -Industrial Commission (on rehearing) 97
P. (2d) 582 (Utah 1939), supra note 23.
"Kentucky Statutes, 1939 Supp., § 4748g-21.
"Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 28o Ky. 8n, 134 S. W. (2d) 62o, 622. (Italics
supplied.)
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The Kentucky court in construing this statute apparently has adopted
a construction as narrow as that of the Connecticut decisions.
In the Kentucky case, the Indian Refining Company asked for a
declaration of its rights under the above act, and that it be adjudged
that a distributing agent was not an employee within the statutory definition. The Kentucky court in Barnes v. Indian Refining Co. 44 held
that this agent was an "independent contractor" and not within the
class of persons benefited by the Ad. In reaching such a conclusion the
court seemed to be influenced by these considerations: first, the control
exercised by the oil company was directed merely towards results and
not details; second, even though the legislature said that the act was to
be liberally construed it did not mean that its operation was to be extended to persons not within its letter; third, the act is a taxing statute
and should be construed most strongly against the taxing power; fourth,
one of the company's agents was a corporation and it is clearly apparent
that the legislature did not intend to include within the scope of the
45
Ad services rendered by corporations.
It seems unfortunate that this erroneous decision was considered as
controlling in another jurisdiction. 46 In the first place, it was shown,
and it has often been held,4 7 that the oil company exercised a substantial degree of control over the distributing agent. Secondly, it is difficult
to see how a statute of this nature can be "liberally construed to accomplish the purposes thereof" without extending its benefits to a larger
class of persons than is embraced within the common law concept of
"servant." Thirdly, this legislative declaration for liberality of construction should take precedence over the canon of interpretation that excises should be construed in favor of the taxpayer. And lastly, while the
"280 Ky. 8ni, 134 S. W. (2d) 62o (1939).
",In Texas Co. v. Wheeless, 187 So. 880 (Miss. 1939) construing a similar contract
under a similar statute, the court held that a consignment agent was without the
provisions of the act. Apparently the court was influenced by the facts that: (i) this
was an excise tax and hence should be construed most strongly against the taxing
power, (2) many of the consignment agents were corporations, and (3) "employment"
should be interpreted in its ordinary sense. Accord: American Oil Co. v. Wheeless,
187 So. 889 (Miss. 1939).

45Indian Refining Co. v. Dallman, 8 U. S. L., Week 441 (S. D. Ill. 1940).
"Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 93 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), and cases therein
cited. For a complete discussion of the consignment contracts and the control which
the petroleum companies exercise over their distribution agents and gasoline station
operators see, Gulf Refining Co. v. Fox, 11 F. Supp. 425 (S. D. W. Va. 1935) aff'd 297
U. S. 381, 56 S. Ct. 510 , 80 L. ed .731; Ashland Refining Co. v. Fox, 11 F. Supp. 431
(S. D. W. Va. 1935), aff'd, 297 U. S. 381, 56 S. Ct. 510, 8o L. ed. 731; Maxwell v. Shell
Eastern Pet. Prod. Co. Inc., 90 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S.
715, 58 S. Ct. 24 (1937)-
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legislature admittedly did not intend to bring the services rendered by
a corporation within the Ad, such a reason has no bearing upon the
present case. The question to be determined here is whether or not consignment agents in their individual capacities are to be considered employees of the company. Moreover, it might well be shown that it was
the intention of the legislature, even though the consignment agent was
a corporation, to consider the employees of the corporate agent employees of the oil company within the meaning of the A.
At the present time a prediction regarding the trend of decisions
under either type of statute would be mere conjecture. A brief summary
of the past decisions might, however, serve as a guide. Where an admitted control has been exercised by the "employer" over the details
of the services sought to be included within the ambit of an unemployment compensation statute, the courts have held that the person performing such services was entitled to the benefits of unemployment
compensation under either type of statute.48 Where it has been shown
that a substantial degree of control has been exercised by the employer,
but under a common law test an independent contractor relation can
be made out, cases arising under the narrow type of statute have held
that the individual performing the services under the contract was not
an "employee." 49 On the other hand, courts construing a broad statute
have held that an employment relationship subject to the At has been
established.5 0 Where no substantial degree of control could be shown,
the "employer" has been held not liable for tax payments under either
type of statute. 51
It is argued that the primary cause of these inconsistent decisions is
"Jack and Jill, Inc. v. Tone, 9 A. (2d) 497 (Conn. 1930); McDermott v. State, 196
Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d)568 (1938).
"Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 183, 4 A. (2d) 640,
121 A. L. R. 993 (1939); Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 28o Ky. 8xi, 134 S. W. (2d)
620 (1939); American Oil Co. v. Wheeless, 187 So. 889 (Mis . 1939); Texas Co. v.
Wheeless, 187 So. 88o (Miss. 1939).
"°Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Industrial Commission, 95 P. (2d) 4
(Colo. 1939); Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 88
P. (2d) 560 (Colo. 1939); Andrews v. Commodore Knitting Mills, 257 App. Div. 515,
13 N. Y. S. (2d) 577 (1939); Matter of Scatola v. Bronx Home News Pub. Co. 257 App.
Div. 471, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 55 (1939); Unemployment Compensation Commission v.
Jefferson Standard Life Insurance CO., 215 N. C. 479, 2 S.E. (2d) 584 (1939). Contra:
Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernest, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939).
"Probably the court which has been most liberal in its decision on this particular
point was the Utah court in Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission,
91 P. (2d) 512 (Utah 1939). It will be noticed, however, that even there the attempt
was made to establish the control element in order to hold that the commission agent
was an employee within the meaning of the Utah Act.
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the failure of the various legislatures to define clearly the employment
relationships which they intended to include within the scope of the
Ads. This failure, coupled with the economic predilections of the several courts,5 2 and their apparent inability to distinguish satisfactorily
between the relationships of master and servant, principal and agent,
and hirer and independent contractor, has unduly restricted the coverage of many of the statutes. In view of the purpose for which the Social Security Ad was passed, the fact that the older concepts of master
and servant arose in entirely different and unrelated fields, and the ease
with which evasions can be effected under an interpretation based upon
common law principles, it would seem that a liberal construction would
offer the better approach under either a broad or a narrow unemployment compensation statute.
EMERY COX, JR.

THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF LAW

The problem of the corporate practice of law, though not a new
one in the courts,' has in recent years been receiving wide spread attention due to the increased activities of trust companies and collection
agencies.2 The rapid increase in the number of trusts being administered by banks and trust companies in the United States,3 each maintaining a separate legal department with its own attorney-employee officers drafting various types of instruments which the lawyer has been
accustomed to designate as legal instruments, and the drafting of which
to the mind of the average attorney constitutes the "practice of law,"
r'See Unemployment Compensation Commission of N. C. v. Jefferson Standard
Life Insurance Co., 215 N. C. 479, 2 S. E. (2d) 584 (1939), supra note 22, and Stone, J.,
dissenting in Morehead v. People of the State of New York, 298 U. S.587, 633, 56 S.
Ct. 918, 933, 8o L. ed. 1347 (1936).
'As early as Lord Coke's day it was the recognized doctrine that a corporation
could not appear "in person" by its officers or agents, who were not attorneys, in an
action against itself. i Coke On Litt. 66b.
2Otterbourg, Collection Agency Activities: The Problem From the Standpoint of
the Bar (1938) 5 Law and Contemp. Prob. 35, "There are now functioning in the
United States approximately four hundred twenty-nine committees on unauthorized
practice of law in addition to the National Committee of the American Bar Association."
3Encyc. of the Social Sciences (1935) 12,5, "In the year ending June 30, 1933, it
was reported by the comptroller of the currency that national banks were administering over ioo,ooo individual trusts with assets aggregating over $6,oooooo,ooo and
were handling corporate trusts . . . aggregating over $So,ooo,ooo,ooo." See also i
Powell, Cases and Materials on Trusts and Estates (1932) 41-47.
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has furnished a major source of the litigation. Collection agencies have
likewise fallen under the ban against the corporate practice of the law
because, even though attorneys are hired by the agencies to collect
debts, such attorneys are answerable to the agencies rather than to the
creditor members upon whose claims suits are being brought.
A corporation, being an artificial entity which exists only in con4
templation of law, has neither the right nor the power to practice law.
The reasons assigned for excluding corporations from the practice of
law have regard to the special nature of the attorney's calling. The
practice of the legal profession calls for skill and knowledge, necessarily involves the intimate and confidential relationship of trust and
confidence which exists between attorney and client, and is subject to
the power of the courts to use summary proceedings by disbarment or
otherwise, if necessary, to enforce on the part of the attorney observance of obligations and duties growing out of this relationship. The
courts hold that a corporation cannot adequately satisfy these considerations. 5 It is conceded that a corporation could comply with the prerequisite of skill and knowledge by hiring licensed attorneys to act for
it, but the cases uniformly hold that the practice of law by corporations
would be destructive of the relationship of trust and confidence between attorney and client 6 should the corporation intervene as an em7
ployer of attorneys.
The exclusion of corporations from the practice of law has been effected in various ways and upon differing theories. Courts in some
4
People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922); Pacific
Employers' Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, io Cal. App. (2d) 592, 52 P. (sd) 992 (x935); Boykin

v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 51, 162 S. E. 796 (1932); In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co.,
49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1931); In re Otterness, 181 Minn.
254, 232 N. W. 318 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1319 (1931); In re Co-operative Law Co., 198
N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1gao), 139 Am. St. Rep. 839, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 55 (191), 19

Ann. Cas. 879.
TPeople v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 2o9 Pac. 363 (1922); In re
Shoe Manufacturers' Protective Ass'n, 3 N. E. (2d) 746 (Mass. 1936); People v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (1919), rev'g 18o App. Div. 648,
168 N. Y. S. 278 (1917); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n of City of Richmond, 167 Va. 327, 189 S. E. 153 (1937); State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants' Protective
Corp., 1o5 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
'People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 2o9 Pac. 363 (1922); United
States Title 8. Guaranty Co. v. Brown, 166 App. Div. 688, 152 N. Y. S. 470 (1915); In
re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910), 139 Am. St. Rep. 839, 32
L. R. A. (N. S.) 55 (1911), 19 Ann. Cas. 879; Montgomery v. Utilities Ins. Co., 117

S. W. (2d) 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants' Protective
Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
7See Jackson, The Establishment of Cordial Relations Between the Bar and the
Corporate Fiduciary (1938) 5 Law and Contemp. Prob. 8o.
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states have excluded corporations from law practice under the power
which "inheres" in courts to determine who shall practice law.8 Even
if the charter attempts to empower the corporation to engage in practice, the provision is held to be void because the practice of law is not
a business open to the public generally but is subject to the regulation
of the courts.9 Statutes which permit the organization of corporations
for the purpose of carrying on any business which an individual can
lawfully conduct do not give the corporation the right to practice law,
since the individual has no such right unless he complies with the requirements set forth by the courts and the legislatures. A number of
states have forbidden the corporate practice of law by adopting special
statutes on the subject. 10 Where this has been done, the courts uniformly uphold the statutes. It is only where the legislature attempts to
set a standard below that required by the court for the practice of law,
that a conflict arises. In such cases the legislative action of formulating
requirements is held by the courts as setting only a minimum standard,
and the courts may go above these requirements and apply higher
standards to those desiring to practice law.'1
"In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935); Compare:
Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932); In re Cannon, 2o6 Wis. 374,
24o N. W. 441 (1932); Ex parte Stackler, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934), where the

same principle was applied to individual persons rather than to corporations.
"People v. Merchants' Protective Corporation, 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922);
Creditors National Clearing House v. Bannwart, 227 Mass. 579, 116 N. E. 886, Ann.
Cas. i 9 x8C, 130 (19o7); State ex rel. v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n of Chattanooga, 163
Tenn. 450, 43 S.W. (2d) 918 (1931).

"'2 Ark. Laws (1929) Art. 182; Cal. (Pol. Code) §§ 4o13 subd. 11, 4115, 4300i (Civ.
Code) §§ 172c, 1296b; Idaho Code (1932) § 3-104; 111. Rev. Stat. (Smith Hurd, 1929)
c. 32, § 411-415; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §§ 30909, 4-36o,

4-3602, 4-3605; La.

Rev. Stat. Ann. (Marr Supp., 1926) §§ 55-56; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 221, §§ 46-47;
Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 27, § ig; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) c. 197, § 10175;
Minn. Laws (1931) c. 114; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) c. 78, §§ 11692-11693; Mont. Rev.
Code (1935) §§ 8944-9067; N. J. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1924) §§ 52-214p-r
52-214; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41 §§ 280-28ia; N. D. Comp.
1925) § 811, as amended by Laws of 1933, c. 143; Ohio Gen. Code, §
Code Ann. (193o) §§ 32-5o4, 32-5o6, 22-1213; R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) c.

(Supp. 1930)
Laws (Supp.

8623-3; Ore.
401, § 6238;

Texas Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 43oa; Utah Laws (1927) c. 78, § 345; Va. Code
1919, § 3422 as amended by Acts 1922, c. 389 sec. 1;Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington,
1922) § 3231a (applies to trust companies alone); W. Va. Code (1931) c. 3o Art. 2, § 5.

See People ex rel. Committee on Grievances of Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Denver
Clearing House Banks Performing Trust Functions, 99 Co1. 50, 59 P. (2d) 468 (1936),
where corporations were excluded from the practice of law by special rule of the
Supreme Court.
nIn re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, i8o N. E. 725, 727 (1932): "Statutes
of that nature are valid provided they do not infringe on the right of the judicial
department to determine who shall exercise the privilege of practicing in the courts.
...Where and so far as statutes specify qualifications and accomplishments, they
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When sued, corporations cannot appear "in person" by their own
officers who are not attorneys. 12 Nor may they engage in the practice of
law for other persons by hiring attorneys to act for them; 13 and if they
do render the services in violation of this rule, they will not be allowed
to recover compensation. 14 Even if all the officers and directors of the
corporation are attorneys, still the corporation will not be permitted to
represent a client through its lawyer-officials.' 5 In the latter situation
the courts point out that as the interest of such officers is subject to
transfer by sale, what was formerly a corporation composed entirely of
lawyers may later become one composed only of lay directors and officers, with the corporation still retaining the same rights, powers and
duties.
Whether trust companies should be forbidden to draw instruments
which are normally incident to their business, has proved to be a diffiwill be regarded as fixing the minimum and not as setting bounds beyond which
the judicial department cannot go." Ex parte Stackler, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934);
In re Cannon, 2o6 Wis. 374, 240 N. V. 441 (1932).

"Nightingale v. Oregon Central R. Co., 18 Fed. Cas. 239, No. 10, 264 (C. C.
D. Ore. 1873); Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo. 586, 216 Pac. 718 (1923);
Nispel v. Western Union R. Co., 64 Ill. 311 (1872); Clark v. Austin, 34o Mo. 467,
'Ol S. W. (2d) 977, 982 (1937): "A corporation is not a natural person. It is an artificial entity created by law. Being an artificial entity it cannot appear or act in person.... In legal matters, it must act, if at all, through licensed attorneys"; Culpeper
National Bank Inc. v. Tidewater Imp. Co., 119 Va. 73, 89 S. E. 118 (1916). Contra:
Sellent-Repent Corp. v. Queens Borough Gas and Electric Co., 16o Misc. 920, 921,
29o N. Y. S. 887 (1936), Brower, J., holding that a corporation may appear in person
by its officers who are not attorneys when the complaint was subscribed in the corporate name said: "When a corporation does not go outside its own corporate machinery in the performance of a corporate act, it is acting in person and upon an
equal footing with a natural person, including the right to sue in person."
nPeople v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922); Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, io Cal. App. (2d) 592, 52 P. (2d) 992 (1935); Boykin
v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932); In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co.,
49 Idaho 28o, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1931); In re Otterness, x8i Minn.
254, 232 N. W. 318 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1319 (1931); In re Co-operative Law Co., 198
N. Y. 4.79, 92 N. E. 15 (1910), 139 Am. St. Rep. 839, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.)55 (191), 19

Ann. Cas. 879.
uMidland Credit Adjustment Co. v. Donally, 219 Ill. App. 271 (1926); Collacott

Realty Inc. v. Homuth (Ohio Municipal Ct. Cleveland 1939), 6 U. S. L. Week 761;
Crawford v. McConnell, 173 Okla. 520, 49 P. (2d) 551 (1935). But see United States
Title and Guaranty Co .v. Brown, 166 App. Div. 688, 152 N. Y. S.470 (1915), where

a corporation which had made a contract with a third person to undertake legal
proceedings in violation of § 28o of the Penal Laws of New York, was permitted to
compel an attorney to account for money in his possession belonging to the corporation. The court held that public policy would not permit the attorney to profit by
his own wrongful act though the corporation earned the money in the unauthorized
practice of law.
"People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal.
App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089 (1926).
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cult problem for the courts. The cases are uniform, however, in holding
that a trust company may not engage in the supervision and drafting
of complicated legal instruments, such as wills, and trust agreements
of a testamentary nature.' 6
Some courts have taken a rather liberal approach which permits
both corporations by their attorneys, and individuals who are not lawyers, to draft simple, stereotyped, non-testamentary instruments, providing no consideration has been charged for such services. 17 Opposed
to this view, however, there is substantial authority holding that neither
the simplicity of the instrument,' 8 nor the fact that a consideration may
or may not have been charged 19 is the controlling factor. Most of these
cases look to see whether legal skill and knowledge have been employed
in the preparation of instruments which secure legal rights.2 0 Trust
agreements, as such, have been held to be complicated instruments the
drafting of which requires legal skill and knowledge. 21 If this view be
followed, then even jurisdictions that permit corporations by their attorneys and unlicensed individuals to draft simple, stereotyped instruments would forbid the drawing of trust agreements by corporations.
"'People ex rel. Committee on Grievances of Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Denver Clearing House Bank, 99 Colo. 5o, 59 P. (2d) 468 (1936); In re Eastern Idaho Loan and
Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (gai); In re Shoe
Manufacturers' Protective Ass'n, 3 N. E. (2d) 746 (Mass. 1936); State ex inf. Miller v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74 S. W. (2d) 348 (1934); People v. Peoples'
Trust Co., 18o App. Div. 494, 167 N. Y. S.767 (1917).
1"In re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73
A. L. R. 1323 (1931). Cf. In re Matthews, 62 P. (2d) 578 (Idaho 1936); Crawford v.
McConnell, 173 Okla. 520. 49 P. (2d) 551 (1935). See People v. Title Guarantee and
Trust Co., 277 N. Y. 336, 125 N. E. 666, 671 (1919) (concurring opinion); Cain v.
Merchants' Nat. Bk. & Trust Co., 66 N. D. 746, 268 N. W. 719 (1936).
"Clark v. Reardon, 1o4 S. W. (2d) 4o7 (Mo. App. 1937). See People v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 277 N. Y. 336, 125 N. E. 666, 670 (1919) (concurring opinion).
1
iDn re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (193o) (court
was concerned with whether the work required the application of a legally trained
mind); People v. Association of Real Estate Tax-Payers, 354 Ill.
102, 187 N. E. 823
(1933); Clark v. Reardon, 104 S. W. (2d) 407 (Mo. App. 1937); People v. People's
Trust Co., i8o App. Div. 494, 167 N. Y. S. 767 (1917); Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash.
167, 19 P. (2d) 942 (1933), 90 A. L. R. 278 (1934).
21 Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E. 796 (1932); In re Eastern Idaho Loan
& Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1931); Ely v. Miller,
7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N. E. 836 (1893); Matter of Pace, 170 App. Div. 818, 156 N. Y. S.
641 (1915); In re Duncan, 83 S. C. 186, 65 S. E. 210 (1909), 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 750
(igio), 18 Ann. Cas. 657 (1911).
"Cain et al. v. Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo, 66 N. D. 746, 268
N. W. 719, 723, 724 (1936): "The drawing of complicated legal instruments such as
wills or trust agreements require more legal knowledge than is possessed by the
average layman.... One who draws such instruments for others practices law even
though such instruments might, to some extent, be incident to a business such as
that usually conducted by trust companies."
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In the case of Merrick v. American Security and Trust Company,22
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by a
two to one decision, recently held that a trust company organized to
carry on a fiduciary business as "executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, agent, custodian, and manager," was not engaged in the practice
of law by drafting simple, nontestamentary trust agreements, where the
corporation was named a party in the instrument. The court's position
was that the company should be permitted to draw such instruments as
are "incidental to the authorized business" of a trust company. This
decision represents a definite departure from the usual holding that a
trust company may not draft trust agreements. Cases taking the more
restrictive position hold that a trust company cannot participate in the
drafting of trust agreements by its own attorney-employees, 23 although
the trust company may take all necessary steps, legal or otherwise, in
the execution of such trust agreements once the instrument has been
drawn and the company made a party thereto 2 4
Besides being contrary to the weight of authority, the holding in
the American Security case, is questionable because of the nature of the
case authority relied upon by the prevailing justices. Two of the cases
cited as supporting the rule there adopted did so only by way of dicta, 25
2107 F. (2d) 271 (D. C. App. 1939), cert. denied, 6o S. Ct. 380 (x94o). The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, a six-judge court, now sits in
"divisions" of three judges.
1
3People ex rel. Committee on Grievances of Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Denver Clearing House Bank, 99 Colo. 50, 59 P. (2d) 468 (1936); In re Eastern Idaho Loan and
Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (193o), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1931); In re Shoe
Manufacturers' Protective Ass'n, 3 N. E. (2d) 746 (Mass. 1936); State ex inf. Miller v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74 S.W. (2d) 348 (1934); People v. People's
Trust Co., i8o App. Div. 494, 167 N. Y. S.767 (1917).
"Where statutes authorize trust companies to act as executors and administrators, the companies may, after being so appointed, take such action by their own
attorneys as is necessary to probate the will, or carry out the trust agreement. Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276 N. W. 365 (1937);
Judd v. City Trust and Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N. E. (2d) 288 (1937). Contra: In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318, 320 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1319,
1322 (1931), 15 Minn. L. Rev. 107: "An executor, administrator, or guardian, as such,
has no right to conduct probate proceedings, except in matters where his personal
rights as representative are concerned, as, for instance, where his account as representative is in question, or misconduct is charged against him as representative."
21 People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (1919) was
cited by the majority as holding that a trust company might draft such instruments
as are "incidental to the authorized business of the corporation." All the case actually
held, however, was that a corporation might draw such simple instruments as laymen in the state were permitted to draw, if there was no pretense or simulation to
the character of an attorney by such corporation, as the giving of legal advice. Childs
v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934), cited as authority that real estate brokers
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while another hinged on the peculiar construction of a local statute
which was not involved in the American Security case.26 Three other
cases relied upon are equally weak as authority on the point for which
27
they were cited.
The position taken by Mr. Justice Stephens in his dissenting opinion in Merrick v. American Security and Trust Company,2s that the
drafting of trust agreements by trust companies did constitute the corporate practice of the law, unquestionably represents the majority view
on the question in this country. 29 The view of the dissent was that the
may draw such instruments as are incidental to their business, did not contain such
a holding by that court. The actual holding of the case found a stenographer guilty
of the practice of law by drawing legal instruments for hire. The dictum of the
court on the point dealing with real estate brokers was in response to briefs filed
amici curiae by such brokers, but did not constitute a holding by the court.
^4Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276 N. W. 865
(1937) permitted the drafting of revocable trust agreements by a trust company; but
it should be noted that as the legislature had granted certain specific exemptions from
its prohibition of the corporate practice of law, the court felt it had no power to intervene unless the practice of law by such corporations took place in one of the courts
of the state. Even this is not a majority view on the point involved. Other states having similar statutes have held that it is a judicial function, not a legislative power, to
determine what amounts to the practice of law; and in so far as the legislature attempts to grant trust companies the right to practice law, such a law is unconstitutional. People ex rel. v. People's Stock Yard Bank, 344 II. 462, 176 N. E. 9o (1931)People ex rel. Motorists Ass'n, 354 Ill 595, 188 N. E. 827 (1933); In re Opinion of the,
Justices, 18o N. E. 725 (1932); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55
R. I. 122, 179 AtI. 139 (1935), 1oo A. L. R. 226 (1936).
2"Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones, 13o S. W. (2d) 945 (Mo. 1939), was relied
upon for the holding that an insurance company could have its lay adjusters fill out
and obtain releases on claims by third parties against their insured; yet the court
pointed out that what the adjuster did in the settlement of claims bore no relation to
the practice of law since the adjuster did not purport to advise any claimant on his
legal rights but merely made a statement of the amount the company would settle the
claim for; that the interests of the claimant and the adjuster instead of being confidential (as in attorney-client relation) were actually adverse. Cain et al. v. Merchants
National Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo, 66 N. D. 746, 268 N. W%.719 (1936) was cited
to show that a trust company drafting simple instruments was not representing that
it gave legal advice. The case actually held, however, that trust agreements werecomplicated instruments and one who drew them was engaged in the practice of law
even though such instruments might, to some extent, be incidental to the business
transacted, such as a trust business. Judd v. City Trust & Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St81, 12 N. E. (2d) 288 (1937) is not authority for the proposition for which it was cited,
that in performing the legal phases of a trust business, attorney-employees of a trust
company are acting for their employer. For this case also holds that the drafting of
trust agreements requires the exercise of legal skill and knowledge for the customers
of the bank who want such instruments drawn. Drawing such instruments by trust
companies is the unauthorized practice of law even though the trust company is
named trustee in the instrument drawn.
2o107 F. (2d) 271, 278 (D. C. App. 1939).
- People ex rel. Committee on Grievances of Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Denver Clearing House Bank Performing Trust Functions, 99 Colo. 50, 59 P. (2d) 468 (1936); In
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criterion for judging whether a trust company's activities constitute the
practice of law should be: "Does the legal service rendered (whether
advice, or the determination whether to use an instrument and if so
what should be the nature and contents thereof) require in a substantial sense the knowledge and judgment of a lawyer; and is it rendered
in whole or in part to a customer of the corporation rather than solely
to the corporation." 30
-Collecting agencies which solicit claims for collection for a fixed
fee, where no resort to the courts is had in the enforcement of such
claims, are held not to be engaged in the corporate practice of the
law.31 They may not, however, employ the services of an attorney in
putting the claim through the courts without falling into the prohibited field of corporate law practice.32 The courts point out that if
an incorporated collection agency engages an attorney to sue on a claim
placed with it for collection, its inability as a corporation to practice
law requires that the relation of attorney and client be established between the attorney employed and the dreditor, rather than between
agency and creditor with the attorney acting as a mere employee of the
agency.33 It makes no difference that the charter of incorporation authorizes the collecting agency to employ attorneys in order to collect
the claims of third parties. 3 4 Attempts by collection agencies to evade
the rule against corporate practice of law by having the creditor make
re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co., 49 Idaho 28o, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73 A. L. R.
1323 (1931); State ex inf. Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74 S. W.
(2d) 348 (1934); Cain et al, v. Merchants Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 66 N. D. 746,
268 N. W. 719 (1936); Judd v. City Trust and Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N. E.
(2d) 288 (1937).
3MMerrick v. American Security and Trust Company, 1o7 F. (2d) 271, 284 (D. C.
App. 1939)3TNeander v. Tillman, 232 App. Div. 189, 249 N. Y. S. 559 (1931); In the Matter
of the Application of Associated Lawyers' Co., 134 App. Div. 350, 119 N. Y. S. 77
o
(1939); Public Service Traffic Bureau v. Haworth Marble Co., 4 Ohio App. 255, 178
N. E. 703 (1931); Kendrick v. State, 218 Ala. 277, 120 So. 142 (1928); State v. James
Sanford'Agency, 167 Tenn. 339, 69 S. W. (2d) 895 (1934).
*2People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App.
354, 244 Pac. 1089 (1926); Creditors National Clearing House v. Bannwart, 227 Mass.
579, 116 N. E. 886 (1917), Ann. Cas. 1918C 13o; Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar
Ass'n of the City of Richmond, 167 Va. 327, 189 S. E. 153 (1937).
wState ex rel. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n of Chattanooga, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S. W.
(2d) 918 (1931); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n of the City of Richmond,
167 Va. 327, 189 S. E. 153 (1937).
"People v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089 (1926);
People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922); In re Eastern
Idaho Loan 8: Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 175 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1931);
Creditors' National Clearing House v. Bannwart, 227 Mass. 579, 116 N. E. 886 (1917),
Ann. Cas. 1918C 13o; State ex rel. v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n of Chattanooga, 163
Tenn. 450, 43 S. W. (2d) 918 (1931).
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an assignment of the claim to the agency for collection, where no consideration is paid for the assignment and the agency merely retains its
fee after collection and sends the balance to the creditor, have been
equally unavailing. 35 The proper course open to the agency after its
demands for payment from the debtor have failed, has been pointed
out in the case of State ex rel. McKittrick v. C. S. Dudley & Co. Inc.3 6
The court there said:
"If collections cannot be made without the services of an attorney, the respondent [collection agency] should return the
claim to the creditor who should be free to select and employ his
own attorney. The respondent should not engage directly or indirectly, in the business of employing an attorney for others to
collect claims or to prosecute suits therefor, nor have any interest in the fee earned by the attorney for his work."
The case authority which exists on the subject of the corporate
practice of the law still dearly denies a corporation the right to practice law. Only when the corporation is the real party in interest to the
litigation may its own attorney-employees handle the case in the courts
for the corporation. Some writers suggest that the reason for the rule
denying the corporation the right to practice law no longer exists, because a court could very well subject corporations to the same requirements as are now imposed upon attorneys, thereby eliminating any
possibility of an unfair advantage being taken of the dient.37 Others,
however, feel that the advent of the corporation into the field of the
practice of law would be utterly destructive of the essential personal
38
element.
It would seem that if corporations practicing law could be held to
the same rigid requirements as are now imposed upon attorneys, the
possibility of public sentiment demanding that they be permitted to
practice may ultimately prevail. And this for the reason that a cormState ex rel. McKittrick v. C. S. Dudley & Co. Inc., 340 Mo. 852, 1o2 S. W. (2d)
895 (1937); State ex rel. Freeboum v. Merchants' Credit Service, 1O4 Mont. 76, 66 P.
(2d) 337 (1937); State v. James Sanford Agency, 167 Tenn. 339, 69 S. W. (2d) 895
(1934). Cf. Mutual Bankers Corp. v. Covington Bros. & Co., 277 Ky. 33, 125 S. W.
(2d) 202 (1939).

-"34o Mo. 852, 1O2 S. IW. (2d) 895, 902 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 693, 58 S. Ct.
L. ed. 535 (1937).
m(1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1114, 1118: "The fear that the entrance of corporations
into the field of law will cause a lowering of the standards of the bar is derived
largely from the impersonal nature of such organizations. But it would not be impracticable to impose the same requirements on corporations that are now imposed
on private attorneys."
ujackson, The Establishment of Cordial Relations Between the Bar and the Corporate Fiduciary (1938) 5 Law and Contemp. Prob. 80.
12, 82
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porate law organization would be able to render a specialized form of
:service at a reduced fee, due to the volume of business transacted. The
allowance of corporate practice could not be accomplished by statutory
,enactment alone, in view of the present holdings of the courts that
theirs is the inherent power to say who may practice law. 39 Indicative
-of the care with which courts guard their authority is the holding in
-Ex parte Stackler.40 There an act of the state legislature which gave
the graduate of a state university law school the right to practice law
automatically on receiving his degree was incorporated into the state
constitution by amendment. The court held, however, that this amendment did not deprive the supreme court of the state of the right to demand further proof of qualifications by requiring such applicant to
take the state bar examination. The court purported to obviate the
constitutional problem by saying it could have required higher standards than those set by the legislature, and the mere putting of such a
statute into the form of a constitutional amendment gave it no greater
-efficacy than a legislative enactment. It would seem, however, that since
so
-courts may be created or abolished by constitutional amendment,
41
may their powers be curtailed by the amending process.

Lzsu D. PRicE

3in re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935); Ex parte
Stackler, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934).
40179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (igs4)1
' In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W. 441 (1932).
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ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw-POWER

OF FEDERAL COURT UPON REMAND

TO

DETERMINE PROCEDURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY. [United States

Supreme Court]
A significant decision in the field of administrative law and procedure has recently been rendered by the United States Supreme Court.
This case, FederalCommunicationsCommission v. PottsvilleBroadcasting Co.,1 defines the scope of a remand from the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia to the Federal Communications

Commission after an appeal from the Commission's finding. The opin2
ion, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, was for a unanimous court.
The proceedings began in 1936 when the Pottsville Broadcasting
Company sought a permit to build a station at Pottsville, Pennsylvania.
The permit was refused by the Commission at that time, due to findings
that the applicant company lacked financial responsibility and did not
sufficiently represent local Pottsville interests. The applicant appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. That court reversed the decision of the Commission as to the financial qualification 3-that finding being dearly based on an error in construing Pennsylvania law-and remanded the case to the Commission "for reconsideration in accordance with the views expressed." 4
Prior to this decision of the Court of Appeals two other applications
were made to the Commission for the facilities sought by the Pottsville
Company, and hearings were held, but no disposition of the question
was made. After the remand the Commission declared that all three
applications should be considered together and "on a comparative
basis." The Pottsville Company then sought and was granted a writ of
mandamus from the same Court of Appeals ordering the Commission
to consider and decide the application of the Pottsville Company "on
the basis of the record as originally made" and not "on a comparative
16o S. Ct. 437, 8 U. S. L. Week 198 (1940).
2

Mr. Justice McReynolds concurred in the result.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 69 App. D. C. 7, 98 F. (2d) 288 (1938).
The court was composed of Groner, C. J., Miller and Edgerton, JJ.
'The court felt that the Commission's decision was based on the financial responsibility point rather than on the ground of insufficient local representation. But
the decision of the Court of Appeals did not foreclose a finding by the Commission
that this second ground alone was sufficient to disqualify the applicant. See 69 App.
D. C. 7, 98 F. (2d) 288, 291 (1938).
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basis" with the later applicants. 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
"because important issues of administrative law are involved." 6 When
the case was heard on the merits, the Court held that after a remand
from the Court of Appeals, although the Commission is bound to act
upon the court's correction of errors of law, it is not impliedly foreclosed by the court's mandate "from enforcing the legislative policy
committed to its charge." Since the policy in question was to judge the
applications in the light of "public convenience, interest, or necessity,"
consideration of the three applications on a comparative basis is permissible after the remand and regardless of the priority of the Pottsville Company's application.
The Federal Communications Commission was created by the Communications Act of 1934.7 Among its duties are the granting and the
renewal of licenses to applicants who desire to operate broadcasting
stations, if "public convenience, interest, or necessity" will thereby be
served.8 In making its decision on these and other matters the Commission was granted by Congress a wide range of discretionary powers
to formulate its own rules of procedure in investigations and hearings. 9
An appeal from a decision of the Commission by an applicant for a
construction permit for a radio station is allowed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 10 The court's review is
limited to "questions of law"; and "findings of fact by the Commission,
if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive unless it shall
clearly appear that the findings of the Commission are abitrary or capricious."" When the Commission's finding is reversed, the cause is
remanded to the Commission to carry out the court's judgment.
When the principal case was before the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Mr. Chief Justice Groner was of the opinion that
"Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 7o App. D. C. 157, 1o5 F. (2d) 36 (1939).
The court consisted of Groner, C. J., Stephens and Edgerton, JJ.

048 Stat. io94 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 402 (e) (1939).

148 Stat. 1o64 (1934), as amended by 5o Stat. 189 (1937), 47 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1939).
848 Stat. 1o83 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 307 (1939).
948 Stat. 1068 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 15 4 (i) (j) (1939). A recent and very important
paper based'on investigation may be consulted for information regarding the inner
workings of the Commission. See Federal Communications Commission, Monograph
No. 3,Vol. i, prepared by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. Also see Caldwell, Comments on the Procedure of Federal Administrative
Tribunals with Particular Reference to the Federal Communications Commission
(1939) 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 74o .
1048 Stat. 1093 (1934) as amended by 5o Stat. 197 (1937), 47 U. S. C. A. § 402(b)

(1939).

"48 Stat. 1o94 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. §

402(e) (1939).
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the remand was one which was conclusive of all questions, excepting
only that of the possible insufficient representation of Pottsville interests by the applicant company. 12 His position was that "the order of
the court entered on an appeal from the Commission ought to have the
same effect and be governed by the same rules as apply in appeals from
a lower federal court to an appellate federal court in an equity proceeding."' 3 In such a case, matters determined by the appellate court
cannot after the remand be again raised and retried in the lower federal court.' 4 But the decision of the appellate court is only binding as
to matters actually decided. The lower court is free to act on all other
matters not mentioned in the remand.' 5 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his
opinion in the principal case, pointed out that even if the view be
adopted that the remand to the Commission is governed by the same
rules as a remand from upper to lower court, the present controversy
is not solved. This was so, apparently, because the Supreme Court found
that the Court of Appeals' remand to the Commission did not contain
any specific direction as to whether the further proceedings should be
on an individual or on a comparative basis.' 6 But the actual ground of
the Court's decision is found in broader considerations, for Mr. Justice
Frankfurter denies that the analogy of the relation between court and
court applies where court and administrative body are concerned. For
here is in issue the interplay of authority granted to the Commission by
Congress' 7 under its power to control commerce, as opposed to the reviewing power as granted to the federal courts by Congress's under
Article III of the Constitution. The Federal Communications Act, in
the sections granting licensing powers to the Commission, does not indude any express provision on the question of whether the Commission in any case is to pass upon applications on an indvidual or a comparative basis, nor does the judicial review section expressly provide
2Mr. Chief Justice Groner, it may be of interest to note, is one of the members
of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, mentioned in

note 9, supra.

' 3Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 70 App. D. C. 157, 105 F. (2d) S6, 39
(1939).
"Latta v. Granger, 167 U. S. 8S, 17 S. Ct. 746, 42 L. ed. 85 (1897).
IsEx Parte Union Steamboat Co., 178 U. S. 317, 20 S.Ct. 904, 44 L. ed. io84 (goo).
"See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 6o S.
Ct. 437, 44o (1940): "The Court of Appeals invoked against the Commission the familiar doctrine that a lower court is bound to respect the mandate of an appellate
tribunal and cannot consider questions which the mandate has laid at rest.... That
proposition is indisputable, but it does not tell us what issues were laid at rest."
"748 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 307(a) (1939).
1848 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended by 50 Stat. 197 (1937), 47 U. S. C. A. § 402(b)
(1939).
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that the Court of Appeals may upon remand instruct the Commission
as to how it shall proceed in this respect. Consequently, the Supreme
Court was compelled to determine the congressional intent upon implications drawn from the Act. And the Court found in the Commission's authority to pass on license applications on public convenience
standards, the implication that the Commission should determine its
methods of proceeding, preferring this conclusion to the contrary solution of broadening judicial control over the Commission's actions. 19
The desirability of such a conclusion is demonstrated by the very
case here under consideration. To have granted the application of the
Pottsville Company without a consideration of the merits of the other
applications would not have satisfied the requirements that the public
convenience, interest, or necessity be the controlling factor. That the
Commission made an error of law while refusing the application, could
not tend to mean that after the correction of the error, the application
must necessarily be granted without any further consideration.
The issue of the principal case does not fit neatly into the usual pattern of the problems of administrative law cases. It cannot be classified
simply as involving a determination with respect to the proper scope of
"judicial review", since that term is used to denote the power of a
court to review administrative decisions upon the merits of the questions at issue.2 0 Nor can the instant case be viewed merely as a determination relative to the internal procedure to be followed by a commission, since the recent cases dealing with that problem concerned
"the procedure in the first instance of administrative agencies themselves. '21 Rather, the case defines the scope of judicial control over administrative procedure after remand from court to commission: whether
OSee Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. i, 26, 58 S. Ct. 999, 1001, 82 L. ed. 1129
(1938). There after a remand to the Secretary of Agriculture, the court said: "What
further proceedings the Secretary may see fit to take in the light of our decision ...,
are not matters which we should attempt to forecast or hypothetically to decide."
See alsor F. R. C. v. Nelson Bros. Bond and M. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 277, 53 S.Ct. 627,
633, 77 L. ed. 1166 (1933).
2nThus in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S.Ct.
527, 64 L. ed. 9o8 (1920), it was held that where the constitutional question of a
confiscatory rate was being considered "the state must provide a fair opportunity for
submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts."
21See Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1,58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. ed. 1129 (1938)
where the court spoke of the basic requirements of fair play in administrative procedure generally. For a general review of the problems confronting students and
workers in the field of administrative law and procedure see Fuchs, Introductory
Comment to a Symposium on Administrative Law (1919) 9 Am. L. School Rev.
139, 140.
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the court could "write the principle of priority into the statute as an
indirect result of its power to scrutinize legal errors." 22 In answering,
that "Only Congress could confer such a priority," 23 the Supreme Court,
although on a narrow point, seems definitely to have departed from its
former attitude of mistrust2 4 and to have adopted a viewpoint sympathetic toward the administrative process. 25- This is not too surprising in
the light of the earlier opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis while a member of the Court 26, and of the presence of Mr. Justice Frankfurter on
the reconstituted Bench.2 7
JOHN E. PERRY

CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-LIABILITY IN TORT OF HOSPITAL TO PATIENT.

[Colorado]
In O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Association,' plaintiff brought an action against defendant for negligence in the care and
medical treatment furnished her while a paying patient in defendant's
sanitarium. To defendant's answer, alleging nonliability by reason of
its being a charitable institution, plaintiff replied that a judgment
would in no way affect the funds of the association used for charitable
purposes, because it had secured a contract of insurance indemnifying
it against all liability for the torts of its agents or servants in the conduct
of the hospital business. To this replication demurrers were sustained
in the trial court and judgment was entered dismissing the action. The
Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case.
2See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 6o S.
Ct. 437. 443 (1940).
2See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 6o S.
Ct. 437, 443 (1940).
"This mistrust of administrative bodies by the courts was dramatically shown by

the case of Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 23, 56 S. Ct.
654, 661, 8o L. ed. 1015 (1936).
"Such an attitude of friendliness toward the administrative is to be noted in the
lectures of Dean James M. Landis. See Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 135.
"See the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 65,
88-89, 52 S. Ct. 285, 298, 307, 76 L. ed. 598 (1932). That the function of courts toward
administrative bodies was one of control rather than of review is the main thesis of
the dissent. For other cases by Mr. Justice Brandeis see Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Brandeis and the Constitution (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 110.
"Mr. Justice Frankfurter's position during his years as teacher and authority
on administrative law is shown in his article, The Task of Administrative Law (1927)
75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 614. The author says at page 617: "It is idle to feel either blind
resentment against 'government by Commission' or sterile longing for a golden past
that never was."
'196 P. (2d) 835 (Colo. 1939).
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The court was of the opinion that where the charitable institution
has insured itself against liability for negligence the public policy requiring that such association be immune2 from tort liability is not
transgressed. The court said that while it was committed to the trust
fund doctrine to protect the funds of the charitable association from
being dissipated by judgments in tort actions, that doctrine did not bar
a suit against a charitable institution based on the tort of its servant or
agent, but only prevented the levying of execution on any property
which was part of the charitable trust. It was held, therefore, that an
action against such a defendant would be denied only where the testimony affirmatively disclosed that a charitable trust existed, and that a
judgment against such trust, if satisfied, would deplete the trust fund.3
American courts have quite consistently held that charitable institutions are not liable to beneficiaries for the torts of their agents or
servants so long as they have not been negligent in selecting or retaining such agents or servants. 4 The leading case, establishing this rule in
England, turned on the so-called trust fund doctrine. 5 In that case an
orphan alleged that he had been refused admittance to an orphanage
contrary to the terms of its charter. The court held that to make the
orphanage liable in damages would be a direct violation of the purposes of the trust under which it operated. It was said that the trust
fund could not be made liable and that even though the action was in
form against the trustee, if it appeared that it was in fact against the
fund, it could not be sustained.
The leading exponent in America of this rule of immunity has been
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In a comparatively early
decision by that court, McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital,6
2Following the language of most court opinions, the words "immunity" and "exemption" are used interchangeably in this discussion.
'Brown v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 85 Colo. 167, 274 Pac. 74o (1929). See also St.
Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22, 24 (1925): "The presumption
is that they [charitable institutions] have power to hold other property. If they have
there is no more reason to say that they are not liable for torts than to say that a
natural person is not because he has no property not exempt from execution. We
think that the judgment against these corporations is valid, but that no property
which they hold in charitable trust can be taken under execution ..
41o Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed. 1931) § 4923.
Feofees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 15o8 (H. L. 1846).
8120 Mass. 432, 436, 21 Am. Rep. 529, 533 (1876): "The funds entrusted .. .are
not to be diminished by such casualties, if those immediately controlling them have
done their whole duty in reference to those who have sought to obtain the benefit
of them." The court here relies to a certain extent on Holliday v. St. Leonard's
Vestry, S. C. 3o L. J. C. P. 361, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861) (the Vestry gratuitously dis-
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it was held that if there had been no neglect on the part of those administering the trust and if due care had been used by them in the selection of their inferior agents, there could be no liability. This case
also adopted the trust fund doctrine.
Another basis for disallowing an action by a beneficiary against a
charitable institution which has been adopted in various American jurisdictions from time to time is the "waiver theory."7 In Schloendorfl v.
Society of New York HospitalsJudge Cardozo, while denying liability
on the ground that the tort was that of a physician acting in the capacity of an independent contractor, expressly approved a previous
New York decision,9 no longer followed in the state, 10 that one becoming a patient in a charitable institution impliedly waived his right to
recover for the negligence of the servants or agents of the institution by
accepting the charity, even though he might pay to help defray the
expenses.
Other cases hold that there can be no liability in the type of case
under consideration, because the doctrine of respondeat superior will
not apply when the master is receiving no pecuniary profit or other
benefit from the employment of the servant or agent."
Finally, the most common basis for the rule of exemption is said to
be the public policy which fosters such charities and will not allol anything to be done to hinder their creation, maintenance, or efficient operation.1 2 Essentially this is the real reason in all of the cases upholding
charged the duty of surveying the public highways and was held not responsible for
the negligence of its employees in the performance of a public function); accord,
Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society, 218 Wis. 169, 26o N. W. 476 (1935).
But see Cohen v. General Hospital Society of Connecticut, i,3 Conn. 188, 154 At.
435, 436 (1931): "A charitable institution is not a state institution acting as an agency
of the sovereign. It is not immune because of the public character of the charity."
TPowers v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic Hosp., iog Fed. 294 (C. C. A. ist, 19o ),
cert. denied, 183 U. S. 695, 22 S. Ct. 932, 46 L. ed. 394 (19oi); Burdell v. St. Luke's
Hosp., 37 Cal. App. 31o, 173 Pac. ioo8 (1918); Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa
1378, 168 N. V. 219 (1918); Cook v. Norton Infirmary, 18o Ky. 331, 202 S. WV. 874
1918); Pepke v. Grace Hosp., 130 Mich. 493, 90 N. V. 278 (1902).
8211 N. Y. 125, 1o5 N. E. 92 (1914).
0Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626 (1910); accord, Barr v.
Brooklyn Children's Aid Society, igo N. Y. Supp. 296 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1921).
"0Sheehan v. North Country Community Hosp., 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. (2d) 28
(1937)nUnion Pacific Ry. v. Artist, 6o Fed. 365 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894); Fordyce v. Woman's
Christian Nat. Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 55o, 96 S. IV. 155 (19o6); Hogan v. Chicago
Lying-in Hosp. & Dispensary, 335 Ill. 42, 166 N. E. 461 (1929); Roberts v. Kirksville
College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 16 S. V. (2d) 625 (Mo. App. 1929); Baylor Univ. v.
Boyd,
18 S. IV. (2d) 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
1
Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A. 4th,
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the nonliability rule-a reason which embraces all of the others.
Whether the courts admit it or not, it is this public policy which has
led to the formulation of the other principles.' 3
All of these reasons for nonliability have been severely criticised on
occasion, many of the criticisms coming from courts repudiating one
basis in favor of another, and others from courts repudiating the rule
altogether. The result has been mass of confused and conflicting opinions. And further, the extent of the immunity-whether it exists in actions brought by servants or strangers as well as by patients-has varied
considerably in different jurisdictions, depending upon which theory
4
the particular case has turned.'
Perhaps the earliest complete repudiation of the rule was in Glavin
v. Rhode Island Hospital.'5 Plaintiff sued for damages for personal injuries suffered while a paying patient in defendant's hospital, the injuries being due to the negligence of defendant's servant. The court
stated that the corporation owed patients the duty of due care in the
selection of competent agents and servants; that when such agents or
servants acted negligently, their negligence was that of the corporation
Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921); Duncan v.
92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (1912); D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hosp., ioi N. J. L. 61, 127 At. 340 (1925); Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N. W. 476 (1935). But see Basabo v. Salvation Army,
35 R. 1. 22, 85 At. 12o, 129 (912): "Public policy does not require that a charitable
corporation be held exempt, but, on the other hand, to relieve it from liability
would be contrary to true public policy.... Just as such a servant has a lawful right
to recover his stipulated wages . . . and to recover damages for breach of his contract ... so also would he be entitled to recover for injuries due to the negligence
of his master and so also would his master be liable for his torts and negligence
while in the service of the master, as in any other case. There is no reason nor logic
in the attempted distinction between the servant of the defendant and the servant
of any other person or corporation."
IsWeston's Adm'x v. Hosp. of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 600, 107 S. E. 785,
789 (1921): "Indeed the trust fund doctrine is simply a rule of public policy."
"'Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 128 App. Div. 214, 218, 112 N. Y. Supp.
566 (2nd Dep't 1911), aff'd, 203 N. Y. 191, 96 N. E. 406 (1911): "The law may imply
an intention on the part of the donors of the charitable funds that such funds shall
be used for the charitable purposes only, and then imply an acquiescence in this intention by all persons who accept the benefits. . . . But no such acquiescence or
waiver can be attributed to an outsider." Enman v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 170
N. E. 43 (Mass. 193o ) (trust fund doctrine followed to its logical conclusion; recovery
denied to strangers as well as beneficiaries); Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal
Church, 147 Mich. 230, 11o N. W. 951 (1907) (nonliability on trust fund doctrine
limited to beneficiaries); Daniels v. Rahway Hosp., i6o At. 644 (N. J. 1932) (nonliability on public policy limited to beneficiaries); Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess
Society, 218 Wis. i69, 26o N. W. 476 (1935) (nonliability on public policy extended
to strangers).
2512 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879).
1929);

Nebraska Sanitarium,
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itself, inasmuch as they were the representatives of the corporation. It
was expressly denied that there is any logical foundation for the doctrine of generally immunity from tort liability on the ground of a public policy against the diversion of trust funds from the purposes of the
trust. For, where a charitable corporation has funds available for general purposes it may apply such funds to pay damages for which it is
held liable, inasmuch as this liability is incurred in carrying out the
trust and is incident to it. In short, a charitable institution is liable in
tort on the same basis as any other corporation.' 6
The Rhode Island decision was followed in Alabama in 1915 in
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association.17 The court in the latter case
noted that the trust fund doctrine had been abandoned in England 8
and in Canada. 19 It was pointed out that to follow the trust fund theory
to its logical conclusion, it would be necessary to grant absolute nonliability to charitable institutions in tort, when in fact the majority rule
in America is definitely opposed to nonliability as to strangers and servants. 20 The court delivered a sound and compelling criticism of the
trust fund doctrine.21 On the question of the application of the rule of
respondeat superior, it was said that it is entirely immaterial to its operation whether the master receives any pecuniary profit or other benefit from the employment of the servant or agent. 22 It was further said
21This case is no longer controlling in Rhode Island, a statute having been passed
exempting charitable hospitals from liability for the torts of any "of its officers,
agents or employees in the management of, or for the care of treatment of, any of
the patients or inmates of such hospital." Public Laws 1930, c. 1612, amending General Laws 1909, c. 213.
171g1 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915).
1
8Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, ii H. L. Cas. 686, ii Eng. Rep. 15oo (1866).
nLavere v. Smith's Falls Public Hosp., 35 Ont. L. R. 98, 9 B. R. C. 13 (1915).
2
Regarding liability to servants and strangers, see io Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (Perm.
Ed. 1931) § 4924.
2191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, 8 (1915): "The doctrine that the will of an individual
shall exempt either persons or property from the operation of general laws is inconsistent with the fundamental idea of government. Nor can I conceive any ground
upon which a court can hold that effect can be given to that will when it relates to
property devised or conveyed for the purpose of a charitable trust."
2But see Southern Methodist Hosp. v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P. (2d) 118, 125
(1935): "The rule of respondeat superior . . . was originally founded solely on reasons of public policy.. . . We think there are circumstances under which the application of that rule should, for the reasons of public policy also, be limited, and
we are of the opinion that while it may do an injustice in individual cases, yet upon
the whole, it is for the best interests of the public to encourage the establishment
and maintenance of charitable institutions by advising the donors thereto that their
funds will not be diverted from their original purpose of charity to pay for the
negligence of the employees of such an institution ......
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that the soundness of the rule of exemption on the ground of public
policy should be determined by the legislature and not by the judiciary.
The court did not decide whether a non-paying patient could be held
to have waived any right of action against the association, but refused
to apply the waiver theory in the case of a paying patient. Nonliability
on the waiver theory, said the court "if held to be sound, must rest upon
the fact that it is the giving and receiving of charity that creates the exemption, and not the nature of the institution administering it."23
An increasing number of American jurisdictions have adopted the
rule of the Glavin and Tucker cases.24 However, the great weight of
authority holds to the rule of the Massachusetts General Hospital
case, 25 that a charitable institution is not liable for the torts of its agents
or servants if due care has been used in their selection and maintenance.2 6 A smaller number of jurisdictions grant absolute immunity in
tort to charitable institutions, whether the action be brought by bene27
ficiary, servant, or stranger.
In comparatively recent years, the courts of some jurisdictions have
apparently begun to recognize the harshness of the majority rule and
have made more or less successful attempts to limit without definitely
Mgi Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, 11 (915).
Geiger v. Simpson Methodist Episcopal Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463
(1928); Bruce v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929); Hewett v. Woman's
Hosp. Aid Ass'n, 73 N. H. 556, 64 Atl. 19o (19o6); City of Shawnee v. Roush, ioi
Okla. 60, 223 Pac. 354 (1923); O'Neill v. Odd Fellows Home, 89 Ore. 382, 174 Pac.
148 (1918).
3
2 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 12o Mass. 432, 21
Am. Rep. 529
(1876).
"Some courts refuse to distinguish between a tort by an agent or servant and
one by the management itself. Bodenheimer v. Confederate Memorial Ass'n, 68 F.
(2d) 507 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S.629, 54 S. Ct. 643, 78 L. ed. 1483
(1934); Adams v. University Hosp., 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907); Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N. W. 476 (1935).
Most of these cases follow the example of Massachusetts. Although the Massachusetti General Hospital case seemed to make it a requisite of exemption that the
officers or management be without negligence, it was later stated by the court in
Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392, 394 (192o) that
the phrase "provided due case has been used in their selection" was "merely precautionary" and should not be "seized upon as a basis for the argument that such a
charitable corporation as a hospital should be held liable for the negligence of its
managing officers in selecting incompetent subordinate agents." Thus the Massachusetts rule has been extended so that at the present time in that jurisdiction a
charitable institution is absolutely exempt from all tort liability. Enman v. Trustees
of Boston Univ., 17o N. E. 43 (Mass. 1930).
'-As to liability to strangers and servants, see io Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed.
1931) §§ 4922, 4924.
24
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abolishing it.28 The method of the Colorado court is commendable,
although not entirely satisfactory. There, under the rule of qualified
immunity, no exemption from liability will be recognized unless the
entire assets of the institution are held for the benefit of the charity.
Thus, the court allows the action to be prosecuted to judgment and
execution to be levied on all property other than that held for the
charitable purposes.29 The disadvantage of this rule is that it is only
applicable in those jurisdictions which grant immunity on either public policy or the trust fund doctrine. Obviously, the decision includes
no answer to the implied waiver theory, nor to those cases refusing to
2'England v. Hosp. of Good Smaritan, 88 P. (2d) 227 (Cal. App. 1939) (patient
paid $25 per week, this amount being less than the average cost; court held for
plaintiff because no charity was extended to plaintiff, and further plaintiff had no
knowledge of alleged charitable nature of institution); Morton v. Savannah Hosp.,
148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918) (if a charitable hospital treats patients for pay it is
liable to the extent of the income derived from the treatment of the paying patients);
Medical College v. Rushing, i Ga. App. 475, 57 S. E. 1083 (1907) (liable for the
mutilation of the corpse of a charity patient); Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial
Hosp., 51 P. (ad) 229 (Utah 1935) (a charity receiving patient for pay owes the duty
of due care and is liable for the failure to exercise that care).
Some of the later cases, especially in England, have determined the question of
liability upon the principle of what the hospital actually undertakes to do. Under
this principle the question in each case would be (i) whether or not there is an express contract which can furnish the measure of duty and liability; (a) if not, what
the hospital holds itself out as undertaking to perform. In the latter event liability
will depend on whether or not the medical staff are paid attendants furnished by
the hospital, or whether they are merely attached to the hospital as consultants.
Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hosp., [199o] 2 K. B. 820, 829, 9 B. R. C. 1, io: "The
governors of a public hospital, by their admission of the patient to enjoy gratuitous
benefit ... undertake that the patient shall be treated only by experts... and further, that those experts shall have at their disposal fit and proper apparatus and
appliances ...
" Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 24o N. Y. 328, 148 N. E. 539, 542
(1923): "With us a hospital or university owes to patients or to students whatever
duty of care and diligence is attached to the relation as reasonably implicit in the
nature of the undertaking and the purpose of the charity."
2OSt. Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Co1. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925). The Supreme
Court of Tennessee has also adopted the rule of the Colorado courts. McLeod v. St.
Thomas Hosp., 17o Tenn. 423, 95 S. V. (2d) 917, 919 (1936): "The exemption and
protection afforded to a charitable institution is not immunity from suit, not nonliability for a tort, but that the protection actually given is to the trust funds themselves. It is a recognition that such funds cannot be seized upon by execution, nor
appropriated to the satisfaction of a tort liability. And certainly it is no defense to
a tort action, that the defendant has no property subject to execution." This case
was followed by Vanderbilt Univ. v. Henderson, 127 S. W. (2d) 284, 287 (Tenn. App.
1938): ". . . this [McLeod case] . . is a recognition that a charitable institution is
liable for a tort of its agent and may be pursued to judgment; but that the institution's trust property cannot be taken to satisfy such judgment; and that where
such institution has liability insurance, such insurance is not trust property of the
institution and may be appropriated to the satisfaction of such judgment."
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apply respondeat superior to charitable institutions. Furthermore, in
most cases all of the property of the institution is used for the purposes
of the charity. Only in a rare instance will property exist which a court
can hold to be free from an imposition in the nature of a trust.3 0
The one form of property that would be free from such an imposition is liability insurance. Unfortunately, under the rule of the majority of jurisdictions such insurance is ineffectual. The ordinary liability insurance policy is an indemnity policy limiting payment by the
insurer to those instances in which there has been a judgment against
the insured. Therefore, if the institution is not liable in tort to a beneficiary, the mere fact that it is the owner of a policy of liability insurance will not make it so.31 This is an entirely reasonable and logical
conclusion in those jurisdictions which hold to the rule of absolute
nonliability to beneficiaries. It is entirely unreasonable in those jurisdictions which hold to the rule of qualified liability, and has been so
recognized. 32 Thus, if the rule of the Colorado case is adopted, that
a charitable institution is liable in tort as any other institution or corporation, but that the liability may not be satified from the trust property, there is no reason why the judgment may not be satisfied from the
liability insurance policy. Under such a rule the injured beneficiary is
recompensed, the trust property is saved harmless, and the insurer is
not escaping the risk which it has been paid to bear.
Of course the Colorado rule is of temporary value only. It is a simple matter to write insurance policies excluding beneficiaries of the insured charities. Nevertheless, it is a step in what is submitted to be the
proper direction-the complete abolition of the rule of nonliability.
The rule was established for reasons of policy which no longer exist. In
an earlier day, benevolence of this type was administered almost entirely by private individuals and institutions. They were few and they
were poor, and it was entirely just that they be given such an exemption
nIri Gamble v. Vanderbilt Univ., 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S. W. 510 (1918), where a
building owned by defendant was operated at a profit, the profits being used for the
charitable purpose, plaintiff was allowed to recover from the rents and profits, such
liability
being incident to the operation of the building.
31Levy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100 (1925); William's Adm'x
v. Church Home for Females, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. (2d) 753 (1928); Enman v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 17o N. E. 43 (Mass. 193o); Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Moore,
156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (193o); Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hosp., 261 Mich.
327, 246 N. W. 137 (1933).
,O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 96 P. (2d) 835 (Colo. 1939);
Brown v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 85 Colo. 167, 274 Pac. 740 (1929); St. Mary's Academy
v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925); McLeod v. St. Thomas Hosp., 17o Tenn.
423, 95 S. W. (2d) 917 (1936).
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as an aid and an encouragement. But today, a quickened moral and
social sense and an increased national wealth have led to a tremendous
expansion of endowed charitable institutions, to government subsidies
to such institutions, and to outright government operation and maintenance of such institutions. Furthermore, the steadily advancing trend
has been to spread the normal risks present in every activity among as
great a number of people as possible, the most obvious manifestation
of this trend being the growth of the large insurance companies. In
view of these facts the exemption of charitable institutions from tort
liability stands as an anachronism in Anglo-American law, peculiarly
vicious in that it thrusts the entire risk of harm on those persons least
BRYC E,
ii.
able to bear it-those forced to accept charity.33

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT "PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES" CLAUSE AS A LIMITATION UPON STATE TAXING POWR.

[United States Supreme Court]
The protection afforded a federal citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment "privileges or immunities" clause, 1 extended by the 1935 decision
of Colgate v. Harvey,2 has again been restricted by the Supreme Court
in the case of Madden v. Kentucky3 to accord with the interpretation
4
first given that clause in 1873 by the Slaughter-House Cases.
uHarper, Law of Torts (1933) § 294: "The policy of the law requiring individuals to be just before generous seems equally applicable to charitable corporations.
To require an injured individual to forego compensation for harm when he is otherwise entitled thereto, because the injury was committed by the servants of the
charity, is to require him to make an unreasonable contribution to the charity
against his will, and a rule of law imposing such burdens cannot be regarded as
socially desirable nor consistent with sound policy." The recent trend to liability is
shown by Sheehan v. North Country Community Hosp., 273 N. Y. 63, 7 N. E. (2d)
28, 29 (1937). After rejecting the waiver theory as a fiction the court says: "To impose
liability is to beget careful management.... No conception of justice demands that
an exception to the rule of respondeat superior be made." And see Note, Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions in New York (1939) 9 Brooklyn L. Rev. 78.
1U. S. Const. Amend. 14, § x: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States...." It is
to be noted that Art. 4, § 2 of the original Constitution reads: "The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States." (Italics supplied.)
2295 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, So L. ed. 299, 102 A. L. R. 54 (x935).
16o S. Ct. 406, 8 U. S. L. Week 201 (1940). The case has been discussed in (i94o)
53 Harv. L. Rev. 874; (1940) 38 Mich. L. Rev. 720; (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 691; (1940)
88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 621.
'16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873).
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A Kentucky statute 5 imposed on its citizens an annual ad valorem
tax on deposits in banks outside of the state at the rate of fifty cents
per hundred dollars and at the same time imposed on deposits in banks
located within the state a similar ad valorem tax at the rate of ten cents
per hundred dollars. A Kentucky citizen and resident maintained deposits in New York banks, but had not reported these deposits on several prior assessment dates for the purposes of taxation. At his death
and when the estate was settled, the state brought suit to have these deposits assessed as omitted property and to recover the tax. The taxpayer
(estate) attacked the constitutionality of the tax on the grounds that it
violated the due process, equal protection, and privileges or immunities
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky sustained the legislation, and on appeal, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reed, affirmed the decision.
The due process and equal protection objections were dismissed on the
grounds that the classification for the imposition of the tax was not
hostile to or oppressively discriminating against particular persons and
classes. 6 On the privileges and immunities objection, the Court held
that the right to carry on business beyond the lines of the state of residence was not a federal privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision in the Madden case will probably put an end to the
controversy provoked by Colgate v. Harvey.7 In that case a Vermont
statute,8 imposing income taxes on interest bearing securities, exempted from the tax, income from money loaned within the state at
less than 5 %o interest. In an action attacking the constitutionality of the
statute brought by a citizen of Vermont, the Supreme Court held the
tax invalid seemingly on two grounds: first, that the exemption of
money loaned within"the state was a denial of equal protection because
the classification had no reasonable relation to the purpose of the taxthe raising of revenue; and secondly, that aside from this, the discrimination against loans made outside the state was an infringement of the
5Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, Baldwin's Revision (193o) § 4019a-io.
OAs stated by the Court, a state tax statute is presumed constitutional unless it

is proved that there is no conceivable basis to support it. Here the classification "may
have been founded in the purposes and policy of taxation . . . may have resulted
from the differences in the difficulties and expenses of tax collection." 6o S. Ct. 406,
409, 8 U. S. L. Week 201, 202 (1940).
¢296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, 8o L. ed. 299, 102 A. L. R. 54
Pub. Laws of Vt. (1933) § 872 et seq.

(1935).
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federal privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the majority, held as falling among
federal privileges or immunities, "the right of a citizen to engage in
business... or to make a lawful loan of money in any state other than
that in which the citizen ...

resides."' 10 To this opinion Mr. Justice

Reed in the principal case makes dynamic reply: "We think it quite
clear that the right to carry out an incident to a trade, business or calling such as the deposit of money in banks is not a privilege of national
dtizenship."-" The "right to carry on business beyond the lines of the
State of ... residence" is not a privilege or immunity appertaining to,
national citizenship. "In view of our conclusions, we look upon the decision in... [Colgate v. Harvey] as repugnant to the line of reasoning
adopted here. As a consequence, Colgatev. Harvey must be and is overruled."' 2
It had been supposed, prior to the case of Colgate v. Harvey in
1935, that the federal privileges or immunities clause had lost significance as a method of federal control over state action.' 3 This was a
9
At least one writer felt that the case was not decided on the equal protection
clause at all, but on the privileges or immunities clause alone. See Howard, The
Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939) 87
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 273 note 56. The overruling of Colgate v. Harvey by Madden v.
Kentucky, as the Court explained in the latter case, was to the extent that it was
repugnant to the line of reasoning adopted in the Madden case. If the Colgate case
was decided on the equal protection objection as well as the privileges and immunities objection, certainly the result on the equal protection point in the two cases
differs. It seems apparent in both cases, however, that the Justices agree on the fundamental issue that a tax does not have to be imposed equally on all if the classification is one bearing a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the tax is imposed. See 296 U. S. 404, 423, 56 S. Ct. 252, 256, 102 A. L. R. 54, 61, and 6o S. Ct. 406,
408, 8. U. S. L. Week 2o, 2o2. The deciding of this question is in a large degree subjective, and not too much significance can be given to the final determination in
each case. (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 926, 927, 928; Sutherland, J.'s dissent in State Bd. of
Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 550, 51 S. Ct. 540, 548 (1931). The Court
in the instant case, however, by emphasizing the "hands-off" policy of presuming the
validity of the legislation, seems to arrive at the more desirable conclusion.
It is felt that the real significance of the Colgate v. Harvey-Madden v. Kentucky
controversy lies in the disposition of the privileges or immunities clause. This aspect
of the case alone is considered in the present discussion.
2°Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 4 o4,4 3o, 56 S. Ct. 252, 259, 102 A. L. R. 54, 66 (1935).
"Madden v. Kentucky, 6o S. Ct. 4o6, 41o, 8 U. S. L. Week 201, 203 (194o).
I-Madden v. Kentucky, 6o S. Ct. 406, 411, 8 U. S. L. Week 2o, 203 (194o). Mr.
Justice Roberts, joined by Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissented, adhering to the rule
of Colgate v. Harvey. Mr. Justice Hughes concurred in the result on the ground that
the classification was on a reasonable basis.

"See dissent of Stone, J., in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 443, 56 S. Ct.

252,

265, 1o2 A. L. R. 54, 73 (1935); and in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 520, 59 S. Ct.
954, 966 (1939); Brannon. The Fourteenth Amendment (19o) 56 et seq.; Cooley, Gen-
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direct result of its first interpretation in the Slaughter-House Cases.14
It was there held that the chief purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to give the negro national citizenship and to insure his rights as a
national citizen,15 but not to vary "the delicate balance" between state
and national powers. Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the majority, observed that in spite of the "excited feeling growing out of the War" and
the sentiment for a strong national government it was essential that the
states should have "powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights-the rights of person and of property,"
rights not inherent in national citizenship, but in state citizenship.' 6
As rights of state citizenship, they could not be given federal protection
17
by the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This clause was subsequently held to protect only those privileges and
eral Principles of Constitutional Law (1880) 245 et seq.; i Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929) 241, 248; Howard, The Privileges and
Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
262, 267 et seq.; Morris, What Are the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the
United States? (1921) 28 W. Va. L. Q. 38.
116 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873).
21In this case white citizens in the slaughter-house industry were attacking a
Louisiana statute which affected the place and manner of conducting their business.
"OIt appears that the privileges or immunities clause is now understood as not
having been intended to create new rights in federal citizens, but to secure existing
federal citizenship rights to the newly-made citizens. See the language of Mr. Justice
Roberts in Hague v. CIO, 397 U. S. 496, 512 ,59 S. Ct. 954, 962 (1939); Orr v. Gilman,
183 U. S. 278, 286, 22 S. Ct. 213, 216 (1902); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448, 1o S.
Ct. 930, 934 (1890); Ex parte Virginia, 1oo U. S. 339, 365 (1879); Minor v. Hapersett,
21 Wall. 162, 171 (1874). The dissents in the Slaughter-House Cases indicate a strong
feeling that it was really this issue over which the War had been fought, and that
it was the intent of the framers of the Amendment to create a much stronger national government with greater power of control over state governments. SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 97, 100-101, 129 (U. S. 1873); Burdick, Law of the American Constitution (1922) § 116; Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today (6th ed. 1938) 171; (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 936. The rights, privileges and
immunities held to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were, therefore,
those considered "fundamental," those belonging "of right to every free citizen of a
civilizeff government." Slaughter-House Cases dissent, 16 Wall. 36, 97 (1873); 1 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929) 239; Morris,
What Are the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States? (1921) 28
W. Va. L. Q. 38. This idea continued in the dissents of the privileges and immunities cases until the due process clause of the same Amendment began to take over the
field of federal protection of fundamental substantive civil rights against abridgment
by the state governments. For a description of this process, see Warren, The New
"Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431. Also see I
Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929) 243; Borchard.
The Supreme Court and Private Rights (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1051, 1057; Corwin, The
Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment (19o9) 7 Mich. L. Rev. 643; Note
(1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 490, 498.
"Quoted from the Slaughter-House Cases opinion: "Having shown that the
privileges and immunities relied on in the argument are those which belong to citi-
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immunities which "arise out of the nature and essential character of
the national government, or are specifically granted or secured to all
citizens or persons by the United States Constitution,"1 s "or its laws
and treaties made in pursuance thereof."19 Until the case of Colgate v.
Harvey, not one of forty-seven cases20 reaching the Supreme Court on
claim of violations of the clause was successful in establishing that fed21
eral privileges and immunities were infringed by state action.
zens of the States as such, and that they are left to the State Governments for security
and protection, and not by this article placed under the special care of the Federal
government, we may hold ourselves excused from defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which no citizen can abridge, until some
case involving those privileges may make it necessary to do so .. " 16 Wall. 36,
78-79 (U. S. 1873). The doctrines of denying protection under the Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immunities clause to fundamental civil rights is somewhat without purpose in light of the fact that all persons including national citizens now have
protection against a state's unreasonable abridgment of "fundamental substantive
civil rights" under the due process of law clause of the same Amendment. See criticlsms of this development by Borchard, The Supreme Court and Private Rights
(1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1051, 1057; Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
o,
Amendment (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 462; Note (1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 49
495-496, 498 note 52.
18Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.78, 97, 29 S. Ct. 14, 19 (1908); Orr v. Gilman,
183 U. S.278, 286, 22 S. Ct. 213, 217 (1902); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S.377, 382,
14 S. Ct. 570, 571-572 (1894); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448, 10 S. Ct. 930, 934
(189o). Nor were the guarantees of the first eight amendments considered "privileges
and immunities of United States citizenship" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.78, 98, 99, 29 S. Ct. 14, 19 (19o8); Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U. S. 581, 595, 20 S. Ct. 448, 454 (19oo); Burdick, Law of the American Constitution (1922) § 117; McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment (1918) 4 Iowa L. Bull. 219, 2 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law (1938) 402.
'9McPhrso V._lacker, 146 U. S. 1, 38, 13 S.Ct. 3, 11 (1892). Also see Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U. S. 77, 97, 29 S. Ct. 14, 19 (19o8); Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U. S. 245, 261, 55 S. Ct. 197, 203 (1934)21The cases are collected in Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U. S. 404, 445, 56 S.Ct. 252, 266, 102 A. L. R. 54, 74 (1935), and additions are made
in his specially concurring opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S.496, 521, 59 S. Ct. 954,
967 (1939). Mr. Justice Stone listed forty-four cases in Colgate v. Harvey, and added
three more in Hague v. CIO which had arisen before the Colgate decision. Also see
McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment (1918) 4 Iowa
L. Bull. 219, 2 Selected Essays in Constitutional Law (1938) 402, 4o5. Some of the
rights claimed were: to practice law in a state court, to vote, to sell or possess liquor,
to use the American flag for advertising purposes, to obtain dower rights, to graze
sheep on the public domain, or to attend a state university. An extensive listing is
made by Howard, The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate
v. Harvey (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 270-272.
"There was little support for holding the making of investments in other
states without deterrence by the state of origin a right so peculiar as to be a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship, and thereby to differ from rights protected
under the interstate commerce, due process, and equal protection clauses. See Mr.
Justice Stone's dissent to Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S.404, 445, 56 S. Ct. 252, 266, 102
A. L. R. 54, 73-74 (1935); Howard, The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizen-
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It was not made clear in the Colgate opinion whether the difference
in the tax imposed on money loaned within the state and that imposed
on money loaned without was considered an infringement of a federal
privilege or immunity because merely discriminatory, or whether it
was the arbitrary and unreasonable character of the discrimination that
was considered an infringement.22 If mere discrimination was the basis
of the decision, the clause was being used to extend federal protection
over citizens beyond the protection afforded in the other clauses of the
Constitution 23 and, as Mr. Justice Stone saw, with the result of increasship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262. In Williams v. Fears, 179
U. S. 270, 21 S. Ct. 128 (0oo), a state occupation tax on those engaged in hiring
laborers for work outside the state was held not to infringe the federal privileges or
immunities clause. In Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553, 27 S. Ct. 171 (19o6)
a state inheritance tax statute which limited exemptions to charitable corporations
within the state was held not to infringe any rights protected by the privileges or
immunities clause. That statutes tending to interfere with interstate transactions do
not violate rights peculiarly inherent in national citizenship is further indicated by
the case of Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 49 S. Ct. 279 (1929).
Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1867) held that the right to travel through states on
the way to the seat of the national government was a privilege of federal citizenship
and that a state capitation tax on such a privilege was unconstitutional. In Railroad
Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456, 472 (1874), the same type of state action was considered
simply a violation of the commerce clause. The Helson and Randolph case went
further and stated that in so far as Crandall v. Nevada made the right to pass from
one state into another a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship rather than a
right protected by the commerce clause, it had not been followed. Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 251, 49 S. Ct. 279, 281 (1929). Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U. S. 404, 444, 56 S. Ct. 252, 266 (1935), dissent of Stone, J.
The carrying on of business between states such as the issuing of foreign bonds
of exchange and insurance policies, and lending money is not interstate commerce.
Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73 (U. S. 1850); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S.
1868); Nelms v. Edinburg-American Land Mortgage Co., 92 Ala. 157, 9 So. 141 (1891).
Even if it were, however, a tax on net income derived from interstate commerce is
not a burden on such commerce. U. S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S.
321, 38 S. Ct. 499, 62 L. ed. 1135 (1918); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221,
64 L. ed. 445 (1920); Colgate v. Harvey, dissent of Stone, J., 296 U. S. 404, 448, 56
S. Ct. 252, 268, 102 A. L. R. 54, 76 (1935). States have been allowed to foster domestic
industries by the exercise of their taxing power. Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40,
54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. ed. 1109 (1934); Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 41 S. Ct.
219 (1921). Where there has been "neither an invidious discrimination nor a burden
on interstate commerce, as that clause is usually construed, this favoring of domestic
interest rates would seem to be a permissible public aim." (1936) 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
506, 507.
=Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 447, 56 S. Ct. 252, 267, io2 A. L. R. 54, 75
(1935), dissent of Stone, J.; Howard, The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 277; (1936) 49 Harv.
L. Rev. 935.
2The fact of discrimination alone does not violate the interstate commerce clause
even conceding that interstate business was commerce. See supra, note 21. The equal
protection and due process clauses apply only where a tax discrimination is hostile
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ing federal judicial control over state action "sufficient to cause serious
24
apprehension for the rightful independence of local government." If
it was the unreasonable and arbitrary feature of the discrimination that
formed the basis for the application of the clause, it would seem to add
nothing to the guarantee of the equal protection clause, which extends
to "persons," as well as to "citizens." 25 Because of the Court's further
decision that the exemption of dividends derived from corporate business in the state and non-exemption of the same type of dividends from
without the state was not an infringement of the clause, 26 it appears
that the majority's conception was that the clause was thought to prohibit only those inequalities in taxation considered arbitrary and unreasonable. If so, the same result could have been reached by the same
27
judges through the equal protection clause alone.
Legal commentators were confused by the decision and explanations
advanced were varied. Some writers suggested that, if the clause was
being extended beyond the equal protection clause, emphasis was upon
strengthening the concept of a unified national society by removal of
state barriers to interstate activity; 28 some thought it may have been an
avoidance of the restricted construction of the interstate commerce
clause, 29 or to give to interstate business which is not commerce the
80
same protection given interstate commerce by the commerce clause.
or arbitrary and unreasonable with respect to the purpose of the tax. Rottschaefer,
Constitutional Law (1939) §§ 284-286 and cases there cited.
2
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 447, 56 S. Ct. 252, 267, 102 A. L. R. 54, 75
(x935); Howard, The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v.
Harvey (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 277. The same idea was expressed in the
Slaughter-House Cases, i6 Wall. 36, 77, 78 (U. S. 1873).
-Since a corporation is a "person," but not a "citizen" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359,
363, 27 S. Ct. 384, 386 (19o7); Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 561, 19
S. Ct. 281, 282 (1899), the privileges or immunities clause ostensibly does not benefit
corporate business.
=Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 450, 56 S. Ct. 252, 268-269, 102 A. L. R. 54, 77
(1935).
- Quoting from Mr. Justice Stone's specially concurring opinion in Hague v.
CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 525, 59 S. Ct. 954, 968 (1939): "If it be the part of wisdom to avoid
unnecessary decision of constitutional questions, it would seem to be equally so to
avoid the unnecessary creation of novel constitutional doctrine . . . in order to
attain an end easily and certainly reached by following the beaten paths of constitutional decision." See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347,
56 S. Ct. 466, 483 (1936), Mr. Justice Brandeis' second and third "canon of interpretation."
3(1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 95; (1936) 30 111. L. Rev. 953; (1936) 84 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 655.
(1936) 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 5o6.
3(1 936) 20 Minn. L. Rev. 549.
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While one saw in it a further protection of personal liberty against social control,31 another feared the imperiling of democratic institutions
by denying to the states the social control over economic enterprise formerly permitted them.3 2 Among other suggestions: an expression of a
laissez-faire desire to permit commercial endeavor to locate in the most
favorable economic site,33 the Court's revival and expansion of a third
device in the Federal Government's arsenal of methods to review and
censure state action,3 4 and the beginning of a reversion to the fundamental rights theory as argued in the Slaughter-House Cases dissents. 3 5
The general opinion among the writers36 was adversely critical and
in support of the dissent.T
In spite of this controversy, Colgate v. Harvey did not seriously affect federal court litigation. In one case only did the privileges and immunities contention again appear to be upheld.3 8 In Hague v. C10 39
where unincorporated labor organizations and individuals were seeking to restrain the mayor and government of Jersey City from interfering with their union functions, Mr. Justice Roberts, with Mr. Justice Black concurring, wrote the first of the majority opinions, 40 in
Ind. L. J. 39o.
The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v.
87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 278-279.
Col. L. Rev. 669.
Mich. L. Rev. 1034.
3(1936) 24 Calif. L. Rev. 728.
3Among other discussions: (1956) 14 N. C. L. Rev. 282; (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rev. 496; (1936) 14 Tex. L. Rev. 548; (1936) 11 Wis. L. Rev. 434; (1936) 45 Yale L. J.
926.
9=Typical objections are found in Howard, The
Privileges and Immunities of
87
U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 277: "The
Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939)
most disquieting aspect of Colgate v. Harvey . . . is its uncertain scope," and in
(1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 669: "The decision is an unfortunate introduction to a new
area of constitutional uncertainty, in which the judiciary may romp between the
lines of inclusion and exclusion." But cf. Borchard, The Supreme Court and Private
Rights (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1051, 1o63.
84
I n 'one case, however, Asher v. Ingels, 13 F. Supp. 654, 658 (S. D. Cal. 1936),
Colgate v. Harvey was hesitantly cited for its dictum that "The right to transact a
lawful business is a privilege of national citizenship." The case was decided on the
interstate commerce, due process, and equal protection of laws clauses, however, and
no semblance of the privileges and immunities objection again appeared in the
opinion. In Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431, 56 S. Ct. 532, 8o L. ed. 778 (1936), the
federal privileges or immunities clause was rejected as without substance, since in
that case its effect would have been the same as Article 4 § 2 of the Constitution
which "is directed against discrimination by a state in favor of its own citizens and
against the citizens of other states." Colgate v. Harvey was otherwise cited in various
cases, but in the main for its equal protection dictum.
3307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939)'0 For a discussion of the line-up of the Justices in this case and the implication
3'(1936) 11
3
2Howard,
Harvey (1939)
3(1936) 36
3'(1936) 34
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which it was considered a privilege or immunity of national citizenship
to enjoy "freedom to disseminate information concerning the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, to assemble peaceably for
discussion of the Act, and of the opportunities and advantages offered
by it .... 41 It is perhaps significant that Mr. Justice Roberts did not
call on Colgate v. Harvey to support his case. On the other hand he may
have felt that the particular privileges infringed in the two cases were
of too different a nature to afford an analogy. It does seem on principle
that such a right as the one upheld in the Hague case could validly be
a privilege of federal citzenship, even within the accepted interpreta42
tion of the privileges or immunities clause prior to Colgate v. Harvey.
Nevertheless Mr. Justice Stone, in a specially concurring opinion, approved by Mr. Justice Reed, again delivered an attack on the extension
of the privileges and immunities principle strikingly similar to the one
delivered in Colgate v. Harvey. Again he pointed out the futility of
using a historically dead clause, as was done in that case, to achieve a
result which wds completely capable of being reached by the due process clause alone. 43 Quite evidently Mr. Justice Stone felt that this exof the opinion with respect to "freedom of opinion" cases, see Johnson, Post-War
Protection of Freedom of Opinion (1940) i Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 192, 199-201.
"Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 512, 59 S.Ct. 954, 962 (1939).
' 2Dissent of Brandeis, J.,in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 337-8, 41 S. Ct.
125, 129 (1920): "The right to speak freely concerning functions of the Federal Government is a privilege or immunity of every citizen of the United States which, even
before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment a State was powerless to curtail.
... The right of a citizen ... to take part ... in the making of federal laws ... ,
necessarily includes the right to speak or write about them.... Were this not so
'The right of the people peaceably to assemble for purpose of petitioning Congress
for a redress of grievances, .. .' would be a right totally without substance." In the
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79 (U. S.1873): "The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." These rights were
likewise considered under the privileges or immunities clause in U. S. v. Cruickshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552, 553 (1875). Mr. Justice Stone, however, felt that the step
from the above statement to holding "the right to assemble and discuss the advantages of the National Labor Relations Act" a similar privilege, was a "long and
by no means certain one." Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S.496, 522, 59 S. Ct. 954, 967 (1939).
I'Mr. Justice Roberts apparently held that because the rights infringed were
privileges and immunities of national citizenship jurisdiction was conferred by Jud.
Code § 24 (1) and (14), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1)and (14) which require no averment or
proof that the amount in controversy exceeds $3ooo. Mr. Justice Stone, citing the same
provisions of the statute, held that the right to maintain an equity suit to restrain
state officers, acting under a state law, from infringing the rights of freedom of speech
and of assembly guaranteed by the due process clause, is given by Congress to all
persons whether citizens or not.
Mr. Justice Stone's reasons for preferring the use of the due process clause were:
(a) the extension of the privileges or immunities clause, and reversion to the fundamental rights doctrine argued in the Slaughter-House dissents, is a danger to the
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tension was along the same lines as that in Colgate v. Harvey.4 4 In spite
of this fact, however, it cannot be said that the opinion of Mr. Justice
Roberts in Hague v. CIO is in any way affected by the overruling of
Colgate v. Harvey since the claimed privileges and immunities were of
such different nature in the two cases. It is only in the interpretation
propounded by Mr. Justice Stone that a: conflict is found in the cases.
Nevertheless it is not difficult to foresee that henceforth litigants will
feel safer in considering the "privileges or immunities" clause of very
dubious assistance even in freedom of opinon cases, and will base their
arguments on the specially concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in
Hague v. CIO rather than on Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion.
It seems evident that Madden v. Kentucky in no uncertain terms
has again limited the privileges or immunities clause as a "device in
the Federal Government's arsenal of methods to review and censure
state action." 45 Once more the clause will probably go into repose to be
brought out, as in the days prior to Colgate v. Harvey, only by those
litigants seeking protection for vague and uncertain privileges which
find no specific protection in other clauses of the Constitution. If, as
now seems likely, the clause is back where it was before the Colgate decision, its "panacea-like" language will again be held to afford little relief to such applicants. That the fate of the clause is settled gains
weight with the consideration that the Colgate v. Harvey effort to vary
the long-accepted doctrine of the Slaughter-House Cases was tolerated
FrED BARTEN smN, JR.
by the Supreme Court for less than five years.
independence of local government; (b) an unnecessary creation of novel constitutional
doctrine; (c) the record could not support the decree under the privileges or immunities clause since the plaintiff did not aver nor prove that he was a citizen; (d)
a decree based on the privileges or immunities clause would have to be so narrow as
to affect only the relation between the defendant and the national government, that
is, it would have to be restricted to the dissemination of information concerning the
National Labor Relations Act alone, rather than to the dissemination of any lawful
information.
"Mr. Justice Stone: "I do not doubt that the decree ... is rightly affirmed, but I
am unable to follow the path by which some of my brethren have attained that end.
..." 307 U. S. 496, 518, 59 S. Ct. 954, 965 (1939). It was evident that it was not solely
precedent that prompted this position. Rather it seems that the mere use of this
clause in the two cases represented to Justices Stone and Reed'the advent of a dangerous device. This is apparent from the further language: ".. . resort to the privileges
and immunities clause . . . would involve constitutional experimentation as gratuitous as it is unwarranted. We cannot be sure that its consequences would not be unfortunate." 307 U. S.496, 532, 59 S. Ct. 954, 971 (1939)- For a possible method by
which "federal privileges and immunities," as so extended, could have eventually
been used for the benefit of all persons as well as United States citizens, see (1936)
24 Calif. L. Rev. 728, 732.
'5('9a 6 ) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1034, 1037.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY; HABEAS CORPUS-USE OF WRIT TO SECURE RELEASE
FROM IMPRISONMENT AFTER CONVICTION UNDER UNCONSTITUTIONAL

STATUTE. [United States Supreme Court and New Jersey]

The problem of whether a judicial determination of constitutionality is to be given retrospective as well as prospective effect continues to
confront state and federal courts. In Chicot County Drainage District
v. Baxter State Bank' the United States Supreme Court refused to allow
collateral attack upon a judgment reached in a civil proceeding approving a municipal debt reorganization plan, where the statute under
which the proceeding had been undertaken was later declared unconstitutional. In Ex parte Connellan2 the New Jersey Supreme Court permitted collateral attack, by way of habeas corpus, upon a judgment
of conviction in a prosecution arising under an Act which subsequent
to the prisoner's conviction had been held unconstitutional. Though
the two cases at first glance appear to be in conflict, an examination of
the two situations involved may well indicate that a complete reconciliation is possible on practical grounds.
In the Chicot County case the defendant was a drainage district
organized under the laws of Arkansas, with power to issue bonds. In
1932 defendant defaulted on its obligation to pay the bonds and later,
proceeding under the Municipal-Debt Readjustment Act,3 filed a petition for readjustment of its debts. The plaintiff, a bondholder, was
given full notice of the proceedings but did not contest the reorganization. Money was left in the hands of the court for one year for those
bondholders who did not immediately join in the reorganization, but
the plaintiff did not redeem his bonds within that time. Subsequently,
the Municipal-Debt Readjustment Act was held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in Ashton v. Cameron County District.4 The plaintiff thereafter sued to recover on his old bonds, arguing that since the
statute on which the reorganization was based had been invalidated,
the reorganization itself was of no effect. The Supreme Court rejected
the contention and held that the plaintiff, having failed to raise the
question of the validity of the reorganization in the proceedings to
which it was a party, and in which the issue could properly have been
presented and decided, was now prevented by the bar of res judicata
16o S. Ct. 317 (1940). Rehearing denied, 60 S. Ct. 581 (1940).
123 N. J. L. 229, 8 A. (2d) 345 (1939).

2

348 Stat. 798 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 3oi-3o3 (1937).
'298 U. S. 513, 56 S. Ct. 892, 8o L. ed. i3og (1936).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

from raising it in a subsequent collateral attack on the judgment.
Plaintiff had further contended that the district court, being one of
limited jurisdiction conferred by the Act, was deprived of jurisdiction
by virtue of the invalidation of the statute. In answer to this argument
the Supreme Court declared that, though the district court's jurisdiction was limited, yet it had authority to determine whether it had jurisdiction when parties were properly before it; and, while the determination so made was open to direct review, it could not be attacked in a collateral action.
The decisions supporting the result of the Chicot County case are
based on one of two general grounds: first, that the judgment rendered
under the subsequently invalidated statute is voidable, not void, and
thus not subject to collateral attack, or second, that the bar of res
judicata applies to any subsequent action brought attacking the judgment, although the statute upon which the decision was based has been
declared unconstitutional.
The first ground is set out in a dictum in Hanchett Bond Go. v.
Morris.5 The court cited the general rule to the effect that a judgment
on the merits under an unconstitutional statute was not void, but
merely voidable, and was binding on the parties to the action when it
became final, even though at a later date the statute upon which the
proceedings were based was held unconstitutional. Although this pronouncement was dictum, it was later adopted by the court as proper
reasoning in two cases, 6 and practically the same reasoning was relied
7
upon in a decision in another jurisdiction.
The second ground is set out in State v. Trustees of Milwaukee
County Orphans' Board.8 The statute involved provided that after
certain debts were paid, all the personal property of persons in Milwaukee County dying intestate and without heirs should be turned
over to the Orphans' Board as part of its trust fund instead of escheating to the state. The statute was held unconstitutional, 9 and the state
sued t'o recover the money that had been turned over to the Orphans'
Board while the statute was in force. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
refused the state's claims, holding that the decisions of the county court
in settling these estates were res judicata as to the state, since there had
5143

Okla. 11o, 287 Pac. 1o25, 1026 (1930).

OJones v. McGrath, 16o Okla. 211, 16 P. (2d) 853 (1932); Walker v. Stubblefield,
167 Okla. 5o, 27 P. (2d) 1043 (1933).
TBeck et al. v. State, 196 Wis. 242, 219 N. W. 197 (1928).
8218 Wis. 518, 261 N. W. 676 (1935).
9In re Payne's Estate, 2o8 Wis. 142, 242 N. W. 553 (1932).
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been sufficient notice given by the court to all parties interested when
it published notices of the various administration proceedings in the
newspapers.O
Turning to the New Jersey case of Ex parte Connellan,": it appears
that a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality is given a different
effect. By this decision the court in habeas corpus proceedings ordered
the release of a man who had been imprisoned upon a conviction under
the New Jersey "Gangster Act"' 2 which after his conviction but prior
to the filing of the petition for habeas corpus had been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States.' 3 On the basis of
New Jersey precedents' 4 the prisoner was held to be "illegally restrained
of his liberty." A line of cases arising under the same circumstances had
already been decided by the New Jersey court, Ex parte Rose' 5 being
the first decision. There the court had held that habeas corpus was the
only remedy open to the petitioner Rose, inasmuch as time for appeal
had passed.' 6 The further reasoning was advanced that since the statute
had been declared unconstitutional there was no jurisdiction in the
trial court, so that the proceedings in that court were wholly void.
In only one other jurisdiction have cases been found presenting the
7
exact problem of the Connellan case. Ex parte SafarikU
is the principal
10A similar ruling was made in a California case, Los Angeles County v. Seaboard
Security Corp. of America, 139 Cal. App. 497, 34 .-(2d) 191 (1934), where it was held
that if no appeal has been taken from a judgment, and it has been satisfied by payment, it stands impregnable and will prevent any action to change it, though the
statute under which it was decided has subsequently been declared unconstitutional.
And compare Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Anthony et al., 142 Kan. 670, 52 P. (2d) 12o8
(1935), in which the court said that a judgment rendered by a competent court of
record is res judicata when no appeal is taken therefrom, and cannot be set aside
or annulled by subsequent acts of the legislature even on the theory of an emergency.
U123 N. J. L. 229, 8 A. (2d) 345 (1939).
12
New Jersey Stat. Ann., 2:136.
'Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S.451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L. ed. 888 (1939).
2
'In re Stanley Olbrys (mentioned in the Connellan case at 8 A. (2d) 345; no report found), and cases cited supra, note 15.
-1122 N. J. L. 507, 6 A. (2d) 388 (1939). This was followed by two other cases at
practically the same time, Ex parte Miller, 122 N. J. L. 511, 6 A. (2d) 389 (1939); Ex
parte Sterling, 122 N. J. L. 51o, 6 A. (2d) 390 (1939).
'rhis reasoning seems to come under one of the recognized exceptions to the
rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where there is adequate remedy
either by writ of error or appeal. This exception is generally stated broadly that, if
the judgment or order upon which the petitioner is imprisoned is for any reason
void and open to collateral attack; relief may be had by habeas corpus, although the
remedy by appeal is also available. See 29 C. J. 19-2o.
1725

Okla. Cr. 5o, 28 Pac.

1112 (1923).

This case was followed in Ex parte Scott,

25 Okla. Cr. 28, 219 Pac. 158 (1923); Ex parte Wade, 25 Okla. Cr. 29, 219 Pac. 159
(1923); Ex parte Heintz, 25 Okla. Cr. 11,6, 219 Pac. 16o (1923); Ex parte Spence, 25
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case of such a group of Oklahoma decisions arising in 1923. Safarik
was convicted under a law which made it a felony to have in one's possession equipment for making whiskey,' 8 and was sentenced to one year
in prison. When contested later by another party, the law was held unconstitutional, and the prisoner Safarik filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to obtain his release. The court granted the writ saying
he was "illegally restrained of his liberty"'19 and was entitled to be discharged.
It is believed that the federal courts have not yet acted on this type
of case. Habeas corpus is only allowed in these courts to test jurisdictional errors, not those of procedure, 2° and it is not clear which classification would include such questions as are raised in the Connellan
case. However, in the case of Ex parte Baer,2 ' a federal district court,
in habeas corpus proceedings, ordered the release of a prisoner who
had been convicted in a judicial proceeding held pursuant to a Kentucky statute22 which entitled the judge trying the case to a portion of
the fine imposed. Subsequently, a closely similar Ohio statute was dedared unconstitutional on due process grounds by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Tumey v. Ohio.23 At the hearing in the Baer
case the Commonwealth admitted the invalidity of the Kentucky statute on the authority of the Tumey case, but argued that since the petitioner had challenged the statute by which the judge was given power
to try him he had waived his right to rely on the invalidity of the law.
The court decided that the petitioner was being held in custody without due process of law, and was entitled to his discharge. Any conclusion
that the petitioner had waived his constitutional right to a trial according him due process of law, simply by failure to assert the right at
Okla. Cr. 283, 220 Pac. 479 (1923); Ex parte Lockhart, 25 Okla. Cr. 429, 221 Pac.
119 18
(1923).

Chapter 1, Session Laws of Oklahoma, 1923.

1925 Okla. Cr. 50, 218 Pac. 1112 (1923).

2'Dbbie, Habeas Corpus in Federal Courts (1927) 13 Va. L. Rev. 433, 435: "The
writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts tests solely the jurisdiction or power of
the custodian to hold the petitioner in custody; it cannot be used as a writ of error
to correct mere errors of procedure which are not jurisdictional." In Beard v. Sanford, 8 U. S. L. Week 503 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1940), the court refused a writ of habeas
corpus to a petitioner who had been convicted with evidence obtained by wire tapping, despite the fact that subsequent to the petitioner's conviction this practice had
been held unlawful by the Supreme Court of the United States in Nardone v. United
States, 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939), and Weiss v. United States, 60 S. Ct. 269 (1939).
222o F. (2d) 912 (E. D. Ky. 1927). This case is critized in (1938) 14 Va. L. Rev. 483,

as being unsound in principle and against the weight of authority.
SKy. Code (Carroll, 1922 and Supp. 1924) §§ 2554a 41, 1731, 1721,
2273 U. S.510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. ed. 749 (1927).
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the invalid proceedings was branded "arbitrary." It will be noticed
that in this case the petitioner himself first raised the question of the
constitutionality of the law, while in the Connellan case the law had
already been held unconstitutional as a result of an attack by another
party. But the difference is not great, for in the Baer case a similar Ohio
law had been struck down by the United States Supreme Court, leading the Attorney General representing the Commonwealth to admit
the invalidity of the law.
In spite of the apparent conflict in the conclusions in the civil and
criminal cases as to the validity of a prior adjudication based on a
statute which is subsequently held unconstitutional, it is believed that
there are sufficient reasons of policy to sustain each of these ostensibly
inconsistent holdings.
In civil cases it has long been the rule that uniformity of decisions
should be maintained and that uncertainty should be avoided whenever possible. The courts and general public feel that there should be
stability in transactions that are carried out under the eyes of the
courts. To give a retrospective effect to the judicial determination of
invalidity inevitably will tend toward confusion and uncertainty in
the field of commercial enterprise. Such considerations, however, are
absent in the criminal cases, since ordinarily no person except the prisoner will be directly affected by the decision, and no influence will be
felt in the commercial world. No inconsistency is present, therefore, in
the position taken by the courts in criminal cases that proper protection for the liberty of the individual demands that retrospective effect
be given a determination of unconstitutionality. 24 G. MuRRAY Ssrm, JR.

INSURANCE-RECOVERY

UNDER

A

POLICY

CAUSED "SOLELY" BY ACCIDENTAL MEANS.

INSURING

AGAINST

DEATH

[Massachusetts]

In the recent Massachusetts case of Barnett v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Company, it appeared that the insured was injured in an
"In Ex parte Siebold, 1oo U. S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717 (1879), Mr. Justice Bradley said
at page 377, "But personal liberty is of so great moment in the eye of the law that
the judgment of an inferior court affecting it is not deemed so condusive but that
...
the question of the court's authority to try and imprison the party may be reviewed on habeas corpus by a superior court or judge having authority to award the
writ." In this case the plaintiff was convicted of violating the election laws and appealed. The court upheld the conviction saying that the election laws were valid,
but the Justice made the above statement in his opinion, by way of dictum.
124

N. E. (2d) 662 (Mass. 1939).
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automobile accident, and after being confined in the hospital for nine
days was released and went about his business. Two weeks later he became ill with pneumonia, which developed into empyema, causing his
death within two months. His insurance policy contained a clause
which provided that double indemnity would be paid the beneficiary
if the death of insured should be caused "... solely by external, violent
and accidental means ....

independently and exclusive of all other

causes." The Massachusetts court held that double indemnity should
be awarded saying that if the germs were already in his system and his
body was so weakened as a result of the accident that the germs were
enabled to develop into pneumonia, then the jury was warranted in
finding that the death of the insured was "caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means ... independently and exclusively of all
other causes." The court stated further that even if the germs entered
the body after the accident, and, because of the accident's having weakened his resistance, developed into pneumonia the jury would be war2
ranted in reaching the same conclusion as to the cause of the death.
Judging from cases in which the courts have dealt with the problem
of causation, the court in the instant case could readily have regarded
the automobile accident as the "proximate" cause of the death.s However, the provision of the policy, mentioned above, does not employ the
term "proximate" but provides for the payment of double indemnity
only where the accident is the sole cause of the death. Provisions such
as this are obviously inserted by the insurance companies for the purpose of preventing payment of double indemnity in cases where disease, or bodily or mental infirmity concur with the accident to cause
death, or in any way contribute to the death.4 Yet the courts have ig2
This statement seems to repudiate an implication of the case of Larson v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 212. Mass. 262, 98 N. E. lO48 (1912) in which the court said, in
speaking of germs entering the body after an accident: "If, however, her tuberculosis
came from germs introduced into her system after she had sustained these injuries,
or by the operation of some other subsequent and independent cause, then, even
though the disease would not have developed and manifested itself but for her physical condition having been weakened and her power of resistance diminished by
those injuries, it well may be that she could recover no damages for that sickness
and i consequences." 98 N. E. 1o48, 1o5o. It should be noticed that the Larson case
involved not an insurance claim, but an action for damages for negligent injuries,
and that the quoted portion of the opinion is dictum. But the language of the
Massachusetts court in the instant case would seem to indicate that the dictum of the
Larson case would not be followed by that court in such a situation.
3
Kliebenstein v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 193 Iowa 892, 188 N. W. 129 (1922); Watson
v. Rhinderknecht, 82 Minn. 235, 84 N. W. 798 (19o); Hoseth v. Preston Mill Co.,
49 Wash. 682, 96 Pac. 423 (0go8). See Restatement, Torts (1934) § 458.
'Barnett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 24 N. E. (2d) 662, 663 (Mass. 1939).
The policy bound the company to pay double indemnity "Upon receipt of due proof
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nored these provisions and almost uniformly have awarded payment of
double indemnity in cases where the accident was merely the "proximate" cause of death. 5
This practice seems to have first crept into the law with the case of
North American Life &Accident Insurance Co. v. Burroughs.6 The policy provided that "death must be caused solely by such accidental injury. .. ." Here there was an accident followed by disease resulting in
death, and the court permitted the plaintiff to recover for the accidental
death. In its decision the only authority the court found necessary to cite
7
was the definition given the word "accident" in Webster's Dictionary.
The Burroughscase was relied upon in Freeman v. MercantileMutual
Accident Association,s which later decision was cited as controlling in
the principal case and in others to be mentioned in this discussion.
Further illustrative of this position is the case of Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Meldrim.9 Here the policy provided that double indemnity would be paid in cases where the accident was "the direct, independent and exclusive cause of death." The insured was lying in the
hospital with an open wound from a very recent appendicitis operation. He happened to slip from his pillow, the jar causing an embolus
to form in the wound, ultimately resulting in his death. The court
failed to take into account the appendicitis operation, the open wound,
and the weakened condition of the body, but blandly said that the accident of slipping from the pillow was the sole cause of the death, "independent, and exclusive of all other causes."' 1
of the death of the insured . . . caused solely by external, violent and accidental
means, of which there is a visible wound or contusion on the exterior of the body
(except in case of drowning or of internal injuries revealed by an autopsy), and that
such death occurred .. . as a direct result thereof, independently and exclusive of
all other causes, . . . and provided further that the death of the Insured was not
caused directly or indirectly by disease or bodily or mental infirmity ....
rHanna v. Interstate Business Men's Ass'n, 41 Cal. App. 3o8, 182 Pac. 771 (1919);
Atlanta Accident Ass'n v. Alexander, 104 Ga. 709, 3o S. E. 939 (1898), 42 L. R. A.
188 (1899); Robinson v. National Ins. Co., 76 Ind. App. 161, 129 N. E. 707 (19i");
Freeman v. Mercantile Mutual Accident Ass'n, 156 Mass. 351, 3o N. E. 1o3, 17 L.
R. A. 753 (1892); Hickey v. Minister's Casualty Union, 133 Minn. 215, 158 N. W. 45
(1916); Schwindermann v. Great Eastern Casualty Co., 38 N. D. 584, 165 N. W. 982
(1917); U. S. Casualty Co. v. Thrush, 21 Ohio App. 129, 152 N. E. 796 (1926).
069 Pa. St. 43 (1871).
769 Pa. St. 43, 51 (1871): "An accident is 'an event which takes place without one's
foresight or expectation; an event which proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an
unusual effect of a known cause ,and therefore not expected; chance; casualty; contingency'."
'156 Mass. 351, 30 N. E. 1oi3, 17 L. R. A. 753 (1892).
924 Ga. App. 487, 101 S. E. 305 (1919).
31 The following cases involved similar facts and policies: Manufacturers' Acc.
Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan, 58 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893), 22 L. R. A. 620 (1894);
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An even more surprising result was reached in Travelers' Insurance
Co. v. Melick. 11 The insured accidentally injured his foot, and gangrene
and tetanus set in. From time to time he suffered tetanic spasms causing excrutiating pain. While he was suffering from such a spasm, the
attendant momentarily left him, and upon returning found the insured
with a knife in his hands and his throat and jugular vein cut. But the
judge instructed the jury that they could find that the accident was the
"proximate" cause of the death and award recovery for the plaintiff, in
spite of the fact that the policy stated that double indemnity should be
awarded only in case death arose, "through external, violent and accidental means alone... independently of all other means."
It is worthy of note that in situations in which the disease already
existed when the accident occurred, and the effects of both contributed
to cause death, the courts have reached a different conclusion and denied recovery. 12 Such a case was that of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Morrow.13 Here the insured, who had diabetes, accidentally injured his
toe; gangrene set in, and when he was operated upon he died. The
court denied recovery saying that the accident was not the "sole and
exclusive cause of the death." And in a similar case the court said that
"The death in such a case would not be the result of accident alone, but
it would be caused partly by the disease and partly by the accident, and
4
the contract exempted the association from liability therefor."'
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Blum, 27o Fed. 946 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1921); Dewey v.
Abraham Lincoln Life Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 1220, 257 N. W. 3o8 (1934); Collins v.
Casualty Co. of America, 224 Mass. 327, 112 N. E. 634, L. R. A. 1 9 1 6E, 1203 (1916).
Another case differing from the instant decision only in the phraseology of the
policy is Sheehan v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 6 N. E. (2d) 777 (Mass. 1937), in which
an accident was followed by pneumonia resulting in the death of the insured. Here
again the court ignored the fact that the parties had expressly contracted against
payment of double indemnity in situations where death should be "caused wholly or
partly, directly or indirectly by infirmity or disease," and awarded double indemnity
even though it seems highly probable that the pneumonia must have played some
part in causing the death.
n65 Fed. 178 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894), 27 L. R. A. 629 (1895).
uNational Masonic Acc. Ass'n v. Shryock, 73 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896); Commercial Travelers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Fulton, 79 Fed. 423 (C. C. A. 2d, 1879); Hubbard v..Mutual Acc. Ass'n, 98 Fed. 930 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1879); Stanton v. Travelers'
Ins. Co., 83 Conn. 780, 78 Ad. 317 (1910), 34 L. R. A (N S.)445 (1911); Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Weir, 24 Ohio App. 5, 156 N. E. 921 (1927); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dorney,
68 Ohio St. 151, 67 N. E. 254 (19o3).
23213 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1914), 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213.
"National Masonic Acc. Ass'n v. Shryock, 73 Fed. 774, 776 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896).
That the authorities are by no means unanimous even on this proposition is illustrated by the holdings in the following cases: Scanlan v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 93 F. (ad) 942 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1937); Fetter v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 174 Mo. 256,
73 S.W. 592, 61 L. R. A. 459, 97 Am. St. Rep. 56o (19o3).
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It seems highly questionable whether there is any material difference between the two situations. In the one, the disease or bodily infirmity existed before the accident; in the other it arose after the accident. In neither situation was the disease or the accident the sole and
exclusive cause of the death, for in both situations each aggravated the
effects of the other.
It is difficult to see how the parties could have entered into contracts
which would more specifically set out the obligations of the various insurance companies. There is nothing ambiguous about the phrases,
"solely and exclusively" and "independent of all other causes." Yet the
courts have refused to adopt the ordinary meaning of these words when
so used in insurance policies. The reason for such interpretations may
be that when the average man purchases such accident policies as discussed here, he is unaware of the exact wording of the contract, and the
salesman usually does not bother to explain it to him. All the purchaser
knows is that he has bought an insurance policy which will pay him
double indemnity in case he dies as a result of an accident. But merely
because the layman is unaware of the difference between "sole" and
"proximate" cause, the courts should not in effect make a different
contract between the parties. If the insurer has in any manner acted
fraudulently, a different case would be presented, but no such theory
is relied upon by the courts in the cases under discussion. It may be
that as a matter of social policy, the public should be afforded protection against its own lack of business acumen, and the insurance companies should be prevented from limiting the extent of their liability on
policies by inserting phrases not understood or noticed by persons taking insurance. But since the legislative departments of the state governments have widely assumed the power to regulate the insurance business as it affects the public interest, it seems that the needed aid should
be extended to the insuring public by means of direct regulatory statutes adopted by the legislatures, and not by strained constructions of
contracts by the courts. In any event, this purported protection will be
indirectly neutralized by the necessary raising of insurance rates by
the companies to cover the increased risk. The net result will still involve an improved situation, however, since both the companies and
those insured will be certain of the extent of the coverage accorded by
the policies.
STANFoR ScHEwr.
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INSURANCE-WHETHER A TRAILER IS A "BUILDING" WITHIN THE TERMS
OF AN ACCIDENT POLICY. [Federal]

In Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Aird,1 the plaintiffs sued as
beneficiaries on an accident 2 policy containing a clause providing for
double indemnity in case of injuries sustained by the insured by the
'burning of a building... if the insured is therein at the time of the
... commencement of the fire." At the time of his death, the insured
w;s on the lease engaged in drilling oil wells, and was using as a combined office and dwelling a trailer which had been raised off its wheels
and placed on supporting jacks. In this condition, the trailer was destroyed by a fire, in which the insured was burned to death. The insurance company defended against paying double indemnity on the ground
that "the trailer was not and could not be 'a building' within the policy
terms." 3 The district court ruled that the trailer so situated was such a
building, and submitted to the jury the single question of whether the
death was caused by the burning of the trailer, the jury finding for the
plaintiffs. 4 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the
holding of the district court on the nature of the trailer as a building
within the meaning of the policy was affirmed. 5 Judge Hutcheson,
though writing the opinion for a unanimous court, went further in his
characterization of a trailer as a building than his colleagues were willing to follow. In his opinion he stated that "the trailer's mobility is of
small significance in determining whether, within the policy terms, it
is 'a building' "; for the dominant consideration lay in the fact that the
trailer was built for use as a dwelling house, and this purpose persisted
whether the trailer was fixed on jacks or was running on its wheels.6
1io8 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 5 th,. 1939).
'In the courts' opinions the policy is referred to sometimes as a life policy and
sometimes as an accident policy. The different terminology is immaterial to this
discussion.
'The Insurance Company also defended on the ground that the insured's death
was caused by a gasoline explosion which preceded the fire, rather than by the burning of the trailer. The jury decided that death resulted from the burning, and this
conclusion was accepted by the trial and appellate courts.
'Aird v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 141 (W. D. Tex. 1939).
"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, 1o8 F. (2d) 186 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
'Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, io8 F. (2d) 136, 138 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939): "What is
dominant here, as to .the trailer, is the purpose for which it was built and used, and
to which it is primarily adapted. That purpose, to be used as a shelter and habitation for deceased, in short, a dwelling house, stands out in and dominates the case.
A dwelling house, constructed so as to be .easily movable, at times, tuning or standing on its wheels, at times, sitting fixedly on jacks or other rigid support, it is still
at all times a dwelling house."
Judge Hutcheson seems to use the term "building" and "dwelling house" sy-
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The district judge had expressly declared that a trailer when attached
to an automobile and moving along the highway "could not by any
stretch of the imagination be conceived to be a building,"r and the two
circuit judges concurring in the result reached by Judge Hutcheson
specifically limited their holding to "this trailer, circumstanced as it
was at the time of the fire." s
Despite the fact that courts have occasionally purported to set up
a general definition capable of covering the meaning of the word
"building," 9 an examination of numerous case holdings makes it dear
that the term is given widely varying significance by the courts when
different issues are involved. Each decision is likely to furnish its own
conclusion as to the import of the word, and a determination in one
case that a certain structure is a "building," may be given no weight as
precedent for the question arising in a different type of case.' 0 Nor do
the courts necessarily tend to adopt popular conceptions or the layman's understanding of the scope of the term.- Thus a fence to be put
around a courthouse was held to be a "building" within the provisions
of a statute requiring certain procedure for the letting of contracts for
the construction of "public buildings"; 12 and the English chancery
court decided that a trelliswork screen erected by the tenant on the
leasehold was a "building," the erection of which violated a covenant
in the lease whereby the tenant promised not to construct any "building" without the consent of the landlord.' 3
Although the fact that a structure is fixed to the land and not
nonymously; but for the purpose of the principal case this usage would have no
significance.
7
Aird v. Aetna Life Ins. CO., 27 F. Supp. 141, 143 (W. D. Tex. 1939).
8
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, io8 F. (2d) 136, 138 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
OGreat Eastern Casualty Co. v. Blackwelder, 21 Ga. App. 586, 94 S. E. 843 (1918);
Rouse v. Catskill and N. Y. Steamboat Company, 59 Hun 80, 13 N. Y. Supp. 126
(i8g1), af'd, adopting lower court opinion, 133 N. Y. 679, 31 N. E. 623 (1892); State
v. Lintner, i9 S. D. 447, 104 N. W. 205 (1905).
"In the principal case the concurring judges, Sibley and Holmes, denied that the
burglary cases cited by Judge Hutcheson were in point in regard to the meaning of
an accident policy. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, xo8 F. (2d) 136, 138 (C. C. A. 5 th,
1939).
2Courts sometimes adopt the interpretation of the word "building" as used by
the layman when such interpretation will strengthen their argument toward the desired result. See Rouse v. Catskill and N. Y. Steamboat Company, 59 Hun 8o, 13 N. Y.
Supp. 126 (1891).
2Swasey v. Shasta County, 141 Cal. 392, 74 Pac. 1031 (1903).
"Wood v. Cooper, [1894] 3 Ch. 671. Another English case held that the side guardwall of a bridge constituted a "building" for purposes of a statute making owners of
abutting buildings liable for contributions to the cost of paving the streets. Arnell v.
London and North Western Ry. Co., 12 C. B. 697, 138 Eng. Rep. 1077 (1852).
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capable of being easily adapted for movability aids in identifying it as
a "building," the conclusion does not follow that movable objects can
not be held to fall within the same classification. In cases arising under
the common law or under criminal statutes defining burglary as "breaking and entering a building. . .", a sheep wagon used as habitation by
sheepherders on the range was held to be a "building,"' 4 and a popcorn and peanut vendor's wagon was given the same standing.' 5 Similarly the New Jersey court held a movable lunch wagon to be a "building" within the meaning of a fire ordinance requiring inspection of
buildings by city officials. 1 6 Freight cars have been denominated
"buildings" in cases arising under burglary' 7 and arson s statutes. But
as against these decisions, one court ruled that a box car is not a "building" such as to satisfy the clause in a deed that the grantee-railway
should erect a building for a depot on the land conveyed. 19 A floating
wharf for receiving, storing, and forwarding goods in river traffic was
found to be subject to a merchanics' lien under a statute allowing such
liens to be filed against "buildings." 20 In Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v.
Warfield,21 the Arkansas court, construing an insurance policy provision
closely similar to the one involved in the principal case, held that the
insured was entitled to recover for injuries suffered in a fire which
burned a "quarter boat" in which insured and other workmen lived
while employed by the government on a river improvement project.
Despite the apparent readiness of the courts to find that objects
adapted to movability are "buildings," a Maryland decision held that
the term "building" could not be appropriately applied to a schoolhouse which was constructed so as to rest directly on the ground without any foundation, and which, though it had on occasion been moved
from place to place within the city, could only be moved by being
taken to pieces and transported section by section to the new location,
22
to be reassembled there.
"State v. Ebel,

92 Mont. 413, 15 P. (2d) 233 (1932).
5People v. Burley, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 213, 79 P. (2d) 148 (1938).
'GTownof Montclair v. Amend, 68 Ad. io67 (19o8), aff'd, 76 N. J. L. 625, 72 Ad.
360 (19o9).
2-State v. Anderson, 154 Iowa 701, 135 N. W. 405 (1912) (wheels and trucks of
car had been removed, and body rested on timbers on ground).
"8State v. Lintner, 19 S. D. 447, 1o4 N. W. 205 (195o).
"St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Berry, 86 Ark. Bo9, 11o S. W. 1o49 (19o8) (deed did not use
word "building"; it called for "depot" to be put on land, and court held "depot"
necessarily involves a "building").
"Olmsted v. McNall, 7 Blackf. 387 (Ind.1845).
2173 Ark. 287, 292 S. W. 129 (1927).
=Whiteley v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 113 Md. 541, 77 At. 882

(1910).
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Obviously, no simple rule of thumb generalization can be applied to
determine whether an object will be classified as a building or as a
non-building. But the apparent inconsistencies among decisions, and
the outwardly surprising rulings which sometimes appear can very
often be fully explained or justified by an examination of the individual cases, with regard to the particular end to be attained by holding
that a structure is or is not a building. Where the public purpose of a
statute or the private purpose of a contract can be served only by finding that a "building" does or does not exist, the courts will reach the
conclusion needed to effectuate that purpose-within the bounds of
rational determination, of course. Thus in the portable schoolhouse
case,23 the Maryland court was confronted with a statute which required
that before a city passed an ordinance for the opening of a new street,
it must file with certain officials a map showing the location of all
buildings which were so situated as to be disturbed by the opening of
the new street. In the instance in question, the map filed by the city had
not marked the position of the portable schoolhouse, though it was in
the route of the proposed street. The court was clearly correct in holding that the schoolhouse was not a building within the meaning of the
statute, inasmuch as the structure could readily be moved out of the
area without damage, and thus could not become the subject of a
claim against the city for compensation. On the other hand, the protection of the public against the theft and destruction of property requires that burglary and arson statutes be given broad application, and
thefts or burnings involving structures of doubtful classification should
be included within the penalties of the statutes. 24 Similarly the public
Whiteley v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 113 Md. 541, 77 At.
(1910).
t

882

" People v. Burley, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 213, 79 P. (2d) 148 (1938); State v. Anderson, 154 Iowa 701, 135 N. W. 405 (1912); State v. Sanders, 81 Kan. 836, io6 Pac. 1o29
(191o) (cave mostly below the surface of the ground but having a roof and a door
made of lumber was held to be a "building" within a statute making it a misdemeanor to injure or destroy the doors and windows of a building); State v. Ebel, 92
Mont. 413, 15 P. (2d) 233 (1932); State v. Lintner, 19 S.D. 447, 104 N. W. 205 (19o5).
But cf. Rouse v. Catskill and N. Y. Steamboat Company, 59 Hun 8o, 13 N. Y. Supp.
126 (x891), aff'd, adopting lower court opinion, 133 N. Y. 679, 31 N. E. 623 (1892), in
which a statute provided that any person allowing liquor to be sold in a "building"
of his ownership should be liable in damages to dependents of one who drinks liquor
in the building and whose subsequent death is caused by the resulting intoxication.
The court held that a river steamboat was not a building within this statute. If the
public needs such protection at all, that need would seem to extend to the selling of
intoxicants on steamboats as well as in saloons. But the court openly expressed its
disapproval of the statute and declared that its application should be strictly limited
and not extended beyond its "evident meaning."
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*interest in guarding against loss of life and property by the fire justified
the holding that the lunch wagon was a building within the terms of
the fire inspection ordinance.25 Further, the statute requiring a specific
procedure for the letting of contracts to construct public buildings presupposes that the protection of the public against the misusing of public funds by government officials demands such regulations. Since the
funds may be wrongly expended in building a fence around a courthouse as well as in building the courthouse itself, the court very properly held that such a fence was a building within the statute. 26 When
the argument was made to the Indiana court that the statute providing
for mechanics' liens on buildings could not be applied t6 floating
wharves, the answer was that "the statute, being remedial, should receive such a construction as most effectually to meet the beneficial end
in view, and to prevent a failure of the remedy." 27 And in order to
enable the workmen who had repaired the wharves to enforce payment
for their services, the wharves were held to be "buildings."
Where the term "building" as employed in a private contractual instrument is before the court for interpretation, the same considerations
are involved. Whether or not a certain structure is included in the reference must depend on which decision will carry out the purpose and
intention of the parties. Thus, when the landowner conveyed land to
a railway company with the stipulation in the deed that as part of the
consideration for the conveyance the railway should maintain a depot
on the land, it seems certain that the landowner was demanding something more substantial than a boxcar parked on a side track and available for storing freight. He contemplated a permanent structure for
the accommodation of passengers and freight, such as a railroad ordinarily erects at stopping places along the line.28 And the English landlord who desired to prevent his tenant from putting up buildings on
the leased property without permission, may well have been as anxious
to avoid having his premises defaced or his adjoining property injured
by the contruction of a trelliswork screen as by the raising of a stable
or woodshed. 29 In the insurance contract, the intention of the parties
is likewise controlling, with the courts here having available for use the
established rule that the terms of the policy are to be construed most
2 Town of Montclair v. Amend, 68 Atl. 1067 (igo8), aff'd, 76 N. J. L. 625, 72 Ad.
360 (i9o9)2Swasey v. Shasta County, 141 Cal. 392, 74 Pac. io3i (19o3).

2Olmsted v. McNall, 7 Blackf. 387, 388 (Ind. 1845).
2St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Berry, 86 Ark. 3o9, 11o S. W. 1049 (1908)"Wood v. Cooper, [1894] 3 Ch. 671.
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strongly against the insurer.30 Where the insured lived even temporarily
in the boat in which he was burned, it would seem that a court need
apply no particular favoritism to the insured to conclude that for the
purposes of this case the boat was a building within the terms of the
insurance contract. 31 It is no doubt true that the company did not intend to insure against all hazards to life and limb attendant on travelling
by boat. But unless the fire causing the injuries of insured was of such
a nature as to be likely to occur only in the case of boats as distinguished
from structures attached to land, the particular loss involved is not
outside the intended coverage of the policy. Similarly, in the principal
case when insured died in a fire which burned his trailer, his death was
caused by such a disaster as the parties must have contemplated-so
long as the occurrence of the fire was not peculiarly affected by the fact
32
that a trailer, rather than an immovable structure was involved.
When a trailer is attached to an automobile and moving along the
highway, persons riding in it are doubtlessly subjected to various kinds
of risk which insurance companies never intended to assume in writing
policies covering "death by the burning of a building." 33 If the trailer
is damaged in a manner characteristic of automobile accidents, and
burns as a result thereof, the insurer should not be held liable under
such policy terms. But if the burning was not materially influenced by
the character of the trailer as a travelling structure, imposing liability
on the insurer does not seem unreasonable, because only the type of risk
contemplated in the policy is involved. Thus, neither the restrictive
view of the concurring judges nor the expansive declarations of Judge
Hutcheson would seem to include a safe generalization. Whether a
trailer moving on the highway or stationed on a lot can furnish the
subject of "the burning of a building" within the terms of the policy,
should depend on whether the fire occurs in a manner and effect usual
in the case of the burning of immovable structures.
FORREST WAL.
Stroehmann v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 300 U. S. 435, 57 S. Ct. 6o7, 81 L.
ed. 732 (1937); Great Eastern Casualty Co. v. Blackwelder, 21 Ga. App. 586, 94 S- E.
843 (1918); Vance, Insurance (2d ed., 193o) § 179.
mInter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Warfield, 173 Ark. 287, 292 S. W. 129 (1927).
=Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, io8 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939). Of course, the
risk of being burned in a trailer is greater than the risk in a fireproof house, because
trailers are flimsy and often made of inflammable materials. But there seems no difference between the risk in a trailer and in an insubstantial wooden immovable
structure, which latter would be conceded to be a "building."
"'See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, 1o8 F. (2d) 136, 138 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939). Judges
Sibley and Holmes in the concurring opinion said: "While so used [a trailer rolling
down the highway] the risk of collapse and perhaps of fire would be very different."
Written in collaboration with the Editors.
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE-VALIDITY OF SALES TAx AS APPLIED TO COMMODITIES SHIPPED INTO STATE FROM ANOTHER STATE. [United States

Supreme Court]
The clause in the Federal Constitution providing that commerce
among the several states shall be regulated by Congress' has never been
interpreted as imposing an absolute prohibition on state action in this
field. And in order to insure the harmonious operation of powers reserved to the states with those conferred upon the national government,
it has been necessary for the courts to make a reconciliation of competing constitutional demands. It is evident that commerce between the
states must not be unduly hindered by state action, and that at the
same time power to lay taxes for the support of a state government
2
must not be too strictly curtailed.
A state-imposed tax which operates to regulate commerce between
the states to an extent that infringes the power conferred upon Congress clearly exceeds constitutional limitations.3 Any form of state tax-

ation the effect of which is to place interstate commerce at a competitive
disadvantage with intrastate commerce is an unconstitutional exercise
of taxing power 4 But the mere fact that a tax has an incidental and indirect effect is no cause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce
of their just share of state tax burdens. 5 There is no prohibition of nondiscriminatory taxation of the instrumentalities of interstate com2u. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, d. 3.
2Board of County Comm'rs, Jackson County, Kansas v. United States, 3o8 U. S.
343, 60 S. Ct. 285, 84 L. ed. 233 (1939); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331,
6o S. Ct. 273, 84 L. ed. 230 (1939); South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell, 303
U. S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510, 82 L. ed. 734 (1938); Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 S. Ct.
1091, 29 L. ed. 257 (1885); Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. ed. 382 (U. S. 1868).
3
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23 (U. S. 1824).
4J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L. ed. 1365 (1938)
(state tax on gross receipts derived from interstate sales); Fisher's Blend Station v.
State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 650, 56 S. Ct. 6o8, 8o L. ed. 956 (1936) (tax on gross receipts of radio broadcasting station); Crew-Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 215 U. S. 292,
38 S. Ct. 126, 62 L. ed. 295 (1917); Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 3o S. Ct.

190, 54 L. ed. 355 (1910) (license fee on percentage of entire capital stock); Galveston,
H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 28 S. Ct. 638, 52 L. ed. io31 (19o8) (privilege
tax on gross receipts from interstate transportation); Philadelphia 9- S. M. S. S. Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 7 S. Ct. 1118, 3o L. ed. 1200 (1887); Morgan v. Parham,
s6 Wall. 471, 21 L. ed. 3o3 (U. S. 1872) (state property tax on movable property em-

ployed in interstate commerce).
5
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 3o3 U. S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546, 82 L. ed.
823 (1938); American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, 39 S. Ct. 522, 63 L. ed. 1o84
(1919)-
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merce. 6 Property is taxable before its movement across a state boundary,7 and likewise after such movement has terminated.8
In the recent case of McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co.,9 the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of whether a New
York City sales tax violated the commerce clause. New York City, duly
authorized by the state legislature, placed a two per cent tax on purchases of tangible personal property. The respondent, a Pennsylvania
corporation, produced coal in its mines in that state and sold it to consumers and dealers (largely public utility and steamboat companies) in
New York City. The contracts of sale were made by the company
through its New York City sales office. The coal was generally moved
by rail from the mine to the Jersey City dock, and thence by barge to
the point of delivery at the purchasers' plants or steamships. Having
paid the sales tax, the respondent sought an order directing the comptroller to make a refund, contending that the tax was an infringement
upon interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, with three Justices dissenting, held the tax valid. As a basis for its position, the Court stated
that taxation of a local business, separate and distinct from transportation which was interstate commerce, was not forbidden merely because
it was induced or occasioned by such business. The coal upon transfer
of possession to the purchaser at the end of an interstate journey was
no longer in interstate commerce, and was subject to the sales tax because the transfer of possession was the taxable event, regardless of the
time and place of the passing of title. The Court agreed that a state
tax upon the operations of interstate commerce measured by gross receipts derived from such commerce was an infringement of the commerce clause, but it held that this tax was conditioned a local activity,
i. e., delivery of goods within the city, so that there was neither discrimination against nor obstruction of interstate commerce.
The respondent corporation, however, insisted that a distinction
be made between sales with no previous contract, transacted after passage into another state, and sales the contracts for which when made
OSouthern Ry. v. Watts, 26o U. S. 519, 43 S. Ct. 192, 67 L. ed. 395 (1923); Wells
Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165, 39 S. Ct. 62, 63 L. ed. i9o (1918).
7
Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1, 54 S. Ct. 34, 78 L. ed. 131 (1933); Bacon v.
Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 33 S. Ct. 299, 57 L. ed. 615 (1913); Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 57,
6 S. Ct. 475, 29 L. ed. 715 (1886).
'General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 28 S. Ct. 475, 52 L. ed. 754 (19o8); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 S. Ct. 365, 48 L. ed. 538 (1go4); Brown
v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 S. Ct. 1091, 29 L. ed. 257 (1885).
"6o S. Ct. 388, 84 L. ed. 343 (1940).
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contemplated transportation across a state line. It maintained that
sales of the latter class were protected by the commerce clause. In this
respect Banker Brothers v. Pennsylvania'o presented a problem somewhat similar to the present situation. In that case a local automobile
dealer sought to combat a one percent tax imposed upon sales of automobiles within the state. Its contention was that the tax was a violation
of the commerce clause, since the cars came from a manufacturer in
another state in response to the dealer's orders. But the court found the
taxable transaction wholly intrastate, there being no agency relationship between manufacturer and dealer in so far as the ultimate purchaser was concerned. Since title was transferred from manufacturer to
dealer, and from de'aler to purchaser, there were two sales. This case
then, cannot be considered as authority, technically, for the present
decision on this point, for it would make no difference whether the
shipment interstate came before or after the purchaser's orders. The
second sale was intrastate and taxable as such.
In Wiloil Corporationv. Pennsylvania"l the factual situation was
somewhat different and more closely analogous to the principal case.
An order for a shipment of oil was placed by a Pennsylvania customer
with a distributor having headquarters in Philadelphia. Pursuant to
this order, the distributor purchased oil in Delaware and had the shipment made directly to the customer. The Court in sustaining a sales
tax upon the transaction, held that interstate shipment was neither
contemplated nor required by the contract for sale, and since the orders
could have been filled from sources in Pennsylvania, it deemed the interstate transportation merely incidental. However, it is doubtful that
this case is absolute authority for the Court's refusal in the BerwindWhite case to make a distinction between sales contemplating and requiring interstate movement, and sales made after such shipment.
Closer to the principal case is GraybarElectric Co. v. Curry,'2 which
was decided upon the authority of the Banker Brothers and Wiloil
cases. Alabama purchasers ordered goods from a dealer in electrical
supplies who maintained a sales office and warehouse in that state. The
goods, were shipped directly from an out of state manufacturer to the
Alabama purchaser, the manufacturer billed the dealer, and the dealer
billed the purchaser. The dealer also maintained a warehouse in
Georgia, and orders which could not be filled from stock in the AlaS. Ct. 38, 56 L. ed. 168 (1911).
U. S. 169, 55 S. Ct. 358, 79 L. ed. 838 (1935).
S. Ct. 139, 84 L. ed. 97 (1939).

10222 U. S. 210, 32
294
226o
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bama warehouse were billed by direct shipment to the purchasers from
the Georgia warehouse. The first of these situations involved two sales
and, except that it necessitated but one delivery, was analogous to the
Banker Brothers case. The second situation was very close to the principal case, the goods being supplied from stock of the dealer warehoused
out of the state and requiring interstate delivery to reach the purchaser.
Contracts were presumably made prior to the shipment across a state
boundary and obviously contemplated such shipment, but the Court
sustained a sales tax in both situations. The sales were held to be local
transactions, the interstate character of the shipment was deemed to
be incidental, and the contracts for the sales were thought neither to
require nor contemplate transportation in interstate commerce.
The Berwind-White case differs from the second method of distribution in the Graybar case in that no coal was stored in New York so
that any fulfillment of orders necessitated an interstate shipment. Yet
the Court said "we have sustained the tax where the course of business
and agreement for sale plainly contemplated the shipment interstate in
fullfillment of the contract," 13 and cited the Wiloil and Graybar cases.
It is to be noted that in those cases, the Court specifically stated that
the contracts for the sales did not contemplate nor require interstate
shipment. Regardless of this inference to the contrary, the Court here
decided that commerce would be subjected to no greater burden
whether the contracts were solicited before or after the interstate ship4
ment.
It was further contended that the conclusion reached in the present
case would be inconsistent with those decisions which held invalid attempts to tax the occupation of soliciting orders for the purchase of
goods to be shipped into the taxing state. However, the Court stated
"McGoldrick v. Benwind-White Coal Mining Co., 60 S. Ct. 388, 397, 84 L. ed.

343 (1940).
"Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 3o6 U. S. 62, 59 S. Ct. 376, 83 L. ed. 488
(1939) (use tax made collectible by local agents of foreign corporation); Monamotor
Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 54 S. Ct. 575, 78 L. ed. 1141 (x934) (license fee on motor vehicle fuel); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17 , 5 4 S. Ct.
267, 78 L. ed. 622 (1934) (license tax on operators receiving and shipping cotton interstate); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 S. Ct. 631, 76 L. ed. 1232 (1932)
(gasoline storage tax); Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 33 S. Ct. 299, 57 L. ed. 615
(1913) (local tax on grain in private elevators prior to interstate shipment); General
Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 28 S. Ct. 475, 52 L. ed. 754 (1908) (inspection fee on
oil awaiting shipment to out of state destination); American Steel 8- Wire Co. v.
Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 S. Ct. 365 ,48 L. ed. 538 (19o4) (merchants tax on nonresident
manufacturing company making local distribution); Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6
S. Ct. 475, 29 L. ed. 715 (1886) (logs intended for transportation into another state).
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that such rule was narrowly limited to fixed-sum license taxes imposed
on the business mentioned. The taxes in those cases seem to have been
aimed at suppression of this business when brought into competition
with intrastate sales, and dearly should be declared invalid.
It was last argued that the tax was measured by gross receipts derived from interstate sales and thus reached for taxation commerce both
within and without the taxing state.15 The Court admitted that a "tax
upon the operation of interstate commerce measured either by its volume or the gross receipts from it"16 would infringe upon the commerce
clause for this very reason;17 but it held that this tax was upon a local
sale- "a local activity [,] delivery of goods within the taxing state upon
their purchase for consumption"' 8-there being no attempt to tax anything in Pennsylvania. The Court said:
"The effect of the tax, even though measured by the sales
price, as has been shown, neither discriminates against nor obstructs interstate commerce more than numerous other state
taxes which have repeatedly been sustained as involving no prohibited regulation of interstate commerce."'19
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in whose dissent Justices McReynolds and
Roberts concurred, felt that the delegation to Congress of power to
regulate commerce among the states had as its purpose the safeguarding
of a free national market and the prevention of erection of state trade
barriers. The case of Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District," established the doctrine that a state cannot tax interstate sales. The Court
there held invalid a tax imposed upon an agent soliciting orders for
subsequent delivery from an extrastate merchant. The actual decision
in the case was satisfactory, but its dictum seemingly stated too universal
1

Gwin, White SePrince v. Henneford, 3o5 U. S. 434, 59 S. Ct. 325, 83 L. ed. 272
(1939);
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L. ed. 1365 (1938).
16
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 60 S. Ct. 388, 398, 84 L. ed.
343 (194o).
17
j. D. Adams Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L. ed. 1365 (1938) held
invalid a gross income tax upon an Indiana corporation engaged in the manufacture
of goods a portion of which were sold outside the state. The tax was found to be not
upon the local privilege of maintaining a manufacturing business, but upon the
gross .receipts of interstate sales. Mr. Justice Stone pointed out, however, that the
tax would have been sustained "had it been conditioned upon the exercise of the
franchise or its privilege of manufacturing in the taxing state." McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 6o S. Ct. 388, 398, 84 L. ed. 343 (1940).
2$McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 6o S. Ct. 388, 398, 84 L. ed.
343 (x94o).
19McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 60 S. Ct. 388, 398, 84 L. ed.
343 (x94o)012o U. S. 489, 7 S. Ct. 592, 3o L. ed. 694 (1887).
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a rule in the declaration that "Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at
all, even though the same amount of the tax should be laid on domestic
commerce .... ,21 The Chief Justice did not go this far but stated a
general rule that state taxation of interstate commerce "either by laying the tax upon the business which constitutes such commerce or the
privilege of engaging in it, or upon the receipts, as such, derived from
it"22 would be beyond the limitations set by the Constitution.23 He
further thought it was a direct burden on interstate commerce since it
was imposed immediately upon the gross receipts of that commerce.
The minority argued for disallowance of the tax on still another
ground-the possibility that each state through which the commerce
passed might impose similar taxes with equal right. It contended that
Pennsylvania might tax the shipment of the coal just as New York has
taxed the delivery, and in that manner subject the interstate commerce
to a double burden. The majority held the delivery an event taxable
only in New York and in that way attempted to avoid the argument of
cumulative taxation. But the contention was not conclusively answered.
The Chief Justice considered the shipment, transshipment, and delivery all integral parts of an interstate sale and saw no reason why New
York should have more right to tax than Pennsylvania. It is but a matter of conjecture as to what the Court would do in the event that Pennsylvania attempted to tax the sales by virtue of the shipment within
that state. It might, as the majority hints here, invalidate such a tax in
the state of origin by holding the delivery the only taxable event of the
transaction. But the minority has raised a point which is not decided
24
here, and which, in the near future may arise for determination.
This decision has adopted the test of transfer of possession as the
point where interstate commerce ceases for purposes of a nondiscrim"Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497, 7 S. Ct. 592, 596,
go L. ed. 694 (1887).
2McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 6o S. Ct. 388, 400, 84 L. ed.
343 (1940).
23J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L. ed. 1365
(1938); Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 65o, 56 S Ct. 6oS, 8o L.
ed. 956 (1936).
2
Thomas Reed Powell suggests that Pennsylvania would hardly impose a tax
upon the shipment for such would be prejudicial to its own coal industry. For a
complete discussion of the case, see Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes-The
Berwind-White Case (194o) 53 Harv. L. Rev. gog.
It is also of interest to note McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
6o S. Ct. 670, 84 L. ed. 672 (194o) which sustained the New York City sales tax when
applied to sales within the city of fuel oil from storage tanks in New Jersey. The oil
was transported to New York piers and then sold and delivered to ships from foreign
countries.
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inatory sales tax. In effect, this is the adoption of the rule established in
the use tax cases which hold that once the goods come to rest a nondiscriminatory tax upon use or enjoyment may be levied on the users
to be collected by the seller. 25 Technically, interstate commerce may
now be said to end when there is a transfer of possession of the goods;
but practically it may be said that interstate sales are taxable (if the
sales tax is nondiscriminatory) since the consummation of every interstate sale must necessarily include "a coming to rest" at point of destination and an unloading or delivery of the physical object sold.
FRANK

C. BEDINGER,

JR.

PROCEDURE-WHETHER RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANY IS SUBJECT TO
JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF STATE IN WHICH BROADCAST Is HEARD
OVER LOCAL AFFILIATED STATION.

[Washington]

The Columbia Broadcasting Company, a New York corporation,
had leased the facilities of the Queen City Broadcasting Company, a
Washington State corporation, to retransmit programs originating in
Columbia's studios, and in studios of affiliated stations. These programs were furnished to the local station over program transmission
lines. In the course of a Columbia broadcast emanating from an affiliated station in St. Louis, and broadcast in Washington State through
the facilities of the Queen City station, statements allegedly defaming
the Waldo Hospital Association of Washington were made. The Hospital Association, in an action for damages for defamation, joined the
Columbia Broadcasting Company as defendant with the Queen City
Company. In an original application to the Supreme Court of Washington for a writ of prohibition,' Columbia questioned the power of
the State of Washington to subject it to the jurisdiction of its courts.
The Washington court held, in State ex rel. Columbia BroadcastingCo.
25Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 3o6 U. S. 62, 59 S. Ct. 376, 83 L. ed.
488 (1939); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524, 81 L. ed. 814
(1937); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 54 S. Ct. 575, 78 L. ed. 1141
(1934)'This device has been increasingly and effectively employed in preventing trial
courts from taking jurisdiction where none exists in fact, and has done much to reduce the unnecessary time and expense of litigating issues beyond the power of the
trial court to entertain. Jardine v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County,
213 Cal. 301, 2 P. (2d) 756 (1931), 79 A. L. R. 291 (1932); Westinghouse Electric and
Mfg. Co. v. Justices' Court of Corcoran Tp. in and for Kings County, 79 Cal. App.
413, 250 Pac. 1104 (1926); Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199
N. E. 628 (1936).
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v. Superior Court of King County,2 with one justice dissenting, that
Columbia was "doing business' 3 in Washington State to an extent sufficient to make it amenable to suit in the courts of that state, and that
service of process on the general manager of the Queen City Company
was good service of process on Columbia.
The complexity of the problem of a state's power over a nonresident
corporation doing business in the state is attested by a marked lack of
harmony in both state and federal decisions.4 No general rules are deducible from the decided cases and the courts seem content to decide
each case upon its own facts. 5 The novel character of an advertising
business carried on through the medium of radio, renders factual analogies both attenuated and unsatisfactory.
"The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power," 6 but when, in
the absence of express consent, does a state have this power over a nonresident corporation? In general, a state may exclude a foreign corporation from doing domestic business within the state,7 and it may impose
the condition precedent to its doing such business that it submit to service of process of the state courts.8 Further, a state may impose such
conditions even on corporations engaged in interstate commerce, so far
as acts done within the state are concerned. 9 Absent express consent,
three possible theories may be suggested as supplying the foundation of
the court's jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing business within
296 P. (2d) 248 (Wash. 1939). An appeal to the United States Supreme Court is
pending, 8 U. S. L. Week 493.
'As to the scope of the term "doing business," see: Restatement, Conflict of Laws
(1934) §§ 167-181; Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) §§ 88-93; note (1929) 6o A. L.
R. 994,'People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233, 6-L. ed. 587 (1918); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct.
944, 58 L. ed. 1479 (1914); Green v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51
L. ed. 916 (x9o7); Rishmiller v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 134 Minn. 261, 159 N.
W. 272 (1916); Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) §§ 88.2, 89.1; Fead. Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Corporations (1926) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 633.
1
St. Louis S. W. Ry. of Texas v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57 L. ed.
486 (1913); Hutchinson et al. v. Chase & Gilbert Inc. et al., 45 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A.
:d, 193o).
'McDonald v. Maybee, 243 U. S. 90, 91, 37 S. Ct. 343, 61 L. ed. 6o8 (1917).
TPaul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868); Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non Residents Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871.
8Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non Residents Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32
Harv. L. Rev. 871, 879-8o.
gInternational Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. ed.
1479 (1914); Beale, The Conflict of Laws § 82.2; Scott, Jurisdiction over Non Residents Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871, 878, 886-891.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

the state. 10 One theory is that of "implied consent," presumed from the
acts of the corporation in doing business in the state."' This concept
12
has been generally discarded in the more recent decisions as fictional.
13
Another theory is that of "presence", which still is widely adhered to,
but which would seem to be inapplicable to the principal case in the
light of Bank of America v. Whiting CentralNational Bank.14 A third
theory is that of "submission,"' 5 based on principles of justice which
require a corporation doing business within a state to submit to the
jurisdiction of its courts to the extent that its laws provide for the exercise of jurisdiction and are reasonable. 16 As indicated by Judge Learned
Hand 17 with reference to the "presence" doctrine, these theories do no
more than put the question to be answered. Each of them leaves unsolved the nebulous and elusive question of whether the foreign corporation is "doing business" within the state; and an affirmative answer to this query is essential to the application of any principle giving
jurisdiction to the courts of the state.
It is not the purpose of this discussion to attempt a general examination of the judicial scope of the term "doing business"; and no
"Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) §§ 89.5, 89.6, 89.7, 89.8; Scott Jurisdiction
over Non Residents Doing Business Within a State (19g) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 871.
"In Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65, 81, 2o L. ed. 354 (U. S. 1870), Mr. Justice Swayne said: "If it do business there, it will be presumed to have assented and
will be bound accordingly." Similar language is found in other cases. See, Robert
Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U. S. 213 , 42 S. Ct. 84, 66 L.
ed. 2o (1921); Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 2o4 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct.
236, 51 L. ed. 345 (9o7); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451
(U. S. 1855).
1In Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 293, 39 S. Ct. 97, 98, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919), Mr.
Justice Holmes said: "But the consent that is said to be applied in such cases is a
mere fiction, founded on the accepted doctrine that the States could exclude foreign
corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this obligation as a condition
to letting them in." See also, Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243
U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. ed. 61o (1917).
"Mr. Justice Brandeis has constantly said that if a corporation does business in
a state' it is present or found there. Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat. Bank,
261 U. S. 171, 43 S. Ct. 311, 67 L. ed. 594 (1923); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis
Brown Co., 26o U. S. 516, 43 S. Ct. 17o, 67 L. ed. 372 (1923); Philadelphia & Reading
Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 37 S. Ct. 280, 61 L. ed. 710 (1917).
14i61 U. S. 171, 173, 43 S. Ct. 311, 312, 67 L. ed. 594 (1923), Mr. Justice Brandeis
said: "The jurisdiction taken of foreign corporations, in the absence of statutory requirement of express consent, does not rest upon a fiction of constructive presence
like 'qui facit per alium facit per se.' It flows from the fact that the corporation itself does business in the state or district in such a manner and to such an extent that
its actual presence there is established."
"Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading C. & I. Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
18Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) § 89.8.
"7Hutchinson et al. v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc. et al., 45 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o).
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cases have been found which purport to apply to the specific business
of radio broadcasting such general principles as may be thought to be
available as guides in cases involving other types of enterprises. The
case of FishersBlend Station v. Tax Commission,'8 strongly relied on
by the majority in the principal case, holds no more than that radio
broadcasting is essentially interstate in character. 19 It does not reach
the conclusion of the majority that the broadcasting company is therefore present and carrying on business20 in those states in which the
broadcast is heard. In Hoffman v. Carter,21 when that case was first
before the Supreme Court of New Jersey, language was employed from
which a conclusion contrary to that of the principal case could be inferred.22 However, on a re-appeal 23 that court expressly reserved decision on the question of whether the delivery to radio receivers in New
Jersey, of programs transmitted by the Columbia Broadcasting Company in New York, could be considered in any sense to constitute the
doing of business in New Jersey. Many cases involving other businesses
are of but negative assistance, in that they merely hold that a particular activity does not constitute doing business, and do not attempt to
state what activities do amount to doing business.24 But it is apparent
U. S. 65o, 56 S. Ct. 6o8, 8o L. ed. 956 (1936).
21This point was made by Mr. Justice Robinson, dissenting in State ex rel. Columbia Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court for King County, 96 P. (2d) 248, 250
(Wash. 1939); and the holding of Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S.
65o, 56 S. Ct. 6o8, 8o L. ed. 956 (1936), would appear to be correctly confined to the
minority interpretation.
2°In Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U. S. 85, 53 S. Ct. 529, 77 L. ed.
1047 (1933) the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed the proposition laid
down in People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 87, 38 S. Ct.
233, 235, 62 L. ed. 587 (1918) that, "The general rule deducible from all our decisions
is that the business must be of such nature and character as to warrant the inference
that the corporation has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction ..
" Engaging in
interstate commerce, alone, would not necessarily meet the requirements of this rule,
and the inference of the majority in the principal case would seem to be erroneous
in this respect.
m117 N. J. L. 205, 187 Ad. 576 (1936).
2In
117 N. J. L. 205, 187 Ad. 576, 577, 578 (1936) the court emphasized the fact
that Columbia's acts were done in New York and that but for the independent acts
of the local station nothing would transpire in the state of New Jersey.
"Hoffman v. Carter, 8 N. J. L. 379, 192 Ad. 825 (1937).
"Activity of a subsidiary corporation is not enough to constitute "doing business"
in a state, Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333, 45 S. Ct.
25 o , 69 L. ed. 634 (1925); Peterson v. Chicago R. I. & P. Co., 205 U. S. 364, 27 S. Ct.
513, 51 L. ed. 841 (1907). Activity of an agent is not enough, Bank of America v.
Whitney Cent. Nat. Bank, 261 U. S. 171, 43 S. Ct. 311, 67 L. ed. 594 (1923). Sending
traveling show rooms around for advertising purposes is not enough, Larkin Co. v.
Commonwealth, 172 Ky. io6, 189 S. W. 3 (1916).
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that among the courts generally a practice or policy prevails whereby
a minimum of activity is held to afford a basis for finding that a corporation is doing business within a jurisdiction and thus is amenable
to service of process on its agents therein.2 5 However, the decisions are
progressively stricter in requiring more activity for a holding that jurisdiction exists for purposes of taxation and of regulation.2 6 This minimum requirement for purposes of service of process would appear to
be satisfied in the case of the Columbia Broadcasting Company, for although its programs emanated from an affiliated station outside of
Washington State, the essential ends and conceded objects of the advertising business were accomplished only when they were received in
homes all over the state. Advertising with Columbia is a business within
itself, as distinguished from mere solicitations that are incidental to a
business concern which is engaged in the actual selling and delivery of
its products. 2 7 Unlike these incidental solicitations, which are isolated

and occasional in their nature, the acts of the Columbia Broadcasting
Company are continuous. Regardless of the medium it chose, Columbia projected its advertising business into the State of Washington. It
should be answerable in the courts of Washington for wrongs arising
out of such business. Of the three possible theories of jurisdiction, it
would appear that the theory of "submission '2 8 may correctly be ap29
plied to hold Columbia subject to the jurisdiction of the state court.

But in service of process on a foreign corporation two elements are
necessary: 3 0 the transaction of business, and an agent through whom
the corporation can be reached. This agent must bear such a relation
to the corporation as to sustain the conclusion that he has power to
"International Harvester Company of America v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. ed. 1479 (1914) (a continuous course of business in
Kentucky, the solicitation of orders which were sent to another state and in response
to which the machines of the Harvester Company were delivered within the state,
was held to amount to "doing business" in Kentucky to the extent which authorized
service of process on its agents engaged in conducting the business; St. Louis S. W.
Ry. of Texas v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245 (1913) (where a railroad company establishes an office in a foreign district and its agents there attend to claims
presented for settlement, it is carrying on business to such an extent as to render it
amenable to process under the laws of that state); Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Busi-

ness

(1925) 25 Col. L.Rev. 18.
-Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business

(1925) 25 Col. L.Rev. ioi8.
"Larkin Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. io6, 189 S. W. 3 (1916), see supra note 24.
28Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) § 89.8.
"Smolik v. Philadelphia and Reading C. and I. Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S. D. N. Y.
1915).
"Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 Fed. 566 (E. D.
Ky. 1922); Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) §§ 88-93.
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receive such service. 3' In the principal case this relationship could have
been found, had there been in Washington State an agent duly con34
33
sented to,32 a public official either consented to, or not consented to,
35
or a "representative agent." The failure of either the Queen City
Broadcasting Company or-its manager to fall convincingly into any of
the four named categories, as shown by an examination of the contract,36 displays an inherent weakness in the decision of the principal
case. This difficulty of finding an agent on whom process may be
served points to the need for legislation providing-for statutory agents
for the service of process on foreign broadcasting corporations.
WILLIAM S. Bums

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-PERIOD OF LIMITATION APPLICABLE TO A Surr
ON A NEW PROMISE. [Virginia]

In 1938, the plaintiff instituted suit against the defendant to recover
the balance due on a sealed promise to pay a debt made in 1923, payable on demand. The defendant filed a plea of the Statute of Limitations, alleging that suit on the instrument was barred by the ten-year
limitation. Plaintiff then gave notice of his intention to rely upon the
debtor's unsealed promise in writing, made in 1930, to pay the instrument. The defendant fied another plea of the Statute of Limitations,
alleging that the claim sued on was barred five years after the date of
the new promise. The sole issue was whether the limitation of ten
aConn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43 L. ed.
569 (1899).
3Penn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S.Ct. 344,61 L. ed.
61o (1917).

"Penn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61
L. ed. 6io (1917).
3
2 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 23 S. Ct. 707,
47 L. ed. 987 (1903).
mCommercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 29 S. Ct. 445, 53 L. ed.
782 (109o); Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43

L. ed. 569 (1899).
"There is manfestly no question here of service upon a statutory agent, consented to or otherwise, since service was made pursuant to a Washington statute
(Rem. Rev. Stat. § 226), providing for service upon "any agent" of the corporation.
The contract between Columbia Broadcasting Company and the Queen City
Broadcasting Company provides only for a leasing of facilities and broadcasting time
for prescribed periods; and beyond a clause directing that Queen City shall obtain
as much publicity for Columbia as possible, it is authorized in no way to act for
Columbia, nor is it empowered in any respect to bind Columbia by its acts.
See, Restatement, Agency (1933) § 1.
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years upon the sealed instrument or that of five years upon the new
unsealed instrument, governed the period of limitation following the
new promise.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, faced with a case of first impression in the jurisdiction and thus proceeding without aid of local precedent, held in Ingram v. Harris' that the new promise merely revitalized
the old debt and did not create a new and substantive contract, and
that, therefore, the original ten-year period of limitation was applicable
to the new promise.
Though this result might be considered to be in accord with the
general rule announced by courts of other states, in order to evaluate
the decision accurately, it is necessary to refer to the statutes involved
and to the interpretation put upon them by the court. The Virginia
Code of 1849 provided that in the case of a new promise, an action
could be brought "within such number of years after the said promise,
as it might originally have been maintained within upon the award or
contract... ."2 It is clear down to this point, as the court stated, that
the period applicable to the original demand would govern the period
of limitation following the new promise. When the Code was revised
in 1887, however, the phraseology was changed to provide that an action could be brought on the new promise "within such number of
years after such promise, as it might be maintained under section
twenty-nine hundred and twenty,3 if such promise were the original
cause of action."14 The revisors of the Code of igig adopted this language without charge, 5 and the identical provision appears in the Code
of 1936. 6
The established rule of statutory construction is that the legislature
will be held not to have intended to change the effect of the existing
statute unless such intention clearly appears. 7 Applying this rule, the
15 S. E. (2d) 624 (Va. 1939)2Va. Code of 1849, p. 592, C. 149, § 7.
'Section 2920 of the Virginia Code of 1887, as revised in Va. Code Ann. (1919)
§ 581o, provides that action may be brought upon any contract by writing under seal
within ten years; if it be upon a contract not under seal, within five years. The same
provision appears in Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 581o.
'Va. Code of 1887, p. 701, c. 139, § 2922.
5Va. Code Ann. (1919) § 5812.
Wa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5812.
7Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, x61 Va. 833, 172 S. E. 282 (1934);
Parramore v. Taylor, 11 Gratt. 220 (1854). Black, Interpretation of Laws (2d ed. 1911)
594: "When statutes are codified, compiled, or collected and revised, a mere change
of phraseology should not be deemed to work a change in the law, unless there was
an evident intention, on the part of the legislature, to effect such change."
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majority of the court in the principal case was of the opinion that the
revisors in 1887 did not intend to change the meaning of the law but
merely to alter the phraseology. The provision "if such promise were
the original cause of action" was held by the majority to mean "if the
original cause of action had accrued at the date of such promise." However, if the Code of 1849 was perfectly clear, as the court itself stated, it
would seem a logical assumption that the change in the language of the
statute must have been made in order to alter the meaning. Otherwise,
there would have been no reason for adopting the new phraseclogy.
Surely the revisors would not substitute ambiguous terminology for
clear statement, yet intend the statute to retain its original meaning.
In the principal case, great weight seems to have been given to the address before the Virginia State Bar Association by Judge E. C. Burks,
one of the revisors of the Code of 1887. The court felt that since he
spoke of other changes in the Statutes of Limitations, he would have
made some reference to this particular section of the statute had the
revisors intended to make such an important change as that contended
for in this case. But Judge Burks stated that he would only refer to a
few of the more important changes, for otherwise his remarks would
assume the length of a book.8 It is entirely conceivable that he thought
this change was unimportant, and such an opinion is borne out by the
fact that this is the first case requiring a construction of the statute
since its enactment fifty-three years ago.
The insertion of the word new before the word promise in the section, "within such number of years after such [new] promise as it [the
action] might be maintained under section fifty-eight hundred and ten,
if such [new] promise were the original cause of action," as Mr. Justice
Hudgins pointed out in his dissent, 9 dearly shows that the intention
was to make the form of the new promise the determining factor in
fixing the new period of limitation. To say the least, if this interpretation had been adopted by the majority it would have done no undue
violence to the words of the statute. The better rule would seem to be
that the time should be extended by such a promise for the period allowed by law for the enforcement of simple contracts. 10
8(1891) 4 Va. St. Bar Ass'n Rep. ui5.
OSee Ingram v. Harris, 15 S. E. (2d) 624, 627 (Va. 1939).
201 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1936) § 185.
If the intention of the revisors of the Code of 1887 was that the form of the old
contract should govern the period of limitation of the new promise, it is submitted
that such intention could have been plainly shown by employing the following language: "If any person against whom the right shall have so accrued on an award,

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

As a general rule, in other states, if the acknowledgment or new
promise is made before the Statute of Limitations has run, the effect is
to set aside the operation of the statute up to the time of the acknowledgment or promise, and to start the statute running anew against the
original claim." But, when the acknowledgment or promise is made
after the bar of the statute has become complete, the period of limitation is governed by the form of the new promise. 12 Even in the latter
situation, however, there are numerous cases which apply the period of
limitation that governs the original demand.' 3 The general view proceeds upon the theory that if the acknowledgment is made before the
statute has run, it vitalizes the old debt, whereas if an acknowledgment
is made after the statute has run, it creates a new cause of action. All
authorities agree that the old debt or the moral obligation to pay, furnishes the consideration for the new promise.' 4 It is to be noted that in
or any such contract, shall, by writing signed by him or his agent, promise payment
of money on such award or contract, the -person to whom the right shall have so
accrued may maintain an action for the money so promised, within such number of
years after such promise as the originalcause of action might have been maintained
under section fifty-eight hundred and ten .... If the intention was that the form
of the new promise should govern the new period of limitation, the following language would be appropriate: "If any person against whom the right shall have so
accrued on an award, or any such contract, shall, by writing signed by him or his
agent, promise payment of money on such award or contract, the person to whom
the right shall have so accrued may maintain an action for the money so promised,
within such number of years after such promise as it might be maintained under
section fifty-eight hundred and ten, as if such new promise were an original cause
of action .. "
nDeshler v. Cabiness, 1o Ala. 959 (1847); Austin v.Bostwick, 9 Conn. 496, 25 Am.
Dec. 42 (1833); Rich v. Dupree, 14 Ga. 661 (1854); Van Patten v. Bredow, 75 Iowa
589, 39 N. W. 907 (1888); Russell v. Centers, 153 Ky. 469, 155 S. W. 1149 (1913);
Gilbert v. Collins, 124 Mass. 174 (1878); Mastin v. Branham, 86 Mo. 643 (1885);
Mason v. Rice, 18 Vt. 53 (1844). Contra: Gruenberg v. Buhring, 5 Utah 414, 16 Pac.
486 (1888) (limitation period governed by the new promise).
"Moore v. Diamond Dry Goods Co., 54 P. (2d) 553 (Ariz. 1936); McCormick v.
Brown, 36 Cal. i8o, 95 Am. Dec. 170 (1868); Coker v. Phillips, 89 Fla. 283, 103 So. 612
(1925);. Gilmore v. Green, 77 Ky. 772 (1879); Thornton's Adm'r v. Minton's Ex'r
250 Ky. 8o5, 64 S. W. (2d) 158 (1933); McNeill v. Simpson, 39 S. W. (2d) 835 (Tex.
1931); Canon v. Stanley, ioo S. W. (2d) 377 (Tex. 1936); Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah io8,
44 Pac. io36 (1896); Thisler v. Stephenson. 54 Wash. 6o5, 1o3 Pac. 987 (1909).
"St. John v. Garrow, 4 Port. 223, 29 Am. Dec. 280 (Ala. 1836); Dawson & Dawson
v. Godkifis, 28 Ga. 510 (1859); Sammons v. Nabers, 186 Ga. 161, 197 S.E. 284 (1938);
Bayliss v. Street, 51 Iowa 627, 2 N. W. 437 (1879); Sennott v. Homer & Hypes, 3o Ill
429 (1863).
"Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U. S. 251, 7 S. Ct. 1229, 3o L. ed. 1156 (1887); McCormick v. Brown, 36 Cal. 18o, 95 Am. Dec. 170 (1868); Pittman v. Elder, 76 Ga. 371
(1886); Spencer v. McCune, 73 Ind. App. 484, 126 N. E. 3o (192o); Spilde v. Johnson,
132 Iowa 484, 1o9 N. W. 1023 (19o6); Wilson v. Butt, 168 Va. 259, 19o S.E. 260 (1937).
Needham v. Matthewson, 81 Kan. 340, 1o5 Pac. 436 (19o9); Tolle v. Smith, 98 Ky.
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most jurisdictions, the statutes provide only that the new promise must
be in writing and signed by the party to be charged, but make no provision as to the period within which an action may be brought on the
new promise.1 5 It seems, therefore, that the courts have read into the
statutes the distinction between a promise made before and a promise
made after the bar of the statute has become complete. The decision in

the principal case would place the Virginia statute in line with the
general rule, so far as a promise made before the bar of the statute had
run is concerned. Since the case did not involve a promise made after
the bar of the statute was complete, and since the court expressed no
opinion with reference to that question, assurance is lacking as to the

court's probable holding when such a case comes before it for decision.
The Virginia statute makes no distinction between a promise made
before and one made after the running of the statute, and since it al-

lows suit on either the original demand or the new promise,16 recognition of such a distinction by the court would be unnecessary. Yet it is
difficult to see why the new period of limitation should be governed by
considerations of whether the statutory bar was already complete when

the new promise was made.' 7 Since the debt still exists in both instances, and only the remedy is gone where the bar is complete at the
time of making the new promise, it would seem that the debt should be
464, 33 S. W. 410 (1895) (no statute of limitation involved but there was a discharge
in bankruptcy; since debt was discharged, moral obligation held sufficient consideration for the new promise).
"'Atleast three states do make provision for the period of limitation which shall
be applicable following the new promise. See Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935)
c. 83, § 17; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) c. 60, § 312; W. Va. Code (1931) c.
55, Art. 2, § 8.
2'Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5812.
2It may be suggested that a practical basis for the different rules exists in considerations of the meritorious character of the defendant-debtor's conduct in the two
cases. Where the bar has not yet run completely, the debtor by his new promise does
not deprive himself of any existing defense, but merely postpones the time at which
his defense of limitations may accrue. Though this is beneficial to the creditor, it
may well be that the new promise is made with a view of aiding the debtor himself,
as perhaps by persuading the creditor to refrain from immediate suit to collect the
debt. On the other hand, where the bar has been completed before the new promise
is made, the debtor seems voluntarily to give up an already perfect defense, and give
the creditor a chance to enforce the obligation where without the promise there was
no such chance. Thus, in the latter case, the debtor is more deserving of having the
doubtful question of limitations determined in his favor. In most instances, the new
promise would be made with less formality than the original promise, and to give
the debtor his merited mercy would be to enforce the limitation period applicable
to obligations in the form of the new promise. Though the courts have reached this
result, none apparently has employed this type of reasoning.
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revived in both situations. But as previously stated the new period of
limitation should be governed by the form of the new promise. The
only thing that should turn upon the distinction is the matter of pleading-whether the plaintiff would sue upon the original claim or upon
the new promise.
RODERiCK D. COLEMAN

